☢ test - Í

comments during the telephone conversation. This was error. The substance of a telephone conversation is not admissible unless the caller can be identified and an identification is not sufficient if it rests solely on the contents of the conversation. Brown v. State, 266 Ga. 723, 725(3), 470 S.E.2d 652 (1996).” Bishop v. State, 241 Ga.App. 517, 526 S.E.2d 917 (December 15, 1999). In defendant’s child molestation prosecution, trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress recordings of telephone conversations between defendant and 13-year old victim, made by victim’s parents without consent of victim or defendant. “OCGA § 16-11-62 prohibits the interception or recording of a telephone call by any person who is not a party to the conversation. OCGA § 16-11-62(1), (4). This prohibition includes interceptions by family members. Kelley v. State, 233 Ga.App. 244, 248-249(2), 503 S.E.2d 881 (1998). ‘OCGA § 16-11-62 was intended to protect all persons from an invasion of privacy. Ransom [ v. Ransom, 253 Ga. 656, 324 S.E.2d 437 (1985) ].’ Id. at 249(2), 503 S.E.2d 881. However, OCGA § 16-11-66 provides two specific exceptions which allow such interception. [fn] OCGA § 16-11-66(a) reads as follows: ‘Nothing in Code Section 16-11-62 shall prohibit a person from intercepting a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Further, OCGA § 16-11-66(b) provides that the telephone conversations of a child under 18 years of age may be recorded and divulged if, upon written application by a private citizen, law enforcement agency, or prosecutor's office, a judge of a superior court and the child consent to such taping .” “Under OCGA § 16-11-67, ‘[n]o evidence obtained in a manner which violates [OCGA §§ 16-11-62 through 16-11-66.1] shall be admissible in any court of this state, except to prove violations of [such statutes].’ This creates a state statutory privacy right.” Trial court here erroneously found that the parents could give consent on behalf of the child. “[T]he specific limiting language of OCGA § 16-11-66(b) clearly provides that, when one party to a conversation is under the age of eighteen, the only person who can consent to an interception is a superior court judge, although the judge also must have the consent of the minor child.” Superseded in part by enactment of OCGA § 16-11-66(d), authorizing parents to monitor telephone and other electronic communications of children under 18 years; to disclose those communications to law enforcement where appropriate; and providing for the admissibility of recordings made by parents, as here. Accord, London (July 16, 2015), above. DDDDDD. TELEPHONES Drammeh v. State, 285 Ga.App. 545, 646 S.E.2d 742 (May 25, 2007). Conviction for attempted marijuana trafficking affirmed. Cell phones used to facilitate drug transaction were placed in evidence, and jury heard evidence that officers “had attempted to access the list of phone numbers that had been most recently dialed on the phone.” “ After deliberating for a period of time, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking if they were permitted to consider evidence they had ‘discovered’ on one of the phones. … Although no one knows with certainty what evidence the jury ‘discovered’ in the cell phones, the parties appear to assume that it involved the phones’ memory, about which trial counsel questioned [Officer] Toro. Notably, Drammeh challenges neither the relevancy nor the admissibility of the cell phone contents. He objects only to the fact that the jury considered contents found on the phones not specifically relied upon by the State at trial. He argues that permitting such consideration was tantamount to allowing the jury to conduct an independent investigation of the crime, thereby violating his constitutional rights to due process and a public trial, as well as the right to confront witnesses against him. He fails, however, to cite any legal authority to support this position. More importantly, Drammeh’s argument fails to acknowledge that the cell phones were placed into evidence without objection or stipulations limiting how the jury could use or view the phones. Indeed, Drammeh’s counsel questioned Toro about the contents of the phones generally and about the phones’ internal memory specifically, thereby making those contents an issue in the case. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to consider any contents of the phones did not constitute an abuse of discretion.” EEEEEE. VALUE See also SENTENCING – RESTITUTION – VALUE, below Harris v. State, 328 Ga.App. 852, 763 S.E.2d 133 (August 20, 2014). Theft by taking conviction affirmed, but evidence didn’t establish value of stolen car parts over $100 (to support felony sentence). “This case proceeded under former O.C.G.A. § 16–8–12(a)(5)(A), [FN: The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, deleted the clause ‘if the property which was the subject of the theft was a motor vehicle or was a motor vehicle part or component which exceeded $100 .00 in value. ’] which provided that a person shall be convicted of felony theft by taking if he unlawfully takes motor vehicle parts which exceed $100 in value.” “[W]itnesses observed five or six radiators in the back seat of Harris's car immediately after Harris exited the premises.” Victim testified that the radiators had an average value of $15 apiece. Defendant also admitted to stealing a battery, but no evidence established the value of a battery.