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evidence would support an inference that the value of the aluminum exceeded $500. See Moncus v. State, 229 Ga.App. 803, 804(1)(a), 495 S.E.2d 118 (1997); Ragsdale v. State, 170 Ga.App. at 450, 317 S.E.2d 288. Compare Pate v. State, 158 Ga.App. 395, 397(2), 280 S.E.2d 414 (1981) (holding that evidence of purchase price of railroad signs insufficient to place value on signs that were no longer new or useable).” FFFFFF. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE Seminal case: Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; some victim impact statements were improper, but “particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence and the nature of Martin’s crimes, that there is no reasonable probability that the objectionable portions of the testimony led to the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence.” 1. Improper for family member with no personal knowledge of the details of the crime to testify about them, even though the testimony “was supported by admissible evidence.” Also, “it was improper for this witness to address one of her statements directly to Martin.” 2. Eyewitness/victim, however, was properly allowed to testify to details of the crime, although “it was improper for Ms. Wright to characterize the defendant by referring to him as ‘a cold-hearted piece of waste of life with no soul,’ by giving a personal opinion about Martin’s state of mind by stating that he ‘made all those decisions that night,’ and by giving a personal characterization of Martin’s crimes by stating that he ‘declare[d] war’ on her family. 3. Some statements “were improper in that they strayed from the core of proper victim impact testimony and, instead, referred to the family’s desire for ‘justice,’ attempted to describe Martin’s motive by stating that he exercised ‘poor judgment and character,’ and described Martin as having given ‘no mercy’ to the victims.” Miller v. State, 296 Ga. 9, 764 S.E.2d 823 (October 20, 2014). Murder and firearms convictions affirmed; defendant failed to preserve objection to alleged victim impact evidence. “Miller … contends that the trial court erred when it admitted testimony that Williams was working two jobs to help support his family, with whom he had relocated to Atlanta in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. According to Miller, this testimony amounts to ‘victim impact’ evidence that was unfairly prejudicial. But at trial, Miller did not object to the testimony on the grounds that it was impermissible ‘victim impact’ evidence or unfairly prejudicial. Accordingly, Miller failed to preserve for appellate review the claim of error that he now urges. See Colon v. State, 275 Ga.App. 73, 75(2), 619 S.E.2d 773 (2005); Holmes v. State, 271 Ga.App. 122, 124–125(4), 608 S.E.2d 726 (2004); Shelton v. State, 251 Ga.App. 34, 38–39(4), 553 S.E.2d 358 (2001).” Humphrey v. Lewis, 291 Ga. 202, 728 S.E.2d 603 (June 18, 2012). Habeas court erred in granting relief as to defendant’s malice murder conviction; no prosecutorial misconduct in presenting evidence that incidentally touched on victim impact during guilt/innocence phase. “[N]ot all testimony that describes how the crime has affected the victim is impermissible in the guilt/innocence phase. ‘“[D]etails of context that allow [jurors] to understand what is being described” ... are not improper in the guilt/innocence phase when they are necessary to show something sufficiently relevant.’ (Citations omitted.) Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 643(2)(b) (555 S.E.2d 440) (2001).” Here, victim’s daughter was cross-examined on whether she had discussed the murder with her brother. On re-direct, prosecutor properly placed that testimony into context by having her testify that her contact with her brother and other family members had been limited because she was in a foster home. She also testified that it upset her to talk about her mother’s killing; that she felt bad about no longer having a mother; and that these things “affected her ability to talk with other people about that night.” Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed, but 1. sentence reversed based on improper victim impact testimony. “In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720) (1991), the United States Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440) (1987), which prohibited evidence and argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family at a capital sentencing trial. However, this Court has repeatedly noted that ‘ Payne left undisturbed Booth's holding that the state could not use information or testimony concerning “a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.”’ (Emphasis supplied.) Sermons v. State, 262 Ga. 286, 287(1) (417 S.E.2d 144) (1992) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2).” Family members’ testimony here was improper in several instances, giving witness’s improper hearsay characterizations of the crimes (“that the victims were ‘left under trash and branches, left to die,’ and that the crimes were ‘a senseless, selfish act of nothing but wickedness and evil’”) and defendant (“Bryrant ‘ha[d] proven that he cannot even be a good inmate’” and “had many chances”). “Obviously, these statements did not constitute the ‘glimpse into the life’ evidence describing the victim's life and the impact of her loss on her family and society that this Court has deemed appropriate. We cannot do otherwise than conclude that the constitutional limits on testimony concerning a witness's