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characterizations and opinions about the crime and the defendant were violated. While the family's grief and anger caused by the senseless murders in this case are understandable, and ‘there is no doubt that jurors generally are aware of these feelings, ... any decision to impose the death sentence must “be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” [Cit.]’ Booth, supra, 482 U.S. at 508(B), overruled in part by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. We cannot say that was the case here.” Carley dissents. 2. Slide show of photographs of victim properly admitted. “As this slide show presentation was made without narration except to describe the content of the pictures, which were of Richards alone and with family members at different stages of her life, we do not find that it was unduly inflammatory.” Accord, State v. Worsley , 293 Ga. 315, 745 S.E.2d 617 (July 1, 2013) (family members’ opinions about appropriate sentence for defendant inappropriate in capital sentencing phase). Lacey v. State, 288 Ga. 341, 703 S.E.2d 617 (November 8, 2010). Murder, armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no improper victim impact evidence when prosecutor explained in opening that victim was “‘going down the wrong road,’ sold and used drugs, was not always ethical, was ‘fatally cocky or naïve, or both, about the risks that came with his little hobby,’ and under different circumstances, might have ended up a criminal defendant. These (negative) characterizations of Cunningham were proper, as they were relevant to evidence later offered to explain the context in which these drug-related crimes occurred.” “We have recognized … that in death penalty cases, the State is not precluded from introducing evidence at the guilt phase of trial for some other proper purpose by virtue of the fact that the evidence also incidentally conveys a crime’s ‘victim impact consequences.’ Sermons v. State , 262 Ga. 286, 288(1), 417 S.E.2d 144 (1992). For example, some facts about the victims inevitably will be developed in the guilt phase to provide the jury with the context in which the relevant events occurred. Id. Incidental characterizations of a victim relevant to the facts of the crime are not improper. Butts v. State , 273 Ga. 760 (15), 546 S.E.2d 472 (2001). Although this is not a death penalty case, these same principles apply and guide our analysis here.” Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court erred in admission of victim impact evidence “concerning ‘“a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.”’ Sermons v. State, 262 Ga. 286, 287(1) (417 S.E.2d 144) (1992) (quoting Payne [ v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830, n.2 (111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720) (1991)]).” “For example, witnesses described the crimes as ‘this horrible act’ and described the victims' deaths as ‘brutal,’ which amounted to characterizations of the crimes, regardless of how accurate those characterizations obviously were.” Violations here were “minor,” however, and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Distinguished, Bryant (March 18, 2011), above (violations not minor; death sentence reversed). Keita v. State, 285 Ga. 767, 684 S.E.2d 233 (September 28, 2009). At defendant’s murder trial, no error in admitting cover of victim’s funeral pamphlet. “That cover contained a photograph of the victim in a suit and tie, the phrase “Home Going Celebration,” a cross, the name and address of the funeral home, and the name of the bishop conducting the service. The cover did not contain any information about the victim's membership or role in a church or any other information about the victim. The court reasoned that the State has a right to introduce a photograph of the victim and that the fact the victim had a funeral service was not ‘particularly prejudicial.’ The cover was admitted at trial through the victim's widow, who simply referred to it as part of a funeral pamphlet, without mention of any Christian references.” “The minimal Christian references around the photograph also were not unduly prejudicial. Accordingly, while it would have been preferable for the trial court to have admitted the photograph of the victim alone, without extraneous material that was unnecessary to aid in identifying him, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the document.” Distinguishing cases where victim impact evidence was admitted during guilt-innocence phase, Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774 (653 S.E.2d 439) (2007), and Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640 (555 S.E.2d 440) (2001). ‘In Walker, the trial court permitted the victim's wife, over objection, to testify in ‘the guilt/innocence phase about the victim's church membership and his being a deacon.’” “In Lucas, another death penalty case, evidence was introduced in the guilt- innocence phase that one victim was ‘“an A-B student”’ and made the ‘“All-Star team every year”’ and that the other victim was voted ‘“most likely to succeed by classmates.”’” Walker v State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (October 9, 2007). At sentencing phase of defendant’s capital murder trial, evidence of emotional impact of victim’s death upon his employee was admissible. “The victim impact statute allows testimony in the sentencing phase regarding ‘the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, or the community.” OCGA § 17-10-1.2. Although a trial court’s discretion in controlling victim impact testimony includes the power to limit the number of witnesses who are not family members and the extent of their testimony, we hold that testimony about the ‘emotional impact of the crime on ... the community ’ may include testimony by witnesses who are not family members regarding the impact the crime had on them personally. Id. (Emphasis supplied.). See Jones