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v. State, 267 Ga. 592(2)(b) (481 S.E.2d 821) (1997) (noting that this Court has granted trial courts ‘unusually broad discretion’ in governing victim impact evidence).” Tollette v. State, 280 Ga. 100, 621 S.E.2d 742 (November 7, 2005). Victim impact evidence “encompasses a silent videotape of the victim in life. We also find that the language in OCGA § 17-10-1.2(a)(1) providing that ‘[s]uch evidence shall ... be subject to cross-examination’ is satisfied where the person identifying a videotape of the victim is subject to cross-examination. Id.” Taylor v. State, 264 Ga.App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (December 1, 2003). Prosecutor was properly allowed to ask similar transaction victim how her life had been affected by defendant’s attack, where defense counsel opened the door by introducing the subject of “why she was reluctant to go through with a trial at the time of the crime and why she was able now to come and testify.” Prosecutor’s question to present victim about how her life had been affected by rape, and her response about nightmares and now dressing “more like a ‘boy’ so that her body would be ‘covered up’” were objectionable, but there is no “reasonable probability” they contributed to the jury’s verdict. Smith v. State , 244 Ga.App. 165, 534 S.E.2d 903 (May 24, 2000). Convictions for rape and related offenses affirmed ; trial court properly admitted evidence of that victim was a “basket case” following attack. “We have previously recognized that evidence of a purported rape victim's state of mind following the attack may corroborate her claim that she was raped. See Harvey v. State, 165 Ga.App. 7-8(1), 299 S.E.2d 61 (1983); Jones v. State, 159 Ga.App. 472, 283 S.E.2d 691 (1981).” Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 512 S.E.2d 896 (March 1, 1999). “OCGA § 17-10-1.2 on victim-impact evidence is not unconstitutional, and it is not an ex post facto law violation to apply this statute to a crime that was committed before the statute was enacted. Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 404-05(1)(c), (e), 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994).” GGGGGG. VIDEO RECORDINGS See subheadings FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS - PHOTOGRAPHS, RECORDINGS & VIDEOTAPES, and PHOTOGRAPHS, RECORDINGS AND VIDEOTAPES, both above HHHHHH. VIENNA CONVENTION Anaya-Plasencia v. State, 283 Ga.App. 728, 642 S.E.2d 401 (February 23, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress custodial statement based on alleged violation of Vienna Convention. “In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557) (June 28, 2006), the United States Supreme Court held that ‘even assuming the [Vienna] Convention creates judicially enforceable rights, ... suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36.’ id. at 2674. This is true particularly since ‘[t]he Convention does not prescribe specific remedies for violations of Article 36,’ Id. at 2678(II)(A), and in fact, Article 36 does not guarantee defendants any assistance at all, but rather ‘secures only a right of foreign nationals to have their consulate informed of their arrest or detention – not to have their consulate intervene.’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 2681(II)(A). Instead, ‘[a] foreign national detained on suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, enjoys under our system the protections of the Due Process Clause. Among other things, he is entitled to an attorney, and is protected against compelled self-incrimination.’ Id. at 2681- 2682(II)(A). Finding that ‘Article 36 adds little to these “legal options,”’ the Supreme Court concluded that it is unnecessary to apply the exclusionary rule for a violation of this provision of the Vienna Convention. Id. at 2682(II)(A). The Court nevertheless noted that ‘[a] defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his statements to police.’ Id. See also Ramirez, 279 Ga. 569, 575-576(7) (619 S.E.2d 668) (2005). Here, Anaya-Plasencia’s Article 36 claim was raised at the Jackson-Denno hearing and heard by the trial court as part of his broader challenge to the voluntariness of his statement. Signficantly, Anaya-Plasencia, who did not testify at the hearing and offered no other evidence, failed to show how the alleged Article 36 violation rendered his statement involuntary.” Suggests that Vienna Convention violation is thus admissible at trial for consideration as part of the “totality of circumstances,” even though not, in and of itself, a ground for suppression. Banegas v. State, 283 Ga.App. 346, 641 S.E.2d 593 (January 31, 2007). “Banegas contends that his right under the Vienna Convention on Consular Affairs to speak with the Honduran consulate was violated. According to Banegas, the arresting officer was required to inform him of this right, and his failure to do so warrants suppression. Banegas also argues that the trial court should have permitted him to cross-examine police about their failure to notify him of his right under the Vienna Convention, and should have instructed the jury about the rights of foreign nationals under the Vienna Convention. The same argument, however, was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court in Lopez v. State, in which they