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enforceable in court proceedings. Even assuming that a failure to inform a foreign suspect of his right to call the consulate violates the Vienna Convention, such a violation does not require the suppression of his statement. IIIIII. VOICE IDENTIFICATION See new OCGA § 24-9-901(b)(5). Hernandez-Garcia v. State, 322 Ga.App. 455, 745 S.E.2d 706 (June 27, 2013). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; no improper voice identification evidence was presented. State didn’t try to identify voices on recordings, but rather tied defendant to the conversations by showing that he was in possession of one of the cell phones. “Accordingly, because it did not rely on voice identification to establish Hernandez–Garcia's guilt, the State was not required to offer voice authentication testimony. Rather, for the recordings at issue to be admissible, the State only had to authenticate the recordings themselves, rather than any voices heard on the tapes.” Jones v. State, 318 Ga.App. 26, 733 S.E.2d 72 (October 12, 2012). Convictions for aggravated assault and participating in criminal street gang activity affirmed; trial court properly excluded testimony from defense witnesses. Defense sought to present prior inconsistent statements of victim from two witnesses who claimed to have spoken to victim on phone. Neither witness, however, had ever spoken to victim before and could not recognize her voice. Both witnesses spoke to someone identified as victim’s mother on phone, and asked to speak to victim. “After the investigator asked to speak with [victim] I.G., another female got on the line and provided a date of birth and mobile phone number that matched the records the investigator had concerning I.G. The investigator then testified that I.G. told her that she did not actually see who shot at the victims.” “[I]n both instances the evidence was insufficient to authenticate the identity of the person with whom the investigators spoke. Although the speaker allegedly identified herself as I.G. and verified her telephone number and date of birth, both investigators testified that they did not know I. G., had never spoken to her before, and would not recognize her voice. Thus, there was no evidence of voice recognition. Nor was there any evidence that I.G. later corroborated the telephone conversations. To the contrary, she denied ever speaking to either investigator. Given these circumstances, there was insufficient evidence to authenticate the actual identity of the speaker in either investigators' telephone conversation. [fn] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in precluding the investigators' testimony regarding their telephone conversations on the ground that such testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay.” “We note in passing that under OCGA § 24–9–901(b)(6)(A) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) of the new Georgia Evidence Code, telephone conversations may be authenticated ‘by evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by a telephone service provider to a particular person or business, if ... [i]n the case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called....’ See Ga. L.2011, p. 99, § 2/H.B. 24.” Crawford v. State, 318 Ga.App. 270, 732 S.E.2d 794 (October 1, 2012). Terroristic threats and arson convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted testimony from two witnesses about telephone conversation they overheard, although they weren’t familiar with defendant’s voice. Third witness/victim was able to identify defendant’s voice. “And a witness can testify to what was said by the caller in a phone conversation, even if the witness cannot himself identify the caller, where identity can be established through the competent testimony of a different witness. See Corsini v. State, 238 Ga.App. 383, 384(1) (519 S.E.2d 39) (1999) (witness could testify to threat made over the phone even though she could not identify the caller, where the victim testified that she recognized the defendant's voice before dropping the phone, which was then picked up by the witness who heard the threat).” Perry v. State, 314 Ga.App. 575, 724 S.E.2d 874 (March 5, 2012). Conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed; admission of officer’s testimony identifying defendant’s voice on recording was error, but harmless. “The lead agent testified that he was familiar enough with Perry's voice to recognize it, but he failed to disclose the basis for his purported familiarity. As such, the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation for the lead agent's voice identification testimony.” “‘Although voice identification testimony is generally considered to be direct evidence, Georgia courts have construed such testimony to be opinion evidence, which, of course, is inadmissible unless the witness discloses the basis for his opinion. We also note that a witness may identify a defendant by voice recognition even though his knowledge of the accused's voice was acquired after the event to which the witness testified. And the probative value to be accorded such evidence is a matter for the jury's determination.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. State, 222 Ga.App. 120, 120–121(2) (473 S.E.2d 251) (1996).” Officer’s testimony, however, “was merely cumulative of the informant's competent testimony identifying Perry as the individual who sold her the cocaine during the recorded operation.” Kimble v. State, 301 Ga.App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242 (November 20, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for