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using a communication facility in committing a felony; “[w]hile the State did not present testimony from [anyone] identifying [defendant’s] voice on the recordings” of phone calls in question, circumstantial evidence allowed jury to conclude that it was defendant. Number called was identified as defendant’s number; content of calls pointed to facts known about defendant; and voice in background of recording called defendant by name, “a verbal act connecting [defendant] with the phone number called. See Weems v. State, 295 Ga.App. 680, 683-684(4) (673 S.E.2d 50) (2009).” Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 369, 602 S.E.2d 834 (September 13, 2004). Although she didn’t see the assailant, victim testified that she recognized defendant’s voice in the next room of her house because “Brown had telephoned the [victim’s] home ‘numerous’ times to talk to [victim’s daughter] and had identified herself. [Victim] testified that Brown had a ‘distinctive voice,’ and ‘the minute I heard that, I knowed (sic) who that voice belonged to.’” Held, this evidence was properly admitted. “‘(A)lthough voice identification testimony is generally considered to be direct evidence (cits.), Georgia courts have construed such testimony to be opinion evidence, which, of course, is inadmissible unless the witness discloses the basis for his opinion.’ Shepherd v. State, 173 Ga.App. 499, 500-501(1) (326 S.E.2d 596) (1985). In addition, ‘proof of telephone conversations may be admissible in evidence when the identity of the person against whom the conversation is sought to be admitted is established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence.’ Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 599(3) (255 S.E.2d 710) (1979). ‘[T]he probative value to be accorded such evidence is a matter for the jury’s determination.’ Shepherd, supra at 501. … Under the circumstances, the evidence established a sufficient basis to admit [victim’s] opinion testimony that the second female voice she heard during the attack was that of Brown. See Constantino, supra at (3) (voice identification may be admissible where based on prior telephone conversations; it is not necessary that the speakers had met or spoken face to face). Compare Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695(1) (69 S.E.2d 253) (1952) (where the testifying witness did not know the other person on the telephone, had not ever heard the voice, and the identity of the other person is not otherwise established, the conversation is inadmissible hearsay).” Accord, Withers v. State , 282 Ga. 656, 653 S.E.2d 40 (November 5, 2007) (Witness’ opinion identifying defendant’s voice was properly admitted based on his testimony that he heard defendant’s voice “‘every day’ for three years, and having focused interactions with him in the eighteen months prior to the fatal shooting.”); Sherrer v. State , 289 Ga.App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258 (January 9, 2008) (officer recognized defendant’s voice from telephone conversation offering to sell drugs to informant); Jackson v. State , 284 Ga. 826, 672 S.E.2d 640 (January 26, 2009) (witness “testified that she knows Jackson and could hear his voice on the cell phone.”). JJJJJJ. VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS See new rule in OCGA § 24-10-1006, effective January 1, 2013. KKKKKK. WEAPONS Davis v. State , 272 Ga. 327, 528 S.E.2d 800 (May 1, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting handgun found in search of defendant’s residence although “the state failed to prove that this was the weapon he allegedly used to strike the victim. The eyewitnesses to the crime testified that Davis pistol-whipped the victim with a handgun. The medical examiner testified that the wounds on the victim's head were consistent with those which would be made by a handgun such as the one seized from Davis's residence. A weapon is generally admissible if it is similar to the one used in the crime even though it is not conclusively shown to be the same one. Parker v. State, 226 Ga.App. 462(4), 486 S.E.2d 687 (1997). The jury in this case was authorized to determine whether the gun admitted in evidence was the weapon used by Davis to strike the victim. Id.; Clements v. State, 226 Ga. 66(1), 172 S.E.2d 600 (1970). Any discrepancies between the eyewitnesses' description of the weapon used by Davis went to the weight and credibility of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Parker v. State, 226 Ga.App. at 464, 486 S.E.2d 687.” LLLLLL. WEB PAGES See subheading FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS – INTERNET PAGES, above MMMMMM. WITNESS TAMPERING Williams v. State, 335 Ga.App. 841, 783 S.E.2d 362 (February 26, 2016). Aggravated assault and firearms convictions affirmed; evidence that witness felt threatened by presence of unknown persons in the courtroom was properly admitted . “Threat evidence is admissible to explain a witness’s conduct on the stand, even if it is not tied to a defendant. Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 486, 488(3), 604 S.E.2d 151 (2004). In this case, such evidence was particularly relevant, because on the stand, Walker completely disavowed his identification to the detective of Williams and [co-defendant] Moses as two of the three shooters. He testified that when he told the detective that he had seen both Williams and Moses shooting at him, he had merely been repeating what he had heard from others rather than something he had actually seen.