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In fact, Walker even signed an affidavit prepared by Moses’ previous trial counsel, in which Walker stated that his prior identification of Moses had been mistaken.” Lindsey v. State, 295 Ga. 343, 760 S.E.2d 170 (June 16, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated. “[E]ven though evidence of motive without more is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 543(1) (250 S.E.2d 376) (1978), overruled on other grounds, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 366(2)(a) (314 S.E.2d 621) (1984), it can be considered in the determination of whether an accomplice's version of events inculpating a defendant is corroborated. See Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 786(3) (523 S.E.2d 294) (1999).” Corroboration here: threatening phone calls to State’s witness “in an attempt to dissuade her from testifying.” Although witness didn’t testify who made the calls, “a reasonable and plain inference to be drawn is that Lindsey made the calls or that they were made at his instigation. Evidence of a defendant's attempt to influence or intimidate a witness is circumstantial evidence of guilt, even in the situation in which the defendant does not personally make the attempt, that is, action by a third party to influence a witness not to testify or to testify falsely is relevant and admissible into evidence in a criminal prosecution on the issue of the defendant's guilt when the accused is shown to have authorized the attempt. Kell v. State, 280 Ga. 669, 671(2)(a) (631 S.E.2d 679) (2006). The plain inference that Lindsey was responsible for the menacing phone calls was uncontradicted at trial.” “Thus, there was evidence, albeit slight, to corroborate [co-defendant] Hankerson's version of events identifying Lindsey as the prime mover in the plot to murder Taylor.” Accord, Redding v. State , 297 Ga. 845, 778 S.E.2d 774 (October 19, 2015) (“Though Redding asserts that there was no evidence that he orchestrated or even authorized the jailhouse attack, this claim is belied by Thornton’s testimony that his assailants made statements which made him feel threatened by Redding, as well as by Thornton’s testimony about the remarks of the unidentified man who approached him in the courthouse holding cell.”), Reed v. State, 294 Ga. 877, 757 S.E.2d 84 (March 28, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed witness “to testify regarding Reed's threats to harm her and her family if she failed to cooperate with him after the murder, as well as physical and sexual abuse Reed inflicted upon her both before and after the murder. Reed moved in limine to exclude such testimony, arguing that it was not relevant to the issues in the case and that it improperly placed his character in issue. The trial court held the testimony admissible to explain [witness] Payne's state of mind and conduct in the aftermath of the murder.” “The defense made an issue of Payne's conduct in failing to come forward, and the evidence of Reed's threats and abuse was relevant to explaining that conduct.” Williams v. State, 290 Ga. 533, 722 S.E.2d 847 (February 6, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to evidence of threats against State’s witnesses by an associate of defendant. “The trial court has discretion to admit evidence of a threat to a witness that is not connected to the defendant if the evidence is relevant to explain the witness's ‘reluctant conduct on the witness stand.’ Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 486, 488, 604 S.E.2d 151 (2004). See also United States v. Doddles, 539 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10 th Cir., 2008) (holding that a witness's testimony that he feared retaliation from members of the defendant's gang was admissible to explain his inconsistent statements). Compare Kell v. State, 280 Ga. 669, 671–672, 631 S.E.2d 679 (2006) (holding such evidence inadmissible where the threat was not connected to the defendant or to any influence on the witness's testimony). Here, the evidence of Borrum's threatening gesture to Fitzgerald, which the prosecutor did not connect to Appellant during the questioning of Fitzgerald or Borrum, was admissible to explain Fitzgerald's inconsistent statements and reluctance on the witness stand, which occurred both before and after the threat by Borrum. See Coleman, 278 Ga. at 488, 604 S.E.2d 151. The evidence was also admissible to suggest Borrum's bias in favor of Appellant and thus to impeach the portions of Borrum's testimony that were favorable to Appellant. See Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 340, 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010) (explaining that a witness's bias is always relevant for impeachment purposes).” Martin-Argaw v. State, 311 Ga.App. 609, 716 S.E.2d 737 (September 8, 2011). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant tried to hire someone to murder witnesses prior to trial, finding this evidence “admissible to show ‘motive, intent, identity, course of conduct, and bent of mind where the incidents involve attempts to harm or kill the same individuals.’” Accord, Dukes v. State , 290 Ga. 486, 722 S.E.2d 701 (February 6, 2012) (evidence that defendant threatened or tried to frighten witnesses properly admitted). Kell v. State, 280 Ga. 669, 631 S.E.2d 679 (June 26, 2006). Trial court erred in allowing prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s brother about allegedly-violent efforts to retrieve letters, written by defendant, from defendant’s wife. The issue was used to raise the inference that the letters were incriminating, and that defendant had sanctioned an effort by his family to keep the evidence from the State; however, no evidence authorized either inference. “The mere family relationship between [defendant] and [brother] is not enough, without more, to constitute adequate proof of the necessary