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authorization.” “To the extent that language in Winn v. State, 272 Ga. 482(2) (531 S.E.2d 717) (2000) can be read as holding admissible any credible evidence of an attempt to influence the testimony of a witness as to the issue of an accused’s guilt, without regard to whether evidence establishes that the accused authorized the attempt, that language is disapproved.” Accord, Scott v. State , 305 Ga.App. 710, 700 S.E.2d 694 (August 27, 2010) (reference in opening statement to threats by unspecified family members of defendant against witnesses was improper, absent any ability to link those threats to defendant; family relationship alone not a sufficient link). Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 486, 604 S.E.2d 151 (October 12, 2004). “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a witness to testify about an anonymous threat he received on his answering machine the morning he was scheduled to testify. Whether to admit evidence of such a threat is within the trial court’s discretion. [Cit.] Evidence concerning the threat was not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, and no attempt was made to connect [defendant] with the threat. Rather, the evidence was admitted to explain the witness’s evasive and extremely reluctant conduct on the witness stand. The witness refused to answer certain questions and became agitated when asked about a conversation he had with [defendant]. Evidence of the threat was properly admitted to explain why the witness was being difficult, which was a relevant area of inquiry at trial. [Cit.]” Accord, Foster v. State , 294 Ga. 383, 754 S.E.2d 33 (January 21, 2014) (threat to witness, not connected to defendant, properly admitted to explain witness’s “reluctant conduct on the witness stand”); Moses v. State , 328 Ga.App. 625, 760 S.E.2d 217 (July 15, 2014) (State properly allowed to cross defense witnesses on “whether the witnesses had felt threatened about cooperating with law enforcement or testifying.”); Williams (February 26, 2016), above. Johnson v. State, 255 Ga.App. 721, 566 S.E.2d 440 (June 11, 2002). Defendant’s father’s offer to pay victim to drop charges against defendant was admissible to show consciousness of guilt “because there was some evidence that [the father] did not act independently from his son in making the $5,000 offer to drop the case.” Distinguished in Kell (June 26, 2006), above. Moton v. State, 242 Ga.App. 397, 530 S.E.2d 31 (February 16, 2000). Convictions for selling cocaine affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant had witness’s dog killed two weeks before trial ‘as a warning.” “The legitimate purpose which justifies [witness’s] testimony implicating Moton in a criminal attempt to intimidate a witness against him in a pending criminal trial ‘is that it was evidence of a criminal act by the defendant, constituting an admission by conduct, intended to obstruct justice or avoid punishment for the crime on trial.’ (Citation omitted.) Fugitt v. State, 256 Ga. 292, 294(1)(a), 348 S.E.2d 451 (1986). We find no error in the trial court's implicit determination that proof of Moton's intimidation of a witness was more probative than prejudicial. See Sisson v. State, 232 Ga.App. 61, 66(3)(b), 499 S.E.2d 422 (1998).” Murray v. State, 271 Ga. 504, 521 S.E.2d 564 (September 20, 1999). At defendant’s murder trial, “evidence of a note identified by the recipient, [defendant’s] cousin, as having been written by [defendant],” was properly admitted. “The note was mailed to the recipient three-four weeks before trial, and could be construed as containing veiled threats to the well-being of the recipient/witness. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317(3), 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980). Testimony that the note was written while [defendant] was incarcerated awaiting trial for this crime did not put his character into evidence, since evidence that a defendant has been incarcerated in connection with the crime for which the defendant is on trial does not place the defendant's character in issue. Ferrell v. State, 198 Ga.App. 270(3), 401 S.E.2d 301 (1991); Jackson v. State, 180 Ga.App. 363(3), 349 S.E.2d 252 (1986).” Bain v. State, 239 Ga.App. 696, 521 S.E.2d 832 (August 24, 1999). Defendant’s threats against State’s witness were properly admitted at trial. “Bain argues that the alleged threats were character evidence unrelated to the criminal trespass. However, we have held that ‘[a]ny statement or conduct of a person, indicating a consciousness of guilt, where such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of crime, is admissible against [her] upon [her] trial for committing it.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Conner v. State, 160 Ga.App. 202, 203(4), 286 S.E.2d 441 (1981) (evidence that defendant procured a ‘hitman’ to kill accomplice and co-indictee who planned to testify against him was properly admitted); see also Payne v. State, 152 Ga.App. 471, 473(3), 263 S.E.2d 251 (1979); Smith v. State, 142 Ga.App. 1, 3- 4(4), 234 S.E.2d 816 (1977). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of the threats.” Nealy v. State, 239 Ga.App. 651, 522 S.E.2d 34 (August 18, 1999). At defendant’s armed robbery trial, trial court properly allowed victim to testify that he had been threatened and bribed. “Earlier in the trial, [victim] Hagins gave testimony that the defendants were not the robbers that was inconsistent with other trial testimony and pretrial statements