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he made identifying the defendants as the robbers. In subsequent testimony, Hagins said that, earlier in the trial, he had falsely testified that the defendants were not the robbers because an unidentified person threatened him with bodily harm if he testified against the defendants and because [co-defendant] Mahmoud's father had bribed him with money. The trial court properly allowed Hagins to give this testimony to explain why he had testified falsely and to rebut its discrediting effect. Bivins [ v. State, 200 Ga. 729, 740-741, 38 S.E.2d 273 (1946)]; Benefield [ v.State, 140 Ga.App. 727, 731, 232 S.E.2d 89 (1976)]; compare Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333, 393 S.E.2d 252 (1990) (error to admit prosecution witness' testimony as to threat where it was not admissible to explain other testimony discrediting the witness, and the State's inability to link the threat to the defendant prevented the testimony from being relevant to any other material issue). Moreover, before Hagins gave his explanation, the trial court gave cautionary instructions to the jury that the testimony was solely for the purpose of explaining Hagins' changed testimony, and that it was not to be considered as evidence against any of the defendants or for any other purpose. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial.” Accord, Bryant v. State , 296 Ga. 456, 769 S.E.2d 57 (February 2, 2015) (“the evidence of the threat against [witness] Foster shed light on his initial reluctance to speak with police, to give his full name, and to make a statement. In this regard, the State argued only that Foster was afraid to talk to police, not that the threat was connected to Bryant.”). IX. JURIES AND JURORS A. ACCUSATION/INDICTMENT, SHOWING OTHER CHARGES/ DEFENDANTS Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 783 S.E.2d 652 (March 7, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in redacting indictment “to remove the name of his co-indictee, Javonte Wright, whose charges had been nolle prossed. … [A] trial court has discretion to give the jury a redacted indictment where the only thing deleted is the name of a co-indictee, see Chandler v. State, 143 Ga.App. 608, 609, 239 S.E.2d 158 (1977), and Appellant has failed to explain how that discretion was abused here.” Scott v. State, 277 Ga.App. 126, 625 S.E.2d 526 (January 4, 2006). “Scott argues that the trial court erred in presenting an indictment to the jury that contained the names of several people who were not on trial with him. We disagree. Although the indictment contained the names of other individuals besides Scott who were allegedly involved in the drug deal at the apartment complex, the court made clear in its charge that the jury was only considering the case against Scott and one other co-defendant. [fn] The court further instructed the jury on parties to a crime, the fact that the State had the burden of proving the guilt of each individual defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury was free to acquit an individual defendant even if it found the other defendant guilty. Viewing the charge as a whole, then, we find that the indictment naming several individuals was not confusing to the jury and that there was no error here. [Cit.]” Smith v. State, 277 Ga. 213, 586 S.E.2d 639 (September 15, 2003). Indictment erroneously listed six counts against defendant although grand jury had only indicted on four. Trial court entered dead docket on the two extra charges and showed same on face of indictment which was sent out with jury. “ There is no question that the trial court erred by failing to redact or otherwise mask the indictment to remove from the jury’s consideration any reference to the two additional charges, as well as the dead docketing of those charges, before the indictment was submitted to the jury.” However, “[w]here there is no request to conceal the improper information on the indictment, this Court has held it was not error to permit the indictment with the improper information written thereon to go to the jury room with the jury.” Gentry v. State, 236 Ga.App. 820, 513 S.E.2d 528 (March 8, 1999). No prejudice to defendant where one count of indictment was dismissed, but that count was not redacted before submission to the jury; rather, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider it. “Although the record shows that the jury did not render a verdict as to Count 1, the jury foreman stated that the jury did discuss unredacted Count 1.” The dismissed count charged defendant with possession of cocaine by ingestion. “By virtue of other counts in the indictment and the evidence supporting them, the jury was already aware that the State contended Gentry ingested cocaine. Moreover, the indictment itself was not evidence and the jury was so instructed. It is highly probable that any error in the failure to redact Count 1 from the indictment did not contribute to the verdict. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 60-61, 230 S.E.2d 869 (1976).” Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 513 S.E.2d 235 (February 26, 1999). No error in manner by which trial court presented redacted indictment to jury. “The severed offenses were Counts 1 and 2 on the indictment. Before the indictment was permitted to go out with the jury, it was redacted by removing the pages containing these counts and by blacking out portions of the cover page which referenced the severed offenses and also the names of