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with local rule or state statute. “While the jury administrator did not obtain a notarized affidavit in every situation, she did obtain written confirmation in each case. Under our precedent, there clearly was not ‘such disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute as would vitiate the array [ ]’” Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 145-147(1) (263 S.E.2d 666) (1980) (finding no reversible error where court administrator and his secretary excused potential grand jurors for statutory and hardship reasons based on telephone calls without conducting investigations into excuses).” 3. No violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right , though eight of nine excusals were granted to females. “The fair cross-section requirement does not require that juries mirror a community, and a state may provide reasonable exemptions for its jurors so long as the lists from which the jurors are drawn are representative of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538(VII) (95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690) (1975). See also Sanders v. State, 237 Ga. 858, 858(1) (230 S.E.2d 291) (1976) (applying this doctrine to grand jurors). ‘The Constitution requires only that the State not deliberately and systematically exclude identifiable and distinct groups from jury lists; hence, in order to prevail on a constitutional challenge to the composition of the grand and petit juries in his case, a criminal defendant must establish prima facie that a distinct and identifiable group in the community is substantially under-represented on the jury venire.’ Torres v. State, 272 Ga. 389, 391(4) (529 S.E.2d 883) (2000). Humphreys offered nothing to contradict the evidence in the record showing that the absolute disparity between females in the population of Cobb County and females on the grand jury list was 0.06 percent. Nor did he present any evidence purporting to show the effect the excusals and deferments of eight females had on the final grand jury list. Consequently, Humphreys has failed to carry his burden of establishing a prima facie case of grand jury discrimination. See Sanders v. State, 237 Ga. at 858(1) (2% differential in women and 2.5% differential in black persons are ‘too slight to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination’).” Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 667 S.E.2d 62 (September 22, 2008). Fact that jury panel included no African- Americans didn’t establish defect in process. “‘[T]here is no constitutional guarantee that ... grand or petit juries, impaneled in a particular case[,] will constitute a representative cross-section of the entire community.’ To successfully challenge a jury array based on racial composition, purposeful discrimination must be shown. That burden is not carried by merely presenting evidence that a single jury panel contained a disproportionately small percentage of African- Americans compared to the population at large. Rather, the proper inquiry ‘concerns the procedures for compiling the jury lists and not the actual composition of the grand or traverse jury in a particular case.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Glass v. State, 255 Ga.App. 390, 401(10)(a), 565 S.E.2d 500 (2002). At the hearing on the motion for new trial [defendant] failed to demonstrate any flaw in the selection procedures used for compiling the jury list and thus did not carry his burden of showing purposeful discrimination. See Hansley v. State, 267 Ga. 48(2), 472 S.E.2d 305 (1996).” State v. Parlor, 281 Ga. 820, 642 S.E.2d 54 (February 26, 2007). Trial court erred in quashing indictment based on failure to update grand jury list biennially as required by OCGA § 15-12-40(a)(1). “In addressing the precursor to OCGA § 15-12-40, this Court has said that: ‘the provisions of Code § 59-106 are directory only and, therefore, the failure to revise the jury list in accordance with the timetable set forth in Code § 59-106 does not invalidate the jury list or deprive the defendant of any right to which he is entitled. See McHan v. State, 232 Ga. 470(3) (207 S.E.2d 457) (1974); Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190(1c) (144 S.E.2d 103) (1965); Haden v. State, 176 Ga. 304(1) (168 SE 272) (1933); Daugherty v. State, 59 Ga.App. 898 (2 S.E.2d 519) (1939).’ Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 38(3) (257 S.E.2d 543) (1979). See also Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 80(7) (597 S.E.2d 332) (2004); Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 618-19(2) (593 S.E.2d 335) (2004); Florence v. State, 243 Ga. 738, 740-741(3) (256 S.E.2d 467) (1979); Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 394-395(7) (254 S.E.2d 337) (1979). Accordingly, failure to comply with the strictures of OCGA § 15-12-40(a)(1) ‘will not afford cause for quashing the indictment.’ Haden, supra at 305(1).” This is true of both grand jury and trial jury lists, notwithstanding the statute’s use of the word “shall.” Edwards v. State, 281 Ga. 108, 636 S.E.2d 508 (October 16, 2006). Underrepresentation of a cognizable group (white citizens) by 6.04 percent did not require quashing of indictment, despite provision of Unified Appeal Procedure (UAP) which “sets the limit for under-representation of a cognizable group at five percentage points,” because substantive law provides that disparities less than ten percent are generally constitutional. The UAP, being a rule adopted by the Supreme Court, must fall within the powers granted to the Court by the Constitution; but the Constitution does not empower the Court “to abrogate or interfere with an otherwise-valid statutory enactment, such as the statutory procedure by which prosecutors procure indictments and conduct criminal prosecutions through them. Accordingly, this Court concludes that requiring the quashing of Edwards’s indictment, which has been procured in a manner consistent with the constitutions of Georgia and the United States and consistent with Georgia statutory law, is beyond this Court’s power. The trial court’s decision not to quash Edwards’s indictment, therefore, is affirmed. This Court is not here presented with the question of whether requiring pre-trial the reformation of the traverse jury list to conform with