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the U.A.P.’s five percentage point rule is likewise beyond this Court’s constitutional power, and, therefore, the Court expresses no opinion on that question.” Accord, Humphreys v. State , 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (March 15, 2010) (applied to grand jurors); Foster v. State , 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (November 1, 2010); Ellington v. State , 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012) (still no resolution to whether trial court should have reformed traverse jury list to correct absolute disparities between 5-10 percent). Rice v. State, 281 Ga. 149, 635 S.E.2d 707 (October 2, 2006). “Rice contends that the lists from which his grand jury was drawn and from which his traverse jury will be drawn are unconstitutional because they under-represent Hispanic persons. Such jury composition claims, whether based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, OCGA § 15-12-40, or the Unified Appeal Procedure, require both a showing that the group which allegedly is under-represented is a distinctive, cognizable group in the community and a showing of actual under-representation. See Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158 (575 S.E.2d 462) (2003). We need not address the trial court’s finding regarding whether Hispanic persons are a cognizable group in Cobb County in order to decide Rice’s jury composition claim, because we find that he failed to show any actual under-representation of Hispanic persons.” “Because Rice’s own expert testimony showed that there was no under-representation of Hispanic citizens, the trial court did not err in denying Rice’s jury composition claims regarding that group. See Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 715, 725(5) (571 S.E.2d 740) (2002) (holding that citizenship is properly considered in jury composition claims).” See note on Smith (October 28, 2002), below. Inman v. State, 281 Ga. 67, 635 S.E.2d 125 (September 18, 2006). No error in trial court’s use of 1990 census to certify jury box in May, 2001, because “[defendant] has presented no evidence that the 2000 census report was available to the Cook County trial court in May 2001, but instead relies only on the supposition the 2000 report was available in Cook County in May 2001 …. Furthermore, even if we were to assume the 2000 report was available in Cook County in May 2001, [defendant] has not shown any harm he suffered from the use of the 1990 report rather than the 2000 report, i.e., he has not shown the comparison using the 2000 report would have yielded a different result than the result the trial court reached using the 1990 report. In order to have reversible error, there must be harm as well as error ( Shadron v. State, 275 Ga. 767(5) (573 S.E.2d 73) (2002)), and the lack of evidence of both error and harm renders the enumeration of error meritless.” Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (September 19, 2005). Trial court properly denied defendant’s challenge to the array based on financial hardship to wage-earners resulting from low juror pay. “Lewis claims that the amount of money paid to jurors for their jury service is insufficient to enable wage earners and people with small children to serve on the jury. He alleges that this resulted in hardship excusals that altered the representative nature of the jury list. However, Lewis did not object to the excusal of any particular prospective juror for hardship reasons and the decision to excuse a potential juror for hardship reasons is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Cit.] The record reveals that the trial court did not abuse this discretion. [Cit.] Moreover, the hardship excusals could not have affected the representative nature of the jury list and Lewis did not show that prospective jurors excused for hardship reasons are a cognizable group. [Cit.]” Hernandez v. State, 274 Ga.App. 390, 617 S.E.2d 630 (July 13, 2005). Trial court properly denied defendant’s challenge to the array, which was placed in alphabetical order after being selected randomly . “Hernandez’s counsel argued that the arrangement could lump Hispanic names together, thereby altering the random selection process, although no evidence was presented to show whether Hispanic names tend to start with letters in the latter part of the alphabet…. The defendant has the burden of proving purposeful discrimination in the jury array. Pruitt v. State, 279 Ga. 140, 142(3) (611 S.E.2d 47) (2005); see generally Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 715, 716(1) (571 S.E.2d 740) (2002). Because Hernandez ‘failed to establish any flaw in the selection process, such as manipulation, misuse, or systematic exclusion of cognizable groups, the trial court properly rejected his challenge to the array.’ Riddles v. State, 251 Ga.App. 525, 526- 527(1) (554 S.E.2d 737) (2001).” Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 597 S.E.2d 332 (May 24, 2004). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. 1. Forced racial balancing of the jury wheel from which the grand jury was drawn does not violate a defendant’s statutory rights under OCGA § 15-12-40. “See Ramirez [ v. State, 276 Ga. 158(1), 575 S.E.2d 462 (2003)] (Court approved a grand jury selection procedure fixing the percentage of African-American persons on the grand jury source list to the percentage of African-American persons in the county as reported in the most recent census in accordance with the requirements of the [Unified Appeal Procedure]); Yates v. State, 274 Ga. 312(5), 553 S.E.2d 563 (2001) (Court approved forced balancing to ensure that the racial balance in a grand or traverse jury pool reflects the racial balance in the county population); and