☢ test - Í

Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704(5), 532 S.E.2d 677 (2000) (forced racial balancing is not unlawful).” Forced balancing also is not an equal protection violation because “where the source list ‘was constructed in accordance with the [UAP], specifically with the intent to equally represent the cognizable groups in [the county] as measured by the most comprehensive and objective source available at the time the list was constructed [the 1990 census],’ [ Ramirez ] at 161, 575 S.E.2d 462, [defendant] failed to establish the third element of a prima facie claim of an equal protection violation – that the grand jury selection process was susceptible of abuse or was not racially neutral.” Accord , Foster v. State , 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (November 1, 2010); Ellington v. State , 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). 2. Proper measure of group representation is absolute disparity, not comparative disparity. Accord, Humphreys v. State , 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (March 15, 2010) (applied to grand jurors). 3. Violation of a local court “plan for selection of jurors by mechanical and electronic means” pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-42(b)(1) was not a basis for reversal. “‘Statutes regulating the selection, drawing, and summoning of jurors are intended to distribute jury duties among the citizens of the county, provide for rotation in jury service, and are merely directory. Obviously, however, a disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute will have the effect of vitiating the array.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Meders [ v. State, 260 Ga. 49, 56, 389 S.E.2d 320 (1990)].” No such defect here. Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 593 S.E.2d 335 (March 1, 2004). “Sealey … contends that the source lists from which his grand and traverse juries were drawn unlawfully under-represented Hispanic persons. This claim must fail on appeal, as Sealey failed to present evidence showing Hispanic persons constituted a cognizable group in the county or any evidence establishing either the existence of actual under-representation or the degree thereof. Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 159-162, 575 S.E.2d 462 (2003). There is also no reversible error arising out of the jury commission’s reliance on the most recently available census in creating its source lists as the Unified Appeal Procedure directs. Id. at 160- 162, 575 S.E.2d 462; Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 715, 719, 571 S.E.2d 740 (2002); U.A.P. II(C)(6).” Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444 (March 24, 2003). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Defendant challenged make-up of county grand jury on grounds “that disabled persons are systematically excluded.” Held, while defendant failed to prove that this is true, even if it were, “[h]e also failed to show that the ‘physically disabled’ are a distinctive group under a Sixth Amendment analysis. In addition, with regard to equal protection, the United States Supreme Court has not determined that the physically disabled constitute a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect’ class. ‘Unlike race or gender, disability may legitimately affect a person’s ability to serve as a juror.’” Allowing the disabled to seek excusal on a medical hardship basis with supporting documentation “is not unreasonable or illegal.” Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 575 S.E.2d 462 (January 13, 2003). On interim review of defendant’s capital murder prosecution; trial court properly denied “defendant's motion to quash his indictment insofar as that motion addressed the alleged under-representation of ‘African-Americans’ on the source list from which his grand jury was selected.” Defendant established systematic underrepresentation because the Unified Appeal Procedure (UAP) requires reliance on the decennial census; in 2000, the percentage of blacks in Dekalb County had risen by 11.9% from the time of the 1990 census. However, no Equal Protection or fair cross-section violation shown. 1. Challenge to racial neutrality of grand jury selection procedure. “In order to make a prima facie claim of a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ramirez was required to demonstrate that African-American persons were a recognizable, distinct class of persons, that they were under-represented over a significant period of time or under other circumstances which raised an inference of discrimination, and that the selection procedure employed was susceptible of abuse or was not racially neutral such that any presumption of discrimination raised by the statistics was supported. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494(III), 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) (prima facie case demonstrated by composition of grand juries over time); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-632(I), 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (prima facie case demonstrated by highly improbable outcome of grand jury selection in particular case at hand); see also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998) (holding that the defendant who was of one race had standing to raise an equal protection claim alleging the systematic exclusion from the grand jury of persons of another race). African-American persons are clearly a distinct class of persons for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, and the absolute disparity of 11.9 percentage points between their representation on the 2000 grand jury source list and their presence in DeKalb County's population in 2000 would be sufficiently high, if considered in a vacuum, to raise an inference of discrimination. See Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691 (1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000); Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 571(11), 340 S.E.2d 843 (1986) (‘As a general proposition, absolute disparities under 10% usually are sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.’). However, the statistical evidence should not be considered in a vacuum. … Because we find that the source list from which Ramirez's grand jury was drawn was constructed, in accordance with the Unified Appeal Procedure, specifically with the intent to equally represent the cognizable groups in DeKalb County as measured by the most comprehensive and objective source available at the time the list was constructed, and because the