☢ test - Í

population movements in and out of DeKalb County were obviously beyond the control of the county's jury commissioners, we conclude that Ramirez has failed to show that DeKalb County's grand jury selection procedure was susceptible of abuse or was not racially neutral. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493(III, 97 S.Ct. 1272) (“[A]n official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.” (emphasis in original)). Because Ramirez failed in his attempt to show one of the three elements of a prima facie claim of an equal protection violation regarding African-American persons, the trial court did not err in denying Ramirez's claim regarding that group.” 2. No ‘fair cross- section’ violation. “To make a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation, Ramirez was required to show the following: ‘(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group [in venires from which juries are selected] is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.’ Morrow, 272 Ga. at 692(1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364(II), 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)). A fair cross-section jury composition claim is almost identical to an equal protection jury composition claim, including the statistical thresholds applicable, with the one prominent exception being that the claimant need not demonstrate any intent to under-represent a cognizable group. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368, n. 26, 99 S.Ct. 664. As noted above, African-American persons are a distinctive group, and the 2000 Census showed, in retrospect, that African-American persons were under-represented on the 2000 grand jury source list by 11.9 percentage points. Furthermore, the procedure by which DeKalb County constructed its 2000 grand jury source list did result in the ‘systematic exclusion’ of some African-American persons, however unintentional that exclusion actually was. Nevertheless, a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation can be rebutted if the State can demonstrate that ‘attainment of a fair cross section [is] incompatible with a significant state interest.’ Id. at 368(III), 99 S.Ct. 664. As is discussed above, the DeKalb County jury commissioners constructed a grand jury list that, in accordance with the Unified Appeal Procedure, attempted and succeeded at ensuring fair representation of African-American persons as measured by the most comprehensive and objective source available, the 1990 Census. We find that obtaining that comprehensiveness and objectivity in the DeKalb County jury selection process was a sufficiently significant state interest to rebut Ramirez's prima facie fair cross-section showing regarding the representation of African- American persons .” Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 715, 571 S.E.2d 740 (October 28, 2002). 1. Jury box not unconstitutionally underrepresentative of Hispanics, although great disparity existed between percentage of Hispanics in local population and percentage reflected in jury box, because a large percentage of local Hispanic population were not citizens and thus not eligible to serve. Court adopts test from United States v. Artero , 121 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9 th Cir., 1997): “When alleging underrepresentation of a distinctive group, a defendant ‘must, to establish a prima facie case, present data showing that the percentage of persons in that group [on the jury list] is significantly lower than the percentage eligible to serve on juries’” (emphasis added by Georgia Supreme Court). Contrary to trial court’s finding, evidence showed no systematic exclusion of Hispanics; to the contrary, extensive efforts to locate and register Hispanics were shown. Accord, Al-Amin v. State , 278 Ga. 74, 597 S.E.2d 332 (May 24, 2004) (to measure under-representation of cognizable group, “eligible population statistics, not gross population figures, must be considered.”); Humphreys v. State , 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (March 15, 2010) (applied to grand jurors). See also Rice (October 2, 2006), above; Foster v. State , 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (November 1, 2010) (percentage of Hispanics in jury list properly ‘adjusted to account for the citizenship rate of Hispanic persons”). . 2. In 2000 challenge to grand jury, where 2000 census figures were not available at time grand jury was drawn, jury commission was entitled to base grand jury list on 1990 census , based on Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000). “Obviously, the census conducted by the federal government is not perfect, and county populations are not static. People of all groups constantly move into and out of counties, especially during growth periods such as that currently being experienced in the metropolitan Atlanta area. But the census, a comprehensive county-wide head count, is clearly more accurate than case-by-case population estimates like those found to be unreliable in Morrow. Courts and jury commissions need a valid population benchmark upon which to calculate the appropriate group percentages on the jury list, and that benchmark cannot be a moving target. Smith has not shown how interim population estimates would be more accurate in the compilation of the percentages on the jury list. Indeed, arbitrarily adjusting the group percentages on the grand jury list to accommodate a particular defendant would invite fair- cross-section challenges to the list by other defendants. When compiling the March 2000 grand jury list, the Hall County jury commission properly relied on the most recent decennial census numbers that were available to it. Morrow, supra at 694-695, 532 S.E.2d 78; Unified Appeal Procedure Rule II(C)(6)(b).” Kent v. State, 245 Ga.App. 531, 538 S.E.2d 185 (August 11, 2000). Rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied challenge to the array. “Provided that persons are not systematically excluded on the basis of race or other cognizable grouping, and provided that the jurors comprising a panel are randomly selected from a representative pool,