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the selection process is not inherently defective. See Meders v. State, 260 Ga. 49, 54(2)(c), 389 S.E.2d 320 (1990); Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 497(4), 512 S.E.2d 241 (1999) (defendant needed to present evidence showing that young adults had been consistently underrepresented). Disparities as to blacks, whites, males and females were all less than one percent. “The court also found that the 35 jurors selected for Kent's case had been ‘randomly selected by a computer drawing from what I have determined to be a properly constituted list.’ Since Kent failed to establish any flaw in the selection process such as manipulation, misuse, or systematic exclusion of cognizable groups, the trial court properly rejected his challenge to the array. Jewell v. State, 261 Ga. 861, 862-863(3), 413 S.E.2d 201 (1992); see Pryor v. State, 231 Ga.App. 136, 137(1), 497 S.E.2d 805 (1998).” Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 532 S.E.2d 677 (July 5, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed; grand jury and trial jury pools were not “created in a racially-discriminatory manner.” Rejects defendant’s argument that forced balancing resulted in exclusion of Caucasians. “The method of forced balancing employed by the county in ensuring this proportionality was not unlawful. Sears v. State, 262 Ga. 805, 806(2), 426 S.E.2d 553 (1993).” Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (June 12, 2000). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly rejected defendant’s challenge to the array. 1. Trial court properly found that defendant’s evidence of disparity between Hispanics in the local population and the percentage of Hispanics in the jury box was unreliable. Defendant hired an expert who took a census of Hispanics in one of Hall County’s 86 census blocks – the one “that had reported the highest number of Hispanics in [the 1990 Decennial Census].” Trial court properly “was critical of the expert's test census because the respondents were told that the survey was intended to benefit the Hispanic community and this may have affected the responses. … The trial court also noted that it was conducted in a 1/86th section of the county picked specifically for having the highest number of Hispanics with the results extrapolated to the entire county. The State also pointed out several errors Morrow's expert made in her supporting data and that she had assumed a constant growth rate for the entire county population. Accordingly, the trial court refused to adopt Morrow's expert's Hispanic population percentage instead of the official 1990 Census statistics and we find that this decision was not clearly erroneous.” 2. Use of decennial census. “It was also reasonable for the trial court to note that the 1990 Census was a federally-funded county-wide head count conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau with help from local Hispanics, including one of Morrow's Hispanic witnesses. Morrow attacks the ethnic percentages shown by the 1990 Census as being unreliable, but the 1990 Census was clearly more comprehensive than the 1996 survey of a single Census block.” 3. Absolute disparity less than 10% was constitutionally acceptable. “Generally speaking with regard to the second prong of both [the Sixth Amendment ‘systematic exclusion’ and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection] tests, an absolute disparity between the percentage of a group in the population and its percentage in the jury pool of less than 5% is almost always constitutional; an absolute disparity between 5 and 10% is usually constitutional; and an absolute disparity of over 10% is probably unconstitutional. See Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 571(11), 340 S.E.2d 843 (1986) (‘As a general proposition, absolute disparities under 10% usually are sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.’). A violation of OCGA § 15-12-40 is proven by showing a wide absolute disparity between the percentage of the group in the population and its percentage in the jury pool. West v. State, 252 Ga. 156, 157(1), 313 S.E.2d 67 (1984) (17% absolute disparity for females in jury pool from females in county population violates OCGA § 15-12-40); Devier v. State, 250 Ga. 652(1), 300 S.E.2d 490 (1983) (36% absolute disparity for females in jury pool violates statute). The Unified Appeal Procedure states that there should be no imbalances for cognizable groups greater than 5%, [Unified Appeal Procedure] § E, but this Court has stated that the 5% rule is a prophylactic rule designed to ensure ‘to the extent possible that disparities would be kept well below the constitutional minimum.’ Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403(6), 408, fn. 4, 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985).” Also notes that UAP § E requires that “jury certificate population numbers to be drawn from the ‘most recent decennial census.’” Absolute disparities here, using decennial census, was 3.8% [of grand jury list] and 3% [of trial list] respectively, “well within the legal limit.” Wells v. State , 243 Ga.App. 629, 534 S.E.2d 106 (April 17, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; in challenge to array, the Court could take judicial notice of the U.S. Census. Cochran v. State, 256 Ga. 113, 115(8), 344 S.E.2d 402 (1986). Cox v. State, 241 Ga.App. 388, 526 S.E.2d 887 (December 9, 1999). Conviction for child molestation, incest, and related offenses affirmed; 1. where jury box constituted a fair cross-section of the community, trial court properly denied challenge based on jury commissioners’ discretion to remove qualified individuals from box. “Our Supreme Court has held that ‘[t]here is no requirement that the jury list include the name of every citizen of the county eligible for jury service. The list must include a fair cross-section of the eligible members of the community, not every eligible member of the community.’ (Emphasis omitted.) Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 629(1)(d), 323 S.E.2d 801 (1984), cert. denied, 473