☢ test - Í

U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). Since the jury array included a fair cross section of the eligible members of the community, the trial court did not err in denying the motions challenging the jury array.” Procedure used by jury commissioners discretion to remove any individual from the final list. 2. Batson not applicable to challenge to the array. “Moreover, Cox does not argue that a distinctive group or a recognizable class in the community was excluded from the jury list, and in fact, no person was excluded from the jury list here.” Lane v. State, 239 Ga.App. 230, 520 S.E.2d 705 (June 30, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s challenge to the array claiming that young adults “were excluded from the jury list intentionally, discriminatorily, and systematically,” as defendant failed “to prove that young adults represented a cognizable group in Fulton County. Potts v. State, 259 Ga. 812, 813(1), 388 S.E.2d 678 (1990). To do so, Lane was required to prove that young adults were a group defined and limited by some factor, that a common thread or interest ran through the group, and that the group had a community of interest that would not be represented if the group was excluded from the jury selection process. Id. Secondly, he was required to show that young adults have been consistently under-represented on the jury lists. Id. Lane failed to prove either part of the test because he presented no evidence to support his motion. For example, he made no showing that young adults were a cognizable group in Fulton County or that young adults have been consistently under- represented in the jury pool. Potts v. State, supra, 259 Ga. at 813, 388 S.E.2d 678.” Prine v. State, 237 Ga.App. 679, 515 S.E.2d 425 (April 1, 1999). Defendant’s observation that venire had 13 black members and only one white was insufficient to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the jury composition. “ [I]t is the pool of jurors from which the jury sent to be voir dired is drawn that must be representative of the community, not the individual panel sent to a courtroom for voir dire purposes. ‘[T]he jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Avery v. State, 174 Ga.App. 116, 117(1), 329 S.E.2d 276 (1985). In this case, Prine’s complaint was centered solely on the composition of this single jury panel subject to voir dire in this particular case. Such complaint was defective.” Accord, Reese v. State , 241 Ga.App. 350, 526 S.E.2d 867 (December 8, 1999); Torres v. State, 272 Ga. 389, 529 S.E.2d 883 (May 8, 2000) (“The proper inquiry concerns the procedures for compiling the jury lists and not the actual composition of the grand or traverse jury in a particular case.”); Kent v. State , 245 Ga.App. 531, 538 S.E.2d 185 (August 11, 2000); Riddles v. State , 251 Ga.App. 525, 554 S.E.2d 737 (September 12, 2001) (blacks underrepresented on panel); Sharp v. State , 278 Ga. 352, 602 S.E.2d 591 (September 13, 2004) (whites underrepresented on panel); Pruitt v. State , 279 Ga. 140, 611 S.E.2d 47 (March 28, 2005) (blacks underrepresented on panel); Harris v. State , 272 Ga.App. 650, 613 S.E.2d 170 (April 6, 2005); Adams v. State , 282 Ga.App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (November 27, 2006) (men underrepresented on panel); Langlands v. State , 282 Ga. 103, 646 S.E.2d 253 (June 4, 2007); Fisher v. State , 317 Ga.App. 761, 732 S.E.2d 821 (October 3, 2012); Tyre v. State , 323 Ga.App. 37, 747 S.E.2d 106 (July 15, 2013). See also Rosser (September 22, 2008), above. D. ARRAY, PREJUDICE CAUSED DURING PROCESS McDonald v. State, 296 Ga. 643, 770 S.E.2d 6 (March 2, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to “move to dismiss the traverse jury pool after a prospective juror commented on his belief that Appellant was guilty.” After dismissing that juror, “on the heels of the remark, again questioned the remaining jurors about their impartiality, and none indicated that they harbored any prejudice or bias either for or against Appellant. See Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358(4) (613 S.E.2d 628) (2005) (no error in failing to excuse jury panel where trial court inquired whether errant remark had affected remaining jurors' impartiality).” Sherman v. State, 295 Ga. 339, 759 S.E.2d 832 (June 16, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to challenge jury array after alleged prejudicial remarks by one member of the array. Venireman expounded on his feeling that the defendant’s flight from police made him look guilty, while agreeing that the case should be decided on the evidence. Defense counsel’s motion to strike for cause was unopposed, but counsel later testified that she didn’t seek to excuse the entire venire because “she did not believe that Juror # 12's initial comments were so prejudicial that they would have tainted the other prospective jurors. We do not find that counsel's strategic decision to not move to challenge the poll or to empanel new jurors, [fn] and instead proceed with questioning Juror # 12 outside the presence of the jury, was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course. … Juror # 12's statements were not so inherently prejudicial such as to deny Sherman a fair trial because (1) the comments did not necessarily brand Sherman as a criminal who had committed the specific crimes at issue in this case; and (2) the comments did not link Sherman to any other criminal violations.” Clay v. State, 322 Ga.App. 97, 744 S.E.2d 91 (June 3, 2013). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial