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court properly denied motion to excuse jurors exposed to media reports between jury selection and start of trial, one week later. 1. Motion was improperly referred to as motion for mistrial, as jury hadn’t yet been sworn. Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 687(5) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000). “‘However, this court has held that even though the counsel failed to follow the correct procedure or to use the proper procedural tool, we will not rely upon his inaccurate nomenclature, where the relief sought in a motion is clear.’ Swint v. State, 199 Ga.App. 515, 516 (405 S.E.2d 333) (1991) (citations and punctuation omitted); Sharpe, supra at 687(5) (recognizing existence of authority for disregarding the nomenclature of a defendant's premature motion for mistrial when the import of the motion is clear); Hughey v. State, 180 Ga.App. 375, 377–378(2) (348 S.E.2d 901) (1986). Because Clay's motion for mistrial came after each exposed juror had been individually examined, we view the motion as a challenge to the poll, which is ‘directed solely to an objection ... in [an] individual juror.’ Thompson [ v. State, 109 Ga. 272, 279 (34 S.E. 579) (1899)] (citation omitted); Cauley v. State, 130 Ga.App. 278, 281(1)(a) (203 S.E.2d 239) (1973) (‘A challenge to the poll is one peremptory or for cause, addressed to an individual juror.’) (citation omitted).” 2. “ The trial court questioned the five jurors individually to ascertain whether any of them had been prejudiced by their exposure to the newspaper article. ‘The record show[ed] that none of these [five] jurors had fixed opinions about [Clay]'s guilt or any other issue in the trial.’ Barnes [ v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 351(7) (496 S.E.2d 674) (1998)].” Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771, 743 S.E.2d 12 (March 28, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to excuse jury panel based on prejudicial comment of one member during voir dire. One juror said defendant reminded her of a man who once assaulted her while brandishing a gun. Juror was excused for cause; remaining panel members were instructed to disregard the comment, that defendant wasn’t the man who assaulted the juror, and none indicated it would affect their decision in the case. Citing Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358, 613 S.E.2d 628 (2005) (no abuse of discretion where court gave curative instruction but didn’t excuse jurors after one member “was a high school administrator [who] said during voir dire that he had dealt with the defendant in connection with unspecified ‘discipline problems’ some years before.” “Compare Bell v. State, 311 Ga.App. 289, 291–293, 715 S.E.2d 684 (2011) (reversing a defendant's rape conviction for failure to empanel a new set of prospective jurors where no clarifying and curative instructions were given after a prospective juror wondered aloud whether the defendant was the person who raped his grandmother because the defendant and his grandmother's rapist shared the same name).” King v. State, 320 Ga.App. 90, 739 S.E.2d 654 (February 14, 2013). Conviction for aggravated sodomy affirmed; prospective juror’s comment during voir dire wasn’t so prejudicial as to require that panel be dismissed. “After the panel was advised that the case involved an allegation of aggravated sodomy on a child, a prospective juror indicated that he had heard people talking about the case and indicated that he was ‘not sure’ whether he could set aside his knowledge about the case and deliberate based solely on the evidence. The juror stated: ‘I understand that a person is innocent until proven guilty but some of the stuff that I've heard, I don't know that I can put it aside.’ The juror also said that it was ‘very possibl[e]’ that he had been influenced by what he had heard, but that he could follow the trial court's instructions. The trial court then excused the juror from the case, and voir dire continued.” “[T]he juror's comments ‘did not necessarily imply guilt of the offense under consideration.... Neither did they link [King] to other criminal violations[,] which were complete and separate from the offense for which he was being tried.’ [Cits.] Taken together with trial counsel's failure to accept the trial court's offer to give curative instructions, ‘we find no abuse of discretion in refusing to disqualify the entire panel on the basis of the juror's comments,’” quoting Callaway v. State, 208 Ga.App. 508, 512(2) (431 S.E.2d 143) (1993). Bell v. State, 311 Ga.App. 289, 715 S.E.2d 684 (July 5, 2011). Rape conviction reversed; when prejudicial matter was elicited in voir dire, defendant was “deprived … of his right to begin his trial with a jury free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion.” Juror asked if defendant was the same James Bell who had sexually assaulted juror’s grandmother; prosecutor indicated familiarity with her name, but said “I can't go into the past. … We can't talk about what happened in the past, just talking about today.” “Here, although the prospective juror at issue said he was not sure if the defendant was the same James Bell accused of raping of his grandmother, rather than leave the questioned unanswered, and move on to another juror, the State elicited more information from the juror. Specifically, the State asked if the juror's grandmother was ‘[name omitted]’ thereby providing the other prospective jurors with the name of another alleged rape victim in a crime for which Bell was not on trial. Moreover, the trial court did not undertake any measures to ascertain what, if any, impact the remark had on the panel's ability to decide the case. The State elected not to use evidence of that alleged rape as a similar transaction, and thus it is not a circumstance in which the jury would have heard the incriminating evidence during the trial.” Distinguished, Heywood (March 28, 2013), above. Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 699 S.E.2d 1 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses