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affirmed; no prejudice shown from practice of allowing District Attorney to address array prior to court. “The record shows that the traverse jury pool for the Superior Court of Cobb County is given a brief orientation when they report for duty. As part of this orientation, the District Attorney identifies himself to the jurors and tells them that he would be willing to answer any questions they might have after their jury service is over. Although the District Attorney does not address any cases or defendants with the traverse jury pool at this time, this Court is strained to conceive of any legitimate purpose that is served by allowing the District Attorney to address the traverse jury pool . See, e.g., House v. State, 237 Ga.App. 504(2)(c) (515 S.E.2d 652) (1999). However, there is no indication that the character of the District Attorney's remarks clearly show that they could have been prejudicial to Willis. Furthermore, Willis has made no attempt to show any such prejudice. Willis offers no evidence of any juror being partial on appeal. Under these circumstances, the trial court's ruling does not constitute reversible error.” Little v. State, 298 Ga.App. 298, 680 S.E.2d 154 (June 11, 2009). Trial court was not required to dismiss venire based on one juror’s response during voir dire that “I have never known [Deputy] Lutz to lie[,] and I don't think I could hear anything else that would make a difference[,] and it would be hard for me to be impartial.” “The comment made by the potential juror was not inherently prejudicial because she did not comment on the guilt or innocence of Little, but merely expressed the reason why she could not impartially view the evidence presented at trial,” citing Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 687(5) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000) (“holding that a retired county employee's statement during voir dire that ‘he may have used “these boys” [referring to the three defendants] for work at the jail’ did not inherently prejudice the defendants because the comment did not necessarily imply the defendants' guilt or link them to other criminal violations.”). Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358, 613 S.E.2d 628 (May 23, 2005). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion shown in failing to excuse jurors exposed to prejudicial comment during voir dire. “A motion for mistrial is not the ‘proper procedural tool’ when an allegedly prejudicial comment is made during voir dire of prospective jurors. Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 687(5) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000). Moreover, even assuming that Cotton had made a proper request to impanel new jurors, he still would not be entitled to that relief unless the remark was inherently prejudicial and deprived him of his right to a trial by an impartial jury. Sharpe v. State, supra at 688(5). Here, the record shows that the trial court specifically cautioned the other prospective jurors that [prospective juror’s] comment did not expressly identify Cotton as a disciplinary problem, but only cited that as the reason why he knew him. The trial court also asked whether anyone on the panel who overheard the remark would be prejudiced by it, and none indicated that it would.” Accord, Heywood (March 28, 2013), above; McDonald (March 2, 2015), above. Logan v. State, 265 Ga.App. 134, 593 S.E.2d 14 (December 11, 2003). Prospective juror’s comment “that he was a neighbor and knew ‘[defendant]’s been a problem,” did not necessitate excusal of other jurors who heard the remark. The remark “did not imply that Logan was guilty of the crime with which he was charged.” “‘Generally, dismissal of a jury panel is required when, during voir dire, a prospective juror relays information that is specific to the defendant and germane to the case for which the defendant is on trial. Dismissal is not required, however, when the statements ‘establish only gossamer possibilities of prejudice.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Williams v. State, 248 Ga.App. 111, 112(1) (545 S.E.2d 669) (2001).” Also citing Heng v. State , 251 Ga.App. 274, 554 S.E.2d 243 (2001) (dismissal of other jurors not required where “prospective juror stated that the defendant looked like a punk and ‘comes over here and commits crimes.’” “‘Although the comments were clearly directed at the [defendant], they did not necessarily imply guilt of the offense under consideration, they did not link Heng to other crimes, and they were not inherently prejudicial.’”). Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (November 26, 2003). Defendant, a non-U.S. citizen, was not prejudiced by trial court leading jurors in pledge of allegiance to U.S. flag prior to voir dire. “Robles does not cite any authority for the proposition that a willingness to recite the pledge of allegiance shows a bias for the State in a criminal prosecution. Rather, we find that a juror’s willingness to recite the pledge of allegiance, with its reinforcement of the concepts of ‘liberty and justice for all,’ shows no bias, either for the State, or for one who is charged by the State with a crime, and, in fact, is more likely to remind a juror of his or her obligations in the pursuit of justice. The record discloses that no prospective juror was required to recite the pledge of allegiance.” Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 575 S.E.2d 450 (January 13, 2003). Challenge to panel based on alleged prejudicial remark by one venire member (she “volunteered that she believed the gun involved in the case was the gun stolen from her husband’s vehicle”) could not be made after completion of voir dire, selection, impaneling and swearing of jury, and release of other panel members. Although “a motion for mistrial is premature before a jury is impaneled and sworn …