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[t]he proper remedial measure to correct the possible taint of the panel during voir dire is either a challenge to the poll or a motion for postponement to impanel other jurors who had not heard the remark.” Sharpe v. State , 272 Ga. 684, 531 S.E.2d 84 (May 30, 2000). Murder convictions affirmed; motion for mistrial was improper vehicle to seek redress of alleged prejudice occurring during voir dire where jury hadn’t yet been sworn. “‘The time for making a motion for mistrial is not ripe until the case has begun, and the trial does not begin until the jury has been impaneled and sworn.’ Ferguson v. State, 219 Ga. 33, 35(3), 131 S.E.2d 538 (1963). Therefore, the trial court correctly refused to declare a mistrial. Ferguson v. State, supra at 35(3), 131 S.E.2d 538; Loaiza v. State, 186 Ga.App. 72, 73(2), 366 S.E.2d 404 (1988). Appellants did not utilize the proper procedural tool, which ‘“was either a ‘challenge to the poll’ (cits.) or a motion for a postponement to impanel other jurors who had not heard the remark.” [Cit.]’ Callaway v. State, 208 Ga.App. 508, 511(2), 431 S.E.2d 143 (1993). However, there is authority for disregarding the nomenclature of a defendant's premature motion for mistrial when the clear import of the motion is that the jury panel be excused and another panel be made available. Callaway v. State, supra at 511(2), 431 S.E.2d 143; Swint v. State, 199 Ga.App. 515, 516(1), 405 S.E.2d 333 (1991). In any event, such a remedy was not required here. ‘The inquiry is whether the remarks were “ inherently prejudicial and deprived [Appellants] of [their] right to begin [their] trial with a jury ‘free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion....’ (Cit.)” [Cit.]’ (Emphasis in original.) Callaway v. State, supra at 511(2), 431 S.E.2d 143.” Juror here commented during voir dire that “before he retired from his employment with the county, he may have used ‘these boys’ for work at the jail.” “[Juror] Curry's comments neither necessarily implied Appellants' guilt of the offense under consideration, nor linked them to other criminal violations. Callaway v. State, supra at 512(2), 431 S.E.2d 143.” Also, contrary to defendants’ argument, the term “boy” wasn’t necessarily a racial epithet. Juror was properly excused for cause; upon inquiry by the trial court, no other juror indicated any prejudice from his comment. Accord, Clay v. State , 322 Ga.App. 97, 744 S.E.2d 91 (June 3, 2013). Sinyard v. State, 243 Ga.App. 218, 531 S.E.2d 140 (March 10, 2000). Theft by conversion conviction reversed; jury pool was tainted by prospective juror’s comment “that a friend of hers had been cheated by Sinyard. … The test to be applied is whether the remarks were ‘inherently prejudicial and deprived [defendant] of his right to begin his trial with a jury “free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion....” [Cit.]’ (Emphasis omitted.) Lingerfelt v. State, 147 Ga.App. 371, 373(1), 249 S.E.2d 100 (1978). Here, even with the curative instruction the statement is prejudicial.” Citing Moore v. State, 156 Ga.App. 92, 93(1), 274 S.E.2d 107 (1980) (“a remark by a potential juror in an arson case that the defendant was a ‘firebug’ was prejudicial”) and Lingerfelt v. State, 147 Ga.App. 371, 373(1), 249 S.E.2d 100 (1978) (“we found prejudice where the prospective juror in a rape case said he had heard that the defendant was a peeping Tom.”). Morgan v. State, 271 Ga. 885, 525 S.E.2d 691 (January 18, 2000). Murder and armed robbery convictions affirmed; jury could be said to be randomly selected notwithstanding “the trial court's practice of placing jurors who had been excused during the previous term of court at the top of the jury list. Relying upon Jewell v. State, 261 Ga. 861, 413 S.E.2d 201 (1992), Morgan posits that these jurors were not selected ‘ randomly from a complete list of eligible jurors.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 863, 413 S.E.2d 201. However, the mere fact that the jurors were excused previously does not mean that they were not selected randomly. See Singleton v. State, 229 Ga.App. 135, 136, 493 S.E.2d 556 (1997) (practice of putting late jurors at end of jury list does not affect randomness of jury panel). Moreover, Morgan does not assert that the practice of placing previously excused jurors at the top of the jury list constituted purposeful discrimination or the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group. See Jewell v. State, supra at 862, 413 S.E.2d 201; Singleton v. State, supra.” Accord, Edwards v. State , 312 Ga.App. 141, 717 S.E.2d 722 (October 19, 2011). Weldy v. State, 239 Ga.App. 849, 521 S.E.2d 858 (August 27, 1999). No prejudice caused by “the Hall County Sheriff's practice of greeting prospective jurors as they enter the courthouse for jury duty.” Accord, House v. State , 237 Ga.App. 504, 506(2)(a), 515 S.E.2d 652 (April 6, 1999); Jones v. State , 240 Ga.App. 723, 524 S.E.2d 773 (November 8, 1999). E. BATSON/J.E.B./McCOLLUM 1. APPLICATION TO STRIKES FOR CAUSE Head v. State, 276 Ga. 131, 575 S.E.2d 883 (January 27, 2003). Batson applies only to peremptory strikes, not strikes for cause. See also United States v. Blackman , 66 F.3d 1572, 1575 n. 3 (11 th Cir., 1995). Accord, Devaughn v. State , 296 Ga. 475, 769 S.E.2d 70 (February 2, 2015). 2. DISPARATE TREATMENT OF SIMILARLY SITUATED JURORS