☢ test - Í

Brown v. State, 307 Ga.App. 797, 706 S.E.2d 170 (February 11, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court could find that defense strikes were not race-neutral, discounting proffered reasons as pretextual in light of similarly-situated jurors who were not struck. “‘In the situation in which a racially-neutral reason for the strike is given, the trial court must ultimately decide the credibility of such explanation.’ (Citation omitted.) Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 825, 829(3) (642 S.E.2d 82) (2007). Thus, ‘although a trial judge must accept a facially race-neutral explanation for purposes of determining whether the proponent has satisfied his burden of production at stage two, this does not mean that the judge is bound to believe such explanation at stage three.’ (Emphasis in original.) McKenzie v. State, 227 Ga.App. 778, 779(1) (490 S.E.2d 522) (1997). In its order denying Brown's motion for new trial, the trial court clarified that it found the explanations pretextual after ‘reviewing the strikes, listening to the attorney's purported reasons and observing his demeanor. This court also considered in assessing the veracity of the attorney in striking the jurors, that he failed to strike similarly situated jurors.’ ‘[A] trial court's determination of a McCollum challenge rests largely on assessing the attorney's credibility and state of mind and therefore lies peculiarly within the province of the trial judge.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hicks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 217, 219(2) (635 S.E.2d 830) (2006). Accordingly, ‘where, as here, racially-neutral reasons are given, the ultimate inquiry for the trial court is not whether counsel's reasons are suspect, or weak, or irrational, but whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race-based.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 454(4) (448 S.E.2d 179) (1994). Because the third step of the McCollum procedure requires the trial court to act as the trier of fact, its findings are entitled to great deference and will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Stokes, supra.” Accord, Douglas v. State , 312 Ga.App. 585, 718 S.E.2d 907 (November 15, 2011). Bell v. State, 306 Ga.App. 853, 703 S.E.2d 680 (October 26, 2010). Burglary conviction affirmed; jurors with family members who had been criminally prosecuted weren’t similarly situated with juror whose father “‘had some problems with the IRS.’ There is a marked difference between having a dispute with the IRS and being prosecuted for a crime.” Thomas v. State, 299 Ga.App. 235, 682 S.E.2d 325 (July 16, 2009). Trial court properly found that defense strike was not race-neutral: “Here, defense counsel stated as reasons for striking this juror that, having written nothing in his notes about her, he considered her ‘an unknown, a ticking time bomb.... She [is] an older woman who is a housewife. My client is a relatively young black male who is accused of drug trafficking.’ [fn] Counsel also explained that he was deferring to Thomas's wishes. The trial court ruled that counsel's reasons were not race-neutral, because other jurors that had not been challenged had not given extensive responses . … Further, ‘the decision to defer to another's desires concerning the exercise of the peremptory challenges does not constitute the required racially neutral, case-related explanation of the exercise of the challenged strike [ ],’” quoting Congdon v. State, 262 Ga. 683, 684 (424 S.E.2d 630) (1993). Fact that counsel cited defendant’s race as a justification for the strike allowed the court to find that the other stated reasons for the strike were pretextual. Reid v. State, 298 Ga.App. 889, 681 S.E.2d 671 (July 10, 2009). No clear error where trial court disallowed defense strike: defense rejected a white juror on grounds that she “believed that the person likely responsible for the rape and murder of her friend was not sufficiently punished,” but failed to strike black juror who “agreed that ‘people who are convicted of drugs offenses [like the one at issue here] should be incarcerated and not be given probation.’” Cowan v. State, 279 Ga.App. 532, 631 S.E.2d 760 (May 24, 2006). Prosecutor could strike lone African-American juror because she had family members who had been convicted of capital felonies, although State did not strike other white jurors who had family members convicted of non-capital felonies. “Under Batson, failure to treat similarly situated jurors in a like manner may support a finding of discrimination. See White v. State, 258 Ga.App. 546, 549-550(3) (574 S.E.2d 629) (2002). Whether discriminatory intent exists is generally a matter for the trial court, as such finding ‘rests largely upon assessment of the prosecutor’s state of mind and credibility.’ Id. at 550. And a trial court’s factual findings in this regard are entitled to great deference. [Cit.] Here, the trial court concluded that the African- American juror was not similarly situated to the remaining jurors. Although we find this a close case, given the appropriate appellate standard, we cannot gainsay the trial court’s findings in this regard. [Cit.]” Allen v. State, 280 Ga. 678, 631 S.E.2d 699 (June 26, 2006). “Where, as here, racially-neutral reasons are given, the trial court must ultimately decide ‘whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race- based.’ [Cit.] ‘ In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race- neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the [lawyer’s] state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly