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within a trial judge’s province.” (Cits.)’ [Cit.] Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 454(4) (448 S.E.2d 179) (1994).” Here, a strong prima facie case of discrimination existed – defense counsel used all nine strikes against whites, eight of them men. “‘This overwhelming “‘pattern’ of strikes ... give(s) rise to an inference of discrimination.” [Cit.]’ Gamble v. State, [257 Ga. 325, 326(3) (357 S.E.2d 792) (1987)]. When the very strong prima facie case of discrimination is weighed against Allen’s explanations, the record shows that he did not express any reason why the juror’s friendship with the district attorney in the Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit and his wife was case-related. See Blair v. State, 267 Ga. 166, 167(2) (476 S.E.2d 263) (1996) (race-neutral explanation must be ‘case-related’). Moreover, the record does indicate that Allen did not challenge at least one other juror with a friend who worked as a prosecutor in the same Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit.” Accord, Stokes v. State , 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (February 26, 2007). McKee v. State, 277 Ga. 577, 591 S.E.2d 814 (January 12, 2004). Trial court could find that defense “was motivated by discriminatory intent” in striking juror who “was the victim of a previous crime who could not remember the details of the crime” while not striking other crime victims. Contrary to counsel’s explanation, the inability to remember the details did not indicate that “she could not pay proper attention to the trial.” George v. State, 263 Ga.App. 541, 588 S.E.2d 312 (October 3, 2003). Finds a number of Batson violations where prosecutor struck four of five available black men on the panel, based on the totality of circumstances: evidence contradicted prosecutor’s claim about juror’s “unstable job history,” thus rendering it “so implausible and fantastic as to render the explanation pretextual;” record did not support “prosecutor’s bare assertions about” the juror smiling at defendant and frowning at prosecutor, and prosecutor made no effort to make inquiry about this behavior; struck black male for wearing earring, but allowed white male who wore earring, and did not explain how this “related to the case at hand or how it would render him unable to be a fair and impartial juror;” counsel’s “level of comfort or rapport with the juror is too vague, subjective, non-specific and non-case-related to meet the requirements of Batson ;” “[t]he mere fact that the juror was not working because he planned to go on a family vacation prior to returning to college is, under all the circumstances, such an implausible basis for striking the juror that it rises to the level of being pretextual;” and striking one juror to reach other preferred jurors can be race-neutral, but isn’t in this case where the preferred jurors are not the same race/gender and in light of the other rejected reasons. Foster v. State, 272 Ga. 69, 525 S.E.2d 78 (January 18, 2000). No reversible error in jury trial on defendant’s mental retardation defense to capital murder charge; challenged strike of juror by State was race neutral: “Foster contends that the striking of prospective juror Shropshire on the basis of his extensive medical knowledge was improper because the State failed to strike a similarly-situated white juror who was a medical nurse. However, the prosecutor also noted that juror Shropshire's wife was a psychologist who worked in the field of mental retardation, the juror had worked with her in the past regarding her patients, and additionally that the juror had a relative who was mentally retarded. The transcript thus reflects that Foster, as the opponent of the strike, failed to carry his burden of persuasion by showing that the strike was pretextual. Compare Jones v. State, 270 Ga. 25(2), 505 S.E.2d 749 (1998).” Tillman v. State, 240 Ga.App. 78, 522 S.E.2d 557 (September 15, 1999). Trial court ruled that defendant’s strikes were not race-neutral where similarly-situated jurors of different race were not struck. Strikes here were based on knowing sheriff’s investigator or status as a crime victim. Hutchison v. State, 239 Ga.App. 664, 522 S.E.2d 56 (August 18, 1999). At defendant’s trial for rape, trial court properly sustained Batson challenges to four strikes by defense. Defense counsel acknowledged that one of the four strikes was based on gender. “This is precisely the type of stereotyping that Batson and J.E.B. prohibit. See Tedder v. State, 265 Ga. 900, 901(2), 463 S.E.2d 697 (1995); Herrin v. State, 221 Ga.App. 356, 359, 471 S.E.2d 297 (1996) (counsel's admission of gender consideration is automatically an unconstitutional strike). Although Hutchison did set forth a race/gender- neutral reason for striking the other three reinstated females, these reasons were suspect in light of his admissions. Moreover, the State in each case showed that similarly situated males were seated on the jury, a well-recognized method of demonstrating that discriminatory intent motivated a strike. See Turner [ v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151(2), 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996)]; Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 559(3), 423 S.E.2d 245 (1992).” Hinson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 366, 515 S.E.2d 203 (March 30, 1999). 1. Trial court properly re-seated juror struck because of “‘bad body language with him [, plus] his age and experience or lack of experience.’ The trial court noted that other jurors who were similar in age and experience were accepted.” Juror was a white male student; defense counsel used 11 of 12 strikes to remove white jurors. 2. Trial court properly re-seated juror, finding that counsel’s stated reason for strike was pretextual. Counsel stated strike was because juror was a housewife. “[The trial court ruled that since juror