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no. 15] has worked for 13 years [outside the home] she has [not] been a homemaker her entire life.... and put her back on the jury. Given counsel’s factual inaccuracy (as opposed to lack of knowledge) regarding this juror’s life experiences underlying defendant’s stated racially neutral reason, the trial court was authorized to conclude that stated reason was pretextual.” 3. FINDING OF/WEIGHING OF PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ATTORNEY’S EXPLANATION Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 757 S.E.2d 831 (April 22, 2014). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to raise a Batson challenge to State’s peremptory strikes. Defendant’s contention “that because he is African–American and the jury was comprised of eleven white members and one African–American member, counsel was deficient for failing to make a Batson challenge,” is insufficient . “Appellant's conjecture, based solely on the ultimate composition of the jury, is, by itself, insufficient evidence of purposeful discriminatory intent. See Livingston v. State, 271 Ga. 714, 718, 524 S.E.2d 222 (1999) (‘Even though “circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may include proof of disproportionate impact,” numbers alone may not establish a disproportionate exercise of strikes sufficient to raise a prima facie inference that the strikes were exercised with discriminatory intent. [Cit.]’).” Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 892, 734 S.E.2d 23 (November 5, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; 1 . defendant failed to show Batson violation where “the State apparently used only five of its nine allotted peremptory strikes, and it used four of those strikes (44 percent of its allotted strikes) to strike black jurors. Yet, black jurors represented 50 percent of the venire and 58 percent of the selected jury. Viewed in this context, the mere fact that the State used four strikes to strike black jurors is not enough, we think, to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. See Horton v. State, 234 Ga.App. 478, 481(1) (507 S.E.2d 221) (1998) (when objecting party relies solely on raw numbers of strikes directed to jurors of a certain race, those numbers ordinarily make out a prima facie case only when a significant differential appears between percentage of strikes exercised against jurors of that race and percentage of venire composed of jurors of that race); see also Watkins [ v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 361(2)(a) (711 S.E.2d 655) (2011)] (defendant failed to make out prima facie case of purposeful discrimination against women where State used seven of its eight strikes against women, but ten women served on the selected jury, and percentage of women on selected jury was higher than percentage of women in venire). [fn: Compare Rose v. State, 287 Ga. 238, 240(2) (695 S.E.2d 261) (2010) (State made out prima facie case of purposeful discrimination where 100 percent of allotted strikes were used against white jurors, but white jurors comprised only 48 percent of venire); Smith v. State, 263 Ga. 224, 226(4) (430 S.E.2d 579) (1993) (defendant made out prima facie case of purposeful discrimination where 100 percent of allotted strikes were used against black jurors, but black jurors comprised only 33 percent of venire); Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 8(10) (426 S.E.2d 844) (1993) (defendant made out prima facie case of purposeful discrimination where 80 percent of allotted strikes were used against black jurors, but black jurors comprised only 43 percent of venire). ] ” 2. Discriminatory intent can be shown in other ways, but not here. “We have observed before that, among other things, ‘the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ Mitchell, 275 Ga. at 45(5). But in this case, no transcript of the voir dire or jury selection appears in the record. See Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 813(2) (301 S.E.2d 280) (1983) (when transcript ‘does not fully disclose what transpired at trial, the burden is on the complaining party to have the record completed at the trial court under the provisions of OCGA § 5–6–41(f)’). And in any event, Brown does not argue in his briefs that anything said in voir dire or jury selection helps to make out a prima facie case.” Culver v. State, 314 Ga.App. 492, 724 S.E.2d 485 (March 1, 2012). Convictions for forgery and theft by deception affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court found defense jury strike to be pretextual, and reseated juror. “Defense counsel stated that he could not recall why he excluded juror no. 21 but thought it was because this juror worked in a science- and detail-oriented job, and he did not want such people on the jury in a criminal case. The state countered that the juror ‘stated he worked in pest control ... and he also was a musician by trade ... he's not a technician.’ The trial court then found that juror no. 21 was excluded for a pretextual reason, and reseated that juror. A decision on this and the other Batson factors rests upon the trial court's assessment of defense counsel's credibility and state of mind. ‘[I]t therefore lies peculiarly within the trial judge's province. The trial court's factual findings must be given great deference and may be disregarded only if clearly erroneous.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Moak v. State, 222 Ga.App. 36, 39(3) (473 S.E.2d 576) (1996). Further, as no transcript of voir dire was available, we cannot say that the trial court's finding of pretext and grant of the state's Batson motion were clearly erroneous. See LeMon v. State, 290 Ga.App. 527, 530(1)(b) (660 S.E.2d 11) (2008).” Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (June 13, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial