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court properly found no prima facie case of gender discrimination by State in jury selection. “‘The challenging party makes out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ Livingston v. State, 271 Ga. 714, 718 (524 S.E.2d 222) (1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the record shows that the jury consisted of ten women (83%), that the percentage of women on the jury was 15% higher than the percentage of possible female jurors from which the jury was chosen (19 of the 28 potential jurors who were subject to peremptory strikes were women), and that the prosecutor accepted about 60% of the potential female jurors. See 6 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure, § 22.3(d), pp. 136–137 (3 rd ed., 2007) (citing cases discussing these factors as relevant to a trial court's determination of whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established). Moreover, the prosecutor had four strikes remaining when the panel of 12 jurors was accepted, and the list of prospective jurors indicates that, had the prosecutor used those four strikes against women, the result would have been a jury with eight instead of ten women. Considering all of the relevant facts, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Watkins failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose based on gender.” LeMon v. State, 290 Ga.App. 527, 660 S.E.2d 11 (March 3, 2008). Trial court erred in finding no discriminatory effect, where prosecutor struck all three black jurors in venire. “[W]e conclude that under the circumstances here, where the state’s strikes resulted in the total exclusion of African-Americans from the jury, LeMon made out a case of prima facie discrimination. The trial court erred when it ruled to the contrary. See Glanham v. State, 189 Ga.App. 505, 506(2) (376 S.E.2d 386) (1988) (strikes of all three African-Americans in venire made out a prima facie case); Durham v. State, 185 Ga.App. 163, 166(3) (363 S.E.2d 607) (1987) (strike of single African-American in venire made out an ‘extremely weak’ prima facie case).” Accord, Smith v. State , 306 Ga.App. 301, 702 S.E.2d 211 (October 1, 2010). Allen v. State, 280 Ga. 678, 631 S.E.2d 699 (June 26, 2006). “Where, as here, racially-neutral reasons are given, the trial court must ultimately decide ‘whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race- based.’ [Cit.] ‘ In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race- neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the [lawyer’s] state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” (Cits.)’ [Cit.] Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 454(4) (448 S.E.2d 179) (1994).” Here, a strong prima facie case of discrimination existed – defense counsel used all nine strikes against whites, eight of them men. “‘This overwhelming “‘pattern’ of strikes ... give(s) rise to an inference of discrimination.” [Cit.]’ Gamble v. State, [257 Ga. 325, 326(3) (357 S.E.2d 792) (1987)]. When the very strong prima facie case of discrimination is weighed against Allen’s explanations, the record shows that he did not express any reason why the juror’s friendship with the district attorney in the Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit and his wife was case-related. See Blair v. State, 267 Ga. 166, 167(2) (476 S.E.2d 263) (1996) (race-neutral explanation must be ‘case-related’). Moreover, the record does indicate that Allen did not challenge at least one other juror with a friend who worked as a prosecutor in the same Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit.” Accord, Stokes v. State , 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (February 26, 2007). Goldberg v. State, 280 Ga.App. 600, 634 S.E.2d 419 (June 20, 2006). “Considering that the ratio of African-American jurors to white jurors exceeded the ratio of potential African-American jurors to potential white jurors, the trial court did not err in ruling that Goldberg had not made out a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in jury selection. King v. State, 224 Ga.App. 400, 401(2) (480 S.E.2d 385) (1997). See also Jones v. State, 246 Ga.App. 596-597(1) (539 S.E.2d 602) (2000) (jury contained a larger proportion of African-Americans than did the venire); Livingston, supra (same).” Accord, Bell v. State , 306 Ga.App. 853, 703 S.E.2d 680 (October 26, 2010) (no disproportionate impact from State’s strikes shown when ratio of blacks on jury was same as percentage on venire panel, one-third.). Nelson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 870, 611 S.E.2d 147 (March 3, 2005). Trial court did not err in finding discriminatory intent and seating juror stricken by defense: “ ‘although a trial judge must accept a facially race-neutral explanation for purposes of determining whether the proponent has satisfied his burden of production at stage two, this does not mean that the judge is bound to believe such explanation at stage three.’ (Emphasis in original) McKenzie v. State, 227 Ga.App. 778, 778- 779(1) (490 S.E.2d 522) (1997). In its order denying Nelson’s motion for new trial, the trial court clarified that it found the explanation pretextual ‘based upon defense counsel’s demeanor while providing the explanation for the strike, his misstating what the juror’s response actually was during voir dire, his failure to excuse similarly situated jurors and his exercise of all but one of his strikes against Caucasians.’” “[T]he trial court's ruling arises from its consideration of the totality of the circumstances: ‘[T]he trial court in most cases must infer discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence. The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is