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accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and no additional proof of discrimination is required.’ (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) McKenzie v. State, 227 Ga.App. at 779(1). And this Court must be careful not to substitute its findings for that of the trial court. A judge’s conclusion that a prospective juror has been disqualified for discriminatory reasons is based upon findings of demeanor and credibility, which lie peculiarly within a trial court’s province. Gardner v. State, 225 Ga.App. 427, 434 (483 S.E.2d 912) (1997).” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (February 25, 2003). “‘In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge,’” quoting Hernandez v. New York , 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). Trial court’s findings on counsel’s motivation receive “significant deference.” Sheets v. State , 244 Ga.App. 304, 535 S.E.2d 312 (May 31, 2000). Convictions for vehicular homicide and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly granted State’s Batson objection to defense strikes, and reseated female jurors struck by defendant. Defense counsel claimed to have struck three female jurors because they were non-drinkers, but “the prosecutor pointed out that defense counsel had not challenged a male nondrinker.” “Sheets satisfied the second prong of the Batson analysis. However, considering the totality of the circumstances – the number of Sheets' strikes against women, the fact that Sheets proffered a ‘laundry list’ of reasons for almost every strike, and the fact that Sheets did not strike at least one male nondrinker – the trial court was authorized to conclude that the reasons were pretextual. McGlohon [ v. State, 228 Ga.App. 726, 726-727, 492 S.E.2d 715 (1997)].” Knuckles v. State, 236 Ga.App. 449, 512 S.E.2d 333 (February 12, 1999). “On appeal, the defendant urges that, if the trial court finds as to an excluded juror a racially motivated explanation, this vitiates any legitimate race-neutral explanation as to such juror. We do not agree. Defendant’s argument would be correct if the explanation was clearly racially motivated on its face. See Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 668(1)(c), 437 S.E.2d 463 (1993). In Lingo, the Court held ‘[t]he dissent correctly cites Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga.App. 85, 88, 424 S.E.2d 368 (1992), a recent Court of Appeals case, for the rule that where racially-neutral and neutrally-applied reasons are given for a strike, the simultaneous existence of any racially motivated explanation results in a Batson violation.’ Id. In Strozier, the second reason given was facially and impermissibly racially motivated, which pervaded the exercise of the strike, no matter what other reasons were given. ‘An assumption [without voir dire support] that the prospective juror in the instant case would likewise act “along racial lines” and engage in “misconduct” would constitute “an impermissible assumption ultimately arising solely from the juror’s race.” [Cit.]’ Strozier, supra at 88, 424 S.E.2d 368. Lingo also held that no presumption arises ‘that any reason for striking a black juror, not also used against a white juror – regardless of other reasons for striking a black juror – is, per se racially motivated. This is not what Batson or Strozier hold, or even imply. Rather, there is a Batson violation only where the prosecutor’s explanation is determined to be racially motivated. Where there are multiple reasons for striking a juror, white or black, it cannot be presumed that a reason applied to one juror, of one race, but not applied to another juror, of another race, is racially motivated .’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Lingo, supra at 668-669(1)(c), 437 S.E.2d 463.” 4. MISCELLANEOUS REASONS FOR STRIKES Bester v. State, 294 Ga. 195, 751 S.E.2d 360 (November 18, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no Batson violation, as strike was race neutral. “The prosecutor … said that she struck one of the jurors because he was a bondsman on a large drug case in Atkinson County.” Kirkland v. State, 315 Ga.App. 143, 726 S.E.2d 644 (March 26, 2012). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; State’s strike of jurors who said they “would need forensic evidence in order to convict a defendant” were race-neutral. Raines v. State, 313 Ga.App. 879, 722 S.E.2d 779 (February 3, 2012). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; no Batson violation where prosecutor struck juror who “regularly watched CSI on television and the prosecutor had been involved in a case that ended with a mistrial because a juror who was a CSI fan felt that the scientific evidence presented did not measure up to ‘CSI standards.’”