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5. PRETEXTUAL REASONS FOR STRIKE See subheading FINDING OF/WEIGHING OF PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ATTORNEY’S EXPLANATION, above 6. PROCEDURE Thomas v. State, 334 Ga.App. 189, 778 S.E.2d 815 (October 19, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court’s denial of Batson objections must be affirmed in the absence of transcript of voir dire. Minor v. State, 328 Ga.App. 128, 140(6), 761 S.E.2d 538 (2014). Powell v. State, 297 Ga. 352, 773 S.E.2d 762 (June 15, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “Inasmuch as no Batson challenge or other objection was made below regarding the racial composition of the jury, the issue has been waived for appellate review. See Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639(5) (522 S.E.2d 225) (1999) ( Batson issue was waived on appeal when it was not specifically raised below).” Minor v. State, 328 Ga.App. 128, 761 S.E.2d 538 (July 10, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed, but case remanded for determination of Batson issue. Prosecutor struck juror based on a) theft conviction and b) the juror’s gold teeth. Trial court found the theft conviction to be a race-neutral basis for strike, although she “[was] not impressed [with] the [State's] gold teeth argument.” Court of Appeals expresses concern about “whether this explanation reflected a racial stereotype,” but the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to address the issue, finding the theft conviction to be sufficient. Remanded for consideration of this issue based on Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga.App. 85(5), 424 S.E.2d 368 (1992). “The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted Strozier as standing for the proposition ‘that where it can be determined that the racially neutral explanation is, in fact, pretextual since there is a racially motivated reason that can be independently determined, the jury selection process is invalid under Batson. ’ Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 667(1)(c), n. 4, 437 S.E.2d 463 (1993). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court emphasized that ‘[t]he cases cited by Strozier illustrate that there must be some indication that the “additional reason” is, in fact, racially motivated.’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.” Henderson v. State, 320 Ga.App. 553, 740 S.E.2d 280 (March 20, 2013). Convictions for sexual exploitation of children affirmed; no error in granting State’s Batson challenge to defense strike. Counsel said he struck juror because “I thought I recognized [L.C.] as being a former bailiff here at the [c]ourt. And I struck her because bailiffs see everything and hear everything.” “We agree that Henderson's explanation of his basis for striking L.C. was facially gender-neutral, and therefore, Henderson satisfied the second prong of the Batson analysis. See Toomer [ v. State, 292 Ga. 49, 54-55(2)(b) (734 S.E.2d 333) (2012)]; Sheets [ v. State, 244 Ga.App. 305-306(1) (535 S.E.2d 312) (2000)]. But, ‘although a trial judge must accept a facially [gender]-neutral explanation for purposes of determining whether the proponent has satisfied his burden of production at stage two, this does not mean that the judge is bound to believe such explanation at stage three.’ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Brown v. State, 307 Ga.App. 797, 800(1) (706 S.E.2d 170) (2011). ‘The trial court observed first-hand ... [trial counsel's] demeanor as he explained the reasons for the peremptory strikes before finding, at step three of the Batson analysis,’ that the State established discriminatory intent on the part of trial counsel in striking [juror]. Toomer, 292 Ga. at 57–58(2)(d).” “Giving great deference to the trial court's ultimate finding and considering the totality of the circumstances, including the number of Henderson's strikes against females, trial counsel's inability to articulate a gender-neutral basis for the strike against [another juror], and that counsel was unsure about whether [this juror] was in fact a bailiff,[fn] Henderson has not established clear error in the trial court's finding that the strike was pretextual.” Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga.App. 197, 739 S.E.2d 682 (March 8, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s Batson challenges. 1. Trial court erred, however, in holding that the challenges were untimely. Defendant lodged his challenge after the jury pool had been excused, but before the jury had been sworn. “A Batson challenge is untimely when it is made after the jury has been sworn. See Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 195(3) (515 S.E.2d 610) (1999) (ruling that a Batson challenge should be made before the jury is sworn); Barrow v. State, 269 Ga.App. 635, 639(6) (605 S.E.2d 67) (2004) (ruling that a Batson challenge made after the jury has been impaneled and sworn is untimely). This Court has previously held that a Batson challenge is timely when made after the jury is selected but before it is sworn. See Wright v. State, 186 Ga.App. 104, 105(1) (366 S.E.2d 420) (1988). Since Littlejohn made his Batson challenge before the jury was sworn, it was timely. Id.” 2. “‘There is no requirement that the State's racially neutral explanation for its use of peremptory strikes be supported by a transcript of voir dire.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 453(4) (448 S.E.2d 179) (1994); see also Burgess v. State, 194 Ga.App. 179, 180 (390 S.E.2d 92) (1990).”