☢ test - Í

Holloman v. State, 319 Ga.App. 716, 738 S.E.2d 306 (February 8, 2013). Conviction for selling cocaine affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s Batson challenge. “Holloman contends that although the State proffered the criminal background check of these jurors as the reason for their dismissal, he argues that the State failed to supply evidence of the results of the check at the trial or at the hearing for the motion for new trial, which supports his argument that the proffered reason was not credible. Nevertheless, no evidence was presented by Holloman that the reason given by the State for striking these particular jurors would not also have been applied neutrally to a white juror with a similar background. See Smile [ v. State, 263 Ga. 716, 716–717(1), 438 S.E.2d 75 (1994)]. See also White [ v. State, 258 Ga.App. 546, 550(3), 574 S.E.2d 629 (2002)] (‘A neutral explanation is one based on something other than the race of the juror, and, if discriminatory intent is not inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. At the final stage of a Batson inquiry, the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Ultimately it was Holloman's burden to provide evidence to support his argument, and Holloman failed to produce this proof during trial or at the hearing on the motion for new trial. See White, 258 Ga.App. at 549–550(3), 574 S.E.2d 629 (‘The trial court's decision on a Batson motion rests largely upon assessment of the prosecutor's state of mind and credibility; it therefore lies peculiarly within a trial judge's province. The trial court's factual findings must be given great deference and may be disregarded only if clearly erroneous.’)” Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 130 S.Ct. 1171, 175 L.Ed.2d 1003 (February 22, 2010). Contrary to Court of Appeals’ holding on defendant’s habeas petition, neither Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), nor Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008), “‘clearly establishes’ that a judge, in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge under Batson … must reject a demeanor-based explanation for the challenge unless the judge personally observed and recalls the aspect of the prospective juror's demeanor on which the explanation is based.” “[W]here the explanation for a peremptory challenge is based on a prospective juror's demeanor, the judge should take into account, among other things, any observations of the juror that the judge was able to make during the voir dire . But Batson plainly did not go further and hold that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did not observe or cannot recall the juror's demeanor.” Here, one Texas judge presided over voir dire at defendant’s capital murder trial, a different judge “took over when peremptory challenges were exercised.” Second judge denied a Batson challenge to a strike based on an African-American juror’s demeanor, although that judge hadn’t been present to personally observe the juror’s demeanor. Duffie v. State, 301 Ga.App. 607, 688 S.E.2d 389 (December 14, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for selling cocaine affirmed; fact that State struck the only two black jurors in the venire was not sufficient to show discriminatory intent. “This argument fails, however, because ‘numbers alone may not establish a disproportionate exercise of strikes sufficient to raise a prima facie inference that the strikes were exercised with discriminatory intent.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 246 Ga.App. 596(1) (539 S.E.2d 602) (2000). Here, Duffie offered no additional evidence of discriminatory intent, such as showing that the State failed to strike potential white jurors who were similarly situated to the potential black jurors-i.e., who knew either Duffie or his family, who had displayed signs of favoritism towards Duffie, or who had displayed signs of hostility towards the prosecutor. See Bass [ v. State, 271 Ga.App. 228, 232(4) (609 S.E.2d 386) (2005)].” Bethune v. State, 291 Ga.App. 674, 662 S.E.2d 774 (May 23, 2008). Strike was race-neutral: “when she was asked on the juror questionnaire if she had ever served on a jury, she responded that ‘I don't know what a juror is.’ While Bethune complains that the State failed to ask the venire-member sufficient follow-up questions that might have explained such response, the State was not required to ask any follow-up questions, and its proffered reason for striking a venire- member must be accepted by the trial court so long as it is not inherently discriminatory. Jones v. State, 226 Ga.App. 428, 429(1) (487 S.E.2d 62) (1997).” Ludy v. State, 283 Ga. 322, 658 S.E.2d 745 (March 17, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s Batson challenge; merely stating that State used eight of nine strikes against black jurors “failed to set forth a prima facie case of racial discrimination. … Ludy did not introduce evidence to meet his burden of demonstrating that ‘the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ Mitchell v. State, 271 Ga. 42, 45(5) (461 S.E.2d 803) (2002). He did not show the racial composition of the panels from which the jury was selected or the racial composition of the resulting jury. Compare Livingston v. State, 271 Ga. 714, 719(3) (524 S.E.2d 222) (1999). His only reference to any relevant matter was to the number of strikes by the State exercised against African-American veniremen, which alone does not give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Mitchell, supra. And, even that reference was simply during a colloquy with the bench, which is insufficient to meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See