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pretextual. Defendant claims she was denied the right to review the prosecutor’s notes regarding potential jurors. Held, Georgia law does not accord a defendant the right to review prosecutor’s juror notes and records. Georgia law does not require an in-camera inspection of prosecutor’s notes, as, citing Chavarria v. State , 248 Ga.App. 398 (2001), a defendant is not entitled to cross-examine a prosecutor on the source of the prosecutor’s information about the stricken prospective jurors, even though that information had not been revealed during voir dire. The law puts the decision of whether to inquire further into the trial court’s hands. Harris v. State, 251 Ga.App. 475, 554 S.E.2d 606 (September 6, 2001). It is improper for the trial court to combine steps two and three of the three-part test, set out in Jackson v. State , 265 Ga. 897, 898-899 (1995), which is used to determine whether a party racially discriminated during the exercise of its peremptory strikes of prospective jurors. By combining the steps, a trial court improperly shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the striking party. See also Harrison v. State , 257 Ga.App. 718, 572 S.E.2d 4 (September 18, 2002) (holding that when a trial court terminates the inquiry at step two because the race-neutral reason proffered is silly or superstitious, the court has violated the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike; i.e., unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in a defendant’s step two explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral and the analysis must move to step three wherein the court must decide whether the State (as opponent of the strike) proved purposeful racial discrimination.) Holmes v. State , 273 Ga. 644, 543 S.E.2d 688 (February 16, 2001). “[T]he trial court has the constitutional power to seat an individual juror determined to have been challenged in violation of Batson .” Accord, Brown v. State , 307 Ga.App. 797, 706 S.E.2d 170 (February 11, 2011). Medina v. State, 247 Ga.App. 821, 545 S.E.2d 366 (February 5, 2001). After the State used one of its six challenges to remove the only Hispanic from the jury pool, the defendant posed a Batson challenge. The State’s attorney stated her reasons for the record (that the juror was a young student without ties to the community), whereupon the court asked for the defendant’s response. Defendant gave none, arguing that the trial court must expressly accept or reject the proponent’s reasons as race-neutral before deciding whether the opponent proved racial motivation in the use of the strike. Held, the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to give a race-neutral reason for the strike; the trial court then decides whether the opponent of the strike has proven discriminatory intent. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the proponent’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. Here, the court’s determination that the State’s offered reasons were race-neutral is implicit in the court’s solicitation of the opponent’s arguments why those reasons are not persuasive. Accord, Hicks v. State , 281 Ga.App. 217, 635 S.E.2d 830 (August 21, 2006) (where State challenges defendant’s strike, State has “ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation.”). King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. 1. “During voir dire, the juror requested on his own initiative that he be dismissed from the jury because of his connection to King’s family, explaining that considering the death penalty for King would be difficult for him. King’s contention that the juror was mistaken about which, if any, of King’s family members the juror knew is of little import, because a juror’s belief of a fact need not be correct to influence his or her deliberations. ” 2. “ The trial court did not err by allowing the State to rely on information not derived from voir dire questioning which was gender neutral. [Cit.]” Williams v. State, 271 Ga. 323, 519 S.E.2d 232 (July 6, 1999). “ Batson does not require and Williams offers no authority to support his proposition that in order to bolster his prima facie case of discrimination Williams was entitled to formally interrogate the prosecutor or law enforcement officers as to their method of investigating potential jurors or information gleaned from such investigation in order to discover directly the information obtained by the State in preparing for its jury selection. We decline to so hold here.” Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 515 S.E.2d 610 (May 17, 1999). Batson objection was untimely: “Following the selection of jurors, the trial court asked counsel: ‘Is this your jury?’ When counsel replied that it was, the jurors were sworn and, after the court made some preliminary remarks, it dismissed the jurors for the evening. At that point, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge. The court denied the challenge as untimely. We find no error. See Berry v. State, 268 Ga. 437, 439, 490 S.E.2d 389 (1997) ( Batson challenge is untimely when made after jury was sworn and exited the courtroom); State v. Sparks, 257 Ga. 97, 98, 355 S.E.2d 658 (1987) ( Batson challenge should be made before jury is