☢ test - Í

sworn).” Hinson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 366, 515 S.E.2d 203 (March 30, 1999). 1. When a strike is challenged, the proponent of the strike is required to offer a race-neutral explanation, but is not required to show bias on the part of the juror. “[T]he trial court erred in holding defendant’s reasons for striking certain veniremen were not race-neutral and for placing four stricken jurors on the panel.” Defense counsel used 11 of 12 strikes to remove white jurors; prosecutor raised McCollum objection. Defense counsel justified one strike on basis that juror was a teacher and wife of a church deacon, and he didn’t want a teacher on a drug case. A second juror was “[a] career state employee.” Trial court seated both jurors, ruling that “no bias on the part of [these jurors] was ‘demonstrated in the record.’” Held, trial court improperly ruled that counsel was required to show bias from the record. “Defense counsel’s inference that a career state employee might be an establishment-oriented juror tending to favor the government is neither whimsical nor fanciful, and it is certainly race-neutral. The trial court did not indicate she thought these race-neutral reasons were pretextual, and the State offered no further argument. Moreover, the trial court’s written findings denying defendant’s motion for new trial on this ground erroneously continue to place the onus on the proponent to establish bias during voir dire. Consequently, the record does not authorize a finding that the State, as the opponent of this peremptory strike, met its burden of persuasion to rebut the race-neutral explanation given by defense counsel. The trial court’s reasoning to the contrary again miscasts the ultimate burden of persuasion, which in this case never shifts from the State as the opponent of the strike to establish racially discriminatory intent despite race-neutral explanations.” “‘ We must keep in mind that the reasonable suspicion of a juror’s impartiality that prompts the exercise of a peremptory challenge need not rise to the level of justifying the removal of a venireman for cause. Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732(2), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995). We must also keep in mind that the [proponent’s] multiple rationales for the exercise of [this] strike were facially race- neutral and were supported by [sufficient undisputed] facts elicited during voir dire.... The [proponent’s] failure to ask [additional] questions does not evidence racial animus.’ Turner v. State, [267 Ga. 149, 152-153(2), 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996)].” Two judges dissent, would hold that trial judge was entitled to find counsel’s stated reasons pretextual. 2. Trial court properly re-seated juror, finding that counsel’s stated reason for strike was pretextual. Counsel stated strike was because juror was a housewife. “[The trial court ruled that since juror no. 15] has worked for 13 years [outside the home] she has [not] been a homemaker her entire life.... and put her back on the jury. Given counsel’s factual inaccuracy (as opposed to lack of knowledge) regarding this juror’s life experiences underlying defendant’s stated racially neutral reason, the trial court was authorized to conclude that stated reason was pretextual.” Knuckles v. State, 236 Ga.App. 449, 512 S.E.2d 333 (February 12, 1999). “On appeal, the defendant urges that, if the trial court finds as to an excluded juror a racially motivated explanation, this vitiates any legitimate race-neutral explanation as to such juror. We do not agree. Defendant’s argument would be correct if the explanation was clearly racially motivated on its face. See Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 668(1)(c), 437 S.E.2d 463 (1993). In Lingo, the Court held ‘[t]he dissent correctly cites Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga.App. 85, 88, 424 S.E.2d 368 (1992), a recent Court of Appeals case, for the rule that where racially-neutral and neutrally-applied reasons are given for a strike, the simultaneous existence of any racially motivated explanation results in a Batson violation.’ Id. In Strozier, the second reason given was facially and impermissibly racially motivated, which pervaded the exercise of the strike, no matter what other reasons were given. ‘An assumption [without voir dire support] that the prospective juror in the instant case would likewise act “along racial lines” and engage in “misconduct” would constitute “an impermissible assumption ultimately arising solely from the juror’s race.” [Cit.]’ Strozier, supra at 88, 424 S.E.2d 368. Lingo also held that no presumption arises ‘that any reason for striking a black juror, not also used against a white juror – regardless of other reasons for striking a black juror – is, per se racially motivated. This is not what Batson or Strozier hold, or even imply. Rather, there is a Batson violation only where the prosecutor’s explanation is determined to be racially motivated. Where there are multiple reasons for striking a juror, white or black, it cannot be presumed that a reason applied to one juror, of one race, but not applied to another juror, of another race, is racially motivated .’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Lingo, supra at 668-669(1)(c), 437 S.E.2d 463.” 7. STRIKES BASED ON AGE O’Connell v. State, 294 Ga. 379, 754 S.E.2d 29 (January 21, 2014). Malice murder conviction affirmed; State’s strike of juror, based on her youth and eagerness to serve on the jury, was race-neutral. “A peremptory strike based on a juror's demeanor during voir dire may be deemed to be race-neutral. Toomer [ v. State, 292 Ga. 49, 54 (734 S.E.2d 333) (2012)]. Furthermore, age can be a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike. Burkett v. State, 230 Ga.App. 676, 677 (497 S.E.2d 807) (1998).”