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received notice of trial date. “Therefore, it is clear that any variance in Burnette's last known address did not affect any substantive rights or Burnette's ability to prepare his defense.” Slaughter v. State, 240 Ga.App. 758, 525 S.E.2d 130 (November 10, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for giving false name to officers reversed. “[P]roof that the false name was given at a different time and place to a different officer from the one alleged in the indictment is a fatal variance between the allegations and the proof. Harrison v. State, 192 Ga.App. 690, 385 S.E.2d 774 (1989).” P. WAIVER OF INDICTMENT Martinez v. State, 322 Ga.App. 63, 743 S.E.2d 621 (May 29, 2013). Aggravated assault conviction reversed; waiver of Grand Jury presentment under OCGA § 17–7–71(a) was invalid because not in writing. “[A] written waiver was a necessary prerequisite to the trial court's jurisdiction. See Roberson v. Balkcom, 212 Ga. 603(1) (94 S.E.2d 720) (1956); Armstrong v. State, 281 Ga.App. 297, 298–299 (635 S.E.2d 880) (2006).” Armstrong v. State, 281 Ga.App. 297, 635 S.E.2d 880 (August 25, 2006). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea of former jeopardy; defendant was not put in jeopardy when jury was sworn to try case based on accusation where indictment was required. “‘[A] defendant is not placed in jeopardy until, in a court of competent jurisdiction with a sufficient indictment, he has been arraigned, has pled, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn. [Cit.]’ Fletcher v. State, 213 Ga.App. 401, 404(2) (445 S.E.2d 279) (1994). OCGA § 16-1-8(d) provides: ‘A prosecution is not barred within the meaning of this Code section if: (1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the accused or the crime.’ The trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to try Armstrong” under the original accusation, as defendant refused to waive indictment, and dimissed the accusation on defendant’s motion. “The superior court lacked jurisdiction over the offense, and the prosecution of the offense before that court is void and without effect. The trial court therefore correctly concluded that Armstrong’s prosecution is not barred on the basis of double jeopardy or prior prosecution. OCGA § 16-1-8(d)(1); see Rangel v. State, 217 Ga.App. 152 (456 S.E.2d 739) (1995).” II. ATTORNEYS A. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL See also various subheadings under ATTORNEYS – RIGHT TO COUNSEL , below 1. APPEALS/POST-CONVICTION RELIEF McGee v. State, 296 Ga. 353, 765 S.E.2d 347 (November 3, 2014). Thirteen years after defendant pled guilty to malice murder and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw pleas and motion for appointment of counsel in relation to said motion. “‘A court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion seeking appointed counsel to assist in the filing of an untimely motion to withdraw over which the court will lack jurisdiction.’ (Footnote omitted.) Barnes v. State, 293 Ga. 365, 366, 744 S.E.2d 795 (2013).” Motion to withdraw plea must be filed within same term of court as entry of the plea. Accord, Rhodes v. State , 296 Ga. 418, 768 S.E.2d 445 (January 20, 2015); Spriggs v. State , 296 Ga. 542, 769 S.E.2d 392 (February 16, 2015). Trauth v. State, 295 Ga. 874, 763 S.E.2d 854 (September 22, 2014). Following guilty plea to murder, trial court improperly forced defendant to handle direct appeal pro se. “[W]here, as here, a pro se defendant has been improperly denied counsel for his first appeal, he is entitled to relief in the form of having counsel appointed [to determine if there is any justifiable ground for an appeal from the original convictions, and if such determination is in the affirmative, ... file[ ] and prosecute[ ] [a new direct appeal] with the benefit of counsel,” quoting Roberts v. Caldwell, 230 Ga. 223, 196 S.E.2d 444 (1973). In this regard, because the defendant now has the benefit of counsel to pursue on appeal ‘any justifiable ground’ relating to his original convictions (or, in this case, his guilty plea), even those issues that were raised by the defendant in his first pro se appeal can be considered anew in his second appeal. In this sense, much in the way that the grant of a new trial has the effect of ‘set[ting] aside all proceedings in the old trial,’ Reagan v. Reagan, 221 Ga. 173, 174, 143 S.E.2d 736 (1965), the grant of a new appeal to a defendant who was improperly forced to proceed pro se in his first appeal would have the effect of eliminating any proceedings relating to that defendant's first appeal.” Notes distinction in remedy for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which is “‘to order a new trial,’” quoting Milliken v. Stewart, 276 Ga. 712, 714, 583 S.E.2d 30 (2003). On new direct appeal, however, defendant fails to show ineffective assistance of plea counsel, so denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea is affirmed. Calmes v. State, 312 Ga.App. 769, 719 S.E.2d 516 (November 3, 2011). Physical precedent only; defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses remanded to consider whether defendant waived right to appellate counsel. Trial