☢ test - Í

court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw “because his ‘disagreement on counsel's choices of strategy in the prosecution of his appeal [had] risen to such an unreasonable level that [his] further representation [was] impossible.’” Trial court, however, failed to inquire into whether defendant was waiving appellate counsel, and circuit public defender refused to appoint new counsel, forcing defendant to pursue appeal pro se. “A defendant may waive his right to counsel during post-conviction proceedings, but ‘the record should reflect a finding on the part of the trial court that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se. The record should also show that this choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of proceeding without counsel.’ (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted). Weber v. State, 203 Ga.App. 356, 357 (416 S.E.2d 868) (1992). Additionally, a defendant's ‘insistence upon the appointment of counsel who [will] accede to his demands and pursue a frivolous and baseless line of defense’ may amount to ‘the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Phipps v. State, 200 Ga.App. 18, 19 (406 S.E.2d 493) (1991). See also Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 177–178(2)(a) (702 S.E.2d 415) (2010) (trial court was authorized to conclude that defendant's expression of dissatisfaction with his third lawyer on the day of trial was a dilatory tactic that was the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel); Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638, 638–369(2) (469 S.E.2d 188) (1996) (trial court was authorized to find that defendant's discharge and employment of counsel was a dilatory tactic that amounted to the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Staples v. State, 209 Ga.App. 802, 803–804(3) (434 S.E.2d 757) (1993) (trial court was authorized to find that defendant's demand for a change of counsel was a dilatory tactic that amounted to the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel).” Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 690 S.E.2d 804 (March 1, 2010). Defendant was not entitled to appointment of counsel to appeal denial of his motion to vacate void judgment. “‘An indigent defendant is entitled to representation by counsel only for trial and for the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. [Cits.]’ Orr v. State, 276 Ga. 91, 93(3) (575 S.E.2d 444) (2003). Thus, an indigent defendant who, like Rooney, has filed a motion to vacate void sentences is not entitled to counsel to pursue either the motion or an appeal from the denial thereof. See Orr v. State, supra.” Accord, Holmes v. State , 306 Ga.App. 656, 703 S.E.2d 115 (October 29, 2010) (not entitled to appointed counsel to appeal “motion to correct illegal sentence.”); Pierce v. State , 289 Ga. 893, 717 S.E.2d 202 (October 17, 2011); Jones v. State , 322 Ga.App. 269, 745 S.E.2d 1 (June 17, 2013). Stockton v. State, 298 Ga.App. 84, 679 S.E.2d 109 (May 21, 2009). Trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel to assist defendant with out-of-time appeal of denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea. “‘[A]n out-of-time appeal is the remedy for a frustrated right of appeal, where the appellant was denied his right of appeal through counsel's negligence or ignorance, or if the appellant was not adequately informed of his appeal rights. A defendant has a right to appeal directly the denial of his timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. A defendant is also entitled to the assistance of counsel for such a direct appeal. When a defendant's right to directly appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea has been frustrated, he is entitled to an out-of-time appeal from the order on his motion. The disposition of a motion for out-of-time appeal hinges on a determination of who bore the ultimate responsibility for the failure to file a timely appeal.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Leonard v. State, 293 Ga.App. 808(1) (668 S.E.2d 321) (2008).” Appears inconsistent with Georgia Supreme Court authority, see McGee (November 3, 2014), above. Murell v. Young, 285 Ga. 182, 674 S.E.2d 890 (March 23, 2009). Grant of habeas petition reversed; after entering guilty plea, defendant “had no right to counsel in pursuing an extraordinary motion for new trial …. See Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865, 866, 561 S.E.2d 119 (2002) (extraordinary motion for new trial not available remedy for one who pleads guilty); Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457(1), 532 S.E.2d 102 (2000) (right to counsel attaches only at critical stages of prosecution).” Davis v. Frazier, 285 Ga. 16, 673 S.E.2d 215 (February 9, 2009). Habeas court erred in denying defendant’s petition; delay in filing notice of appeal was fault of trial court, which promised to appoint appellate counsel after denying defendant’s motion for new trial, but then failed to appoint counsel. “‘It is beyond question that an indigent has the right to appointed counsel to assist him on direct appeal; and an individual desiring an appeal need not, once a responsible state authority knows of the desire to appeal and knows of the status of indigency, specifically request appointment of appellate counsel.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Roberts v. Caldwell, 230 Ga. 223, 224 (196 S.E.2d 444) (1973).” Trial court here knew of defendant’s indigence and his desire to appeal, and specifically promised to appoint counsel on the record, but then failed to do so, perhaps because “[a] series of six … appointed attorneys represented Davis during the pursuit of his motion for new trial,” each withdrawing before the hearing was conducted. Coleman v. State, 293 Ga.App. 251, 666 S.E.2d 620 (August 7, 2008). Pro se defendant’s appeal remanded for