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consideration of whether he is indigent and thus entitled to free transcript. “In criminal cases, ‘an indigent, on appeal, is entitled as a matter of right to a free copy of the transcript of trial court proceedings in which he has been a party.’ Stalling v. State, 231 Ga. 37, 38 (200 S.E.2d 121) (1973), citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891) (1956) (indigent criminal defendant entitled to trial transcript at public expense). Motions for new trial and other post-trial motions are part of the ‘proceedings’ contemplated by this rule. The right to a free transcript arises regardless of whether the indigent defendant was represented by retained counsel at the time of the trial court proceeding for which the transcript is sought. (Citations omitted.) Mitchell v. State, 280 Ga. 802(1) (633 S.E.2d 539) (2006). Therefore, since Coleman filed motions to establish his indigency, which were ignored by the trial court, and as an indigent person, he would be entitled to a transcript of the proceedings below, we must remand the case to give the trial court an opportunity to determine whether Coleman is an indigent entitled to a free transcript. See Hall v. State, 162 Ga.App. 713, 716(4) (293 S.E.2d 862) (1982) (on remand, trial court ordered to hold a hearing to determine if [defendant] was an indigent person entitled to a transcript). See also Mapp v. State, 199 Ga.App. 47, 48 (403 S.E.2d 833) (1991) (appeal dismissed and remanded for hearing to determine [defendant's] indigence and for appointment of appellate counsel, if required).” Accord, Singleton v. State , 326 Ga.App. 609, 757 S.E.2d 211 (March 27, 2014) (indigent defendant entitled to free transcript of new trial hearing though he was represented by retained counsel at that hearing). Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 657 S.E.2d 842 (February 25, 2008). Reversing 283 Ga.App. 622, 642 S.E.2d 320 (2007). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s request for appointment of new appellate counsel so that defendant could challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel; defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, and the need to raise the issue of effectiveness of counsel at the first opportunity (that is, before appeal), override the policy of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council “not to authorize the appointment of new counsel for purposes of appeal.” Contrary to State’s assertion, defendant is not required to make a preliminary showing of ineffectiveness in order to obtain new counsel; this would either require trial counsel to show his own ineffectiveness, which he may not ethically do, Hood v. State , 282 Ga. 462, 463, 651 S.E.2d 88 (2007), or would require the defendant to do so pro se, thus denying defendant’s right to counsel and “thereby placing on pro se indigent defendants the burden of proving the existence of a meritorious ineffectiveness claim in order to ‘earn’ what they have a constitutional right to receive, namely, representation by conflict- free counsel. The indigent defendant would thus be compelled on his own ‘to examine the record, research the law and marshal the arguments’ to meet the threshold despite our acknowledgment ‘that they cannot do these very things for themselves.’ Reid v. State, 235 Ga. 378, 381(1) (219 S.E.2d 740) (1975).” Distinguishing cases requiring defendant pre- trial to justify replacement of counsel, e.g., Bailey v. State, 240 Ga. 112(1) (239 S.E.2d 521) (1977); Heard v. State, 173 Ga.App. 543(1) (327 S.E.2d 767) (1985). “In a post-conviction situation, … the legitimacy of a request for appointment of new counsel is per se established, in that trial counsel can not reasonably or ethically be expected to assert or argue his or her own ineffectiveness, Hood v. State, … and the request neither obstructs court procedure nor interferes with the fair administration of justice but rather promotes the prompt resolution of ineffectiveness claims before the judge who presided over the trial, consistent with this Court’s policy of affording initial review of such claims by the trial court. Hood v. State, supra, 282 Ga. at 463.” Opportunity to present ineffective assistance claim in habeas petition is no substitute, inasmuch as Georgia provides no appointed habeas counsel. Bynum v. State, 289 Ga.App. 636, 658 S.E.2d 196 (February 15, 2008). Superior court properly refused to consider defendant’s request for appointment of appellate counsel. “‘Prior to the passage of [the Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003 (the ‘IDA’)], trial courts exercised considerable control over the indigent defense process, including the appointment of counsel to represent indigent defendants. See former OCGA § 17-12-4 et seq. (2002). Following the passage of the IDA, however, public defender offices were established in each judicial circuit of the State. Defendants charged with felonies now apply directly to these offices, rather than to the trial court, for indigent representation. See OCGA §§ 17-12-20; 17-12-27 et seq.’ Odum v. State, 283 Ga.App. 291, 292 (641 S.E.2d 279) (2007). Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that Bynum was required to direct his request for indigent representation directly to the public defender’s office. And the IDA requires that the circuit public defender provide representation in any direct appeal of an action prosecuted in the superior court ‘in which there is a possibility that a sentence of imprisonment or probation or a suspended sentence of imprisonment may be adjudged.’ OCGA § 17-12- 23(a)(1). See also OCGA § 17-12-23(a)(4).” If, as defendant contends, the Public Defender has failed to respond to his request for representation, “Bynum is not without recourse as he may seek relief by application for a writ of mandamus.” Accord, Calmes v. State , 312 Ga.App. 769, 719 S.E.2d 516 (November 3, 2011) (Physical precedent only; mandamus an appropriate remedy should public defender fail to appoint appellate counsel where defendant hasn’t waived it).