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and merely speculate about possible alternative scenarios of how the incident transpired. Rather, Manders was required to admit the underlying act that formed the basis for the charge, which he failed to do. See Haynes [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 81, 635 S.E.2d 370 (August 11, 2006)]; Maxey [ v. State, 272 Ga.App. 800, 802(1) (613 S.E.2d 236) (2005)] . Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to give the requested jury instruction.” Accord, Ogletree v. State , 322 Ga.App. 103, 744 S.E.2d 96 (June 3, 2013) (charged with child molestation by showing child pornographic magazines, defendant wasn’t entitled to charge on accident when he testified that, in fact, he had found the child with the magazines and taken them away from her). Yeager v. State, 281 Ga. 1, 635 S.E.2d 704 (September 18, 2006). At defendant’s murder trial, court properly included, in the requested charge on accident, the concept of criminal negligence. “Yeager claims that by including [criminal negligence] in its charge on accident and in giving a separate charge on the definition of criminal negligence, the jury was led to conclude that they could substitute criminal negligence for malice. A similar complaint was considered and rejected in Sims v. State, 251 Ga. 877, 878(2) (311 S.E.2d 161) (1984), where the Court held: “The trial court’s charge was a correct statement of the law. We do not think the jury would have been misled by the definition of criminal negligence given as part of the charge on accident or misfortune. Rather, the trial court’s instruction simply followed OCGA § 16-2-2.... Death caused by accident is not a crime. Death caused by criminal negligence is not an accident. The trial court quite properly defined criminal negligence to enable the jury to apply the charge on accident to the facts as they might be found to exist.’ See also Black v. State, 222 Ga.App. 80, 82(2) (473 S.E.2d 186) (1996) (a charge on accident which omits the final phrase, ‘criminal negligence,’ is an incomplete statement of the law).” Accord, Watkins v. State , 290 Ga.App. 41, 658 S.E.2d 812 (March 4, 2008) (In defendant’s prosecution for aggravated battery, trial court’s charge on defense of accident was not erroneous based on reference to criminal negligence.). Haynes v. State, 281 Ga.App. 81, 635 S.E.2d 370 (August 11, 2006). Trial court properly refused to give charge on accident. Although there was evidence to support the charge – an out-of-court statement given by defendant – his defense at trial was that he did not touch his granddaughter’s vagina at all, contrary to the indictment. “ The theory of the case as submitted to the jury was that the molestation either happened or it did not – not that it happened by accident. Since a charge on accident was not adjusted to the evidence, the trial court did not err in failing to give the requested charge. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 245 Ga.App. 294, 296(4)(b) (536 S.E.2d 814) (2000).” Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. 104, 610 S.E.2d 66 (March 7, 2005). “[Defendant’s] testimony suggesting the victim died from a drug overdose and denying having taken any action that caused the victim’s death by manual strangulation ‘does not involve homicide by accident as defined in [OCGA § 16-2-2], but only death from accidental means not attributable to any conduct, culpable or otherwise, on the part of the defendant.’ Johnson v. State, 239 Ga. 324(1), 236 S.E.2d 661 (1977). [Defendant’s] testimony ‘does not raise the issue of accident or misfortune within the meaning of [OCGA § 16-2- 2]; rather, it relates solely to the issue of causation. [Cit.]’ Mansfield v. State, 161 Ga.App. 875(3), 289 S.E.2d 814 (1982). Consequently, he was not entitled to a charge on the law of accident and the trial court did not err when it declined to give such a charge. [Cits.]” Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 599 S.E.2d 177 (July 12, 2004). Defendant was not entitled to charge on accident: “there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Hannah’s act of striking Rice was an accident; rather, he testified he did so in self-defense ‘to get her off of me,’ and the jury was instructed on the law pertaining to self-defense…. Evidence that Rice tripped and fell does not go to the affirmative defense of accident concerning any act of Hannah’s, but rather to the factual question of whether any such fall caused Rice’s death.” Byrd v. State, 277 Ga. 554, 592 S.E.2d 421 (February 2, 2004). Trial court did not err in refusing to charge jury on both self-defense and accident. Cites one rare case where failure to give both charges was error, Koritta v. State , 263 Ga. 703, 438 S.E.2d 68 (1994). Trial court here properly charged on accident, but not justification, in accordance with the defense presented at trial. Compare to Lewis (May 27, 2008), above. Stefanell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 412, 587 S.E.2d 868 (September 25, 2003). Defendant, charged with DUI and failure to maintain lane, asked for jury charge on accident, “because there was some contested evidence at trial that his brakes might have malfunctioned.” Trial court properly refused to give the charge: “the law of accident is inapplicable here because Stefanell was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and failure to maintain lane, not failing to stop before hitting the backhoe… ‘[T]he charges against [him] related not to the accident but to his condition while driving.’” Also, defendant was not entitled to a charge on the affirmative defense of accident because he did not admit the underlying