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jury’s conviction of defendant on aggravated battery and child cruelty, each requiring a finding of malice, “thus necessarily means that it would have rejected any accident defense, which is premised on the claim that he acted without any criminal intent. See, e.g., Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 197 (599 S.E.2d 177) (2004) (explaining that, because “the jury was fully charged on the State's burden to prove every element of the crime of murder, including intent,” and “the jury believed Hannah to be guilty of malice murder, it could not have believed [the victim's] death to be the result of an act committed in the absence of criminal intent”); Phillips v. State, 247 Ga. 13, 13 (273 S.E.2d 606) (1981) (holding that the failure to give an accident instruction did not require reversal because the jury's decision to convict the defendant of murder necessarily meant that it concluded the defendant acted intentionally rather than by accident); DeBerry v. State, 241 Ga. 204, 206 (243 S.E.2d 864) (1978) (same). See also Wilkie v. State, 153 Ga.App. 609, 613 (266 S.E.2d 289) (1980) (same with regard to an aggravated assault conviction). [fn] Moreover, the evidence that Sears acted with malicious intent was overwhelming.” Benham, writing for Hunstein and Melton, dissents: “If the logic of [the majority’s] argument is followed, … there would never be a reason to give an accident charge in any malice murder case under any circumstance.” Arnold v. State, 303 Ga.App. 825, 695 S.E.2d 299 (April 23, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery affirmed; no sua sponte charge on accident was justified. “Under OCGA § 16-2-2: ‘A person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.’ … The evidence showed that Arnold, having consumed alcohol and with the intent to show Spradlin that West would die for her, counted down the minutes until he picked up a shotgun and intentionally stood within a few feet of Spradlin and West. … Even if Arnold did not intentionally fire the shotgun, under the evidence in this case, his admitted acts constituted criminal negligence rendering the defense of accident inapplicable.” Hill v. State, 300 Ga.App. 210, 684 S.E.2d 356 (September 24, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter reversed; trial court erred in failing to charge jury on accident, in addition to self-defense charge given. Defendant testified that he picked up knife to protect himself from pipe-wielding victim, but that victim then “ran up [on] me, I swear, he stuck himself.” See also Lewis (May 27, 2008), below. Lewis v. State, 292 Ga.App. 257, 663 S.E.2d 721 (May 27, 2008). Trial court erred in refusing defendant’s request to charge on both defenses of accident and self-defense, charging only on accident. “[T]he Supreme Court of Georgia has held that a trial court should charge the jury on both accident and justification ‘where one who is armed with a weapon claims it accidentally discharged while he was defending himself from another party.’ Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703, 704 (438 S.E.2d 68) (1994). See Turner v. State, 262 Ga. 359, 360-361(2)(b) (418 S.E.2d 52) (1992). That is precisely the situation in the present case. As previously noted, [defendant] testified at trial that the victim was attempting to stab him with a knife, that he was scared for his life and had his finger in the trigger hole of his firearm, that the victim reached for the firearm, and that the firearm discharged when [defendant] fell forward holding the firearm and the victim grabbed hold of the barrel and fell backward. Indeed, [defendant’s] account of what happened is strikingly similar to the defendant’s testimony in the Turner case, where the Supreme Court held that the trial court should have charged on both justification and accident.” Accord, Hudson v. State , 284 Ga. 595, 669 S.E.2d 94 (November 3, 2008) (trial court properly charged on both accident and self-defense, as defendant testified that she used knife to defend herself from victim’s threats, and that she did not mean to stab him); Hill (September 24, 2009), above. Rutland v. State, 282 Ga.App. 728, 639 S.E.2d 628 (December 5, 2006). Trial court properly refused defendant’s request to charge on accident in her prosecution for DUI and reckless driving. “It is firmly established that a defendant charged with DUI is not entitled to a jury instruction on accident or misfortune based on the claim that a traffic mishap that occurred while he was operating the motor vehicle was unavoidable, because a DUI charge relates not to the accident but to the defendant’s condition while driving. Stefanell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 412, 413 (587 S.E.2d 868) (2003); compare Moore v. State, 258 Ga.App. 293, 294(1) (574 S.E.2d 372) (2002) (jury instruction on accident or misfortune approved in vehicular homicide/DUI cases, if there is evidence that defendant could not have avoided collision due to circumstances beyond his control). For the same reasons, the defense of accident has been held inapplicable to a charge of reckless driving. Winston v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 670(5) (607 S.E.2d 147) (2004).” Manders v. State, 281 Ga.App. 786, 637 S.E.2d 460 (October 5, 2006). Trial court properly denied defendant’s request for charge on accident. Defendant was charged with battery by forcing child to ingest shampoo. “Manders testified that he ‘guess[ed]’ it was possible that shampoo ‘ could have ’ accidentally gotten into A.P.’s mouth when Manders was bathing him. But, in order to support a jury charge on accident, it was not sufficient for Manders to take the stand