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instruction given at trial. Accordingly, as the instruction given actually made it easier for the jury to acquit [Collymore] than the instruction he now prefers would, we cannot conclude that the omission of the term “criminal negligence” from the instruction on accident affected the outcome of his trial.’ (Citation omitted.) Mathis v. State, 293 Ga. 35, 40–41(3) (743 S.E.2d 393) (2013).” Goulding v. State, 334 Ga.App. 349, 780 S.E.2d 1 (November 10, 2015). Child cruelty, aggravated assault, and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on accident. “Goulding asserts that he was entitled to the accident charge because the jury heard evidence that he might have accidentally caused injuries to the baby by tossing him in the air, strapping him into his car seat too tightly, and shaking or poking him after he turned blue. But his defense at trial was not that he accidentally hurt the baby. In his closing argument, he denied he hurt the baby and argued that other people had access to the baby during the time frame in which he was injured.” Davis v. State, 323 Ga.App. 266, 746 S.E.2d 890 (July 16, 2013). Aggravated sexual battery and related convictions affirmed (but remanded for resentencing); defendant wasn’t entitled to charge on accident where he didn’t admit the act alleged. “Here, Davis admitted to carrying the victim and to touching her privates during that act of carrying, but not to the act of penetration that was the basis of the charge of aggravated sexual battery. Because Davis did not admit to the act of penetration that was the basis of the charge of aggravated sexual battery, he was not entitled to a jury charge on accident as an affirmative defense to that charge. See OCGA § 16–6–22.2(b); Sevostiyanova [ v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 736(9) (722 S.E.2d 333) (2012)]; compare Jones v. State, 161 Ga.App. 610, 612(4) (288 S.E.2d 788) (1982) (physical precedent only) (where defendant admitted to penetrating victim's vagina with his finger, and where accident was his sole defense to a charge of child molestation, a trial court erred in not charging the jury on that defense).” Ogletree v. State, 322 Ga.App. 103, 744 S.E.2d 96 (June 3, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no error in failing to give charge on accident. 1. Charge wasn’t supported by the evidence. Indictment charged defendant with child molestation by showing child pornographic magazines; defendant testified that instead, he found the child with the magazines and took them from her. “‘Since [Ogletree] denied doing the [ ] acts that formed the basis of [the] charge[ ] against him, his testimony could not form the basis for the requested jury instruction on accident.’ Manders [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 786, 790-791(3) (637 S.E.2d 460) (2006)].” 2. Full charge on intent and burden of proof rendered any error harmless. As to other counts which might have supported charge on accident, “‘the court instructed the jury on the law regarding criminal intent, including that it is an element of all crimes charged; [and] the State's burden to prove all elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’ McLean [ v. State, 291 Ga. 873, 877(4) (738 S.E.2d 267) (2012)] (citation omitted); Sydenstricker v. State, 209 Ga.App. 418, 419–420(2) (433 S.E.2d 644) (1993) (determining that charges as a whole adequately addressed the primary defense that sought to negate the intent element of charged crime). Because the court's charge, when considered as a whole, fully and fairly instructed the jury that it had the duty to acquit Ogletree if it determined that the state had failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it was not plain error under [ State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29 (718 S.E.2d 232) (2011)] not to give a specific charge on accident.” Haithcock v. State, 320 Ga.App. 886, 740 S.E.2d 806 (March 28, 2013). Child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge on accident. “Haithcock's primary, if not sole, defense was that no inappropriate touching or kissing occurred and that G.H.'s accusations were prompted or coached by her mother, who had just initiated divorce proceedings against him. He did not admit to committing the alleged acts or claim that he committed these acts unintentionally.” Henderson v. State, 320 Ga.App. 553, 740 S.E.2d 280 (March 20, 2013). Convictions for sexual exploitation of children affirmed; no plain error in failing to sua sponte charge on accident. Court gave full charges on burden of proof, intent, and requirement that the offense be committed “knowingly.” “Considering the jury charges as a whole, we conclude that the trial court's instruction adequately covered the defense of accident. ‘It is clear that the jury was fully informed that it had to find that [Henderson] acted intentionally, rather than accidentally, in [possessing or controlling the materials]. Thus, having found [Henderson] guilty of the charged offenses, the jury must have chosen to disbelieve [Henderson's] testimony and reject any contention that [his actions were] the result of accident.’ Fincher v. State, 289 Ga.App. 64, 67(2) (656 S.E.2d 216) (2007).” Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 717 S.E.2d 453 (October 17, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no reversible error in failing to charge on accident as a defense under these circumstances. In this shaken baby syndrome case, defendant contended that he “found the victim unresponsive and then shook and hit her in an innocent effort to revive her, [which] provided the evidentiary support for an accident instruction.” Majority finds, however, that