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2. ACCIDENT Watkins v. State, 336 Ga.App. 145, 784 S.E.2d 11 (March 10, 2016). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined charge request on defense of accident. “In this case, Watkins denied any touching occurred, accidental or otherwise. Accordingly, ‘[t]he theory of the case as submitted to the jury was that the molestation either happened or it did not—not that it happened by accident.’ Haynes [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 81, 83(2), 635 S.E.2d 370 (2006)]. … Compare Metts [ v. State, 210 Ga.App. 197, 198(2), 435 S.E.2d 525 (1993)] (accident charge required where defendant claimed he may have touched victim inadvertently when sleeping in the same bed with victim).” Seabolt v. Norris, 298 Ga. 583, 783 S.E.2d 913 (March 7, 2016). Following murder and related convictions, habeas court erred by finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel on this ground (but properly granted Norris relief on other grounds). Trial counsel wasn’t deficient for failing to request a jury charge on accident; “the facts of this case showing that Norris may have been ‘playing with’ the gun near the back of her father’s head when she shot him supports the giving of a charge on involuntary manslaughter based on misdemeanor reckless conduct, but not accident.” Citing Browner v. State , 296 Ga. 138, 765 S.E.2d 348 (November 3, 2014) (no charge on accident where defendant “admitted he pulled back the hammer of the gun and pointed the gun at the victim to scare him.”). Prior opinion, 782 S.E.2d 264, 2016 WL 366902 (February 1, 2016), vacated. Kellam v. State, S15A1913, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 117, 2016 WL 690367 (February 22, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on accident. Defendant contended that he accidentally caused the toddler’s injuries by bouncing her on a bed. But “the only evidence presented regarding the cause of death was that the child’s death was caused by ‘tremendous’ blunt force trauma that could not have been the result of the child’s falling off the bed or a self-inflicted injury. According to the medical examiner, the extensive internal injuries found in the child’s abdomen could not have been inflicted accidentally. She further stated that there was no way the child could have sustained her injuries around the home other than by something similar to a blow from a fist or a kick. Appellant did not challenge this testimony on cross-examination, nor did he present evidence to dispute this testimony. Since accident was not reasonably raised by the evidence, the trial court did not err by failing to give a charge on that defense. See Fain v. State, 165 Ga.App. 188, 189(3), 300 S.E.2d 197 (1983). ‘[A]n affirmative defense of accident generally requires an admission by the defendant that [he] committed the act that caused the victim’s death.’ Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 116, 119–120(2), 765 S.E.2d 328 (2014). At the least, a defendant’s theory of accident, whether it be supported by defendant’s admission or some other evidence, must be consistent with the undisputed evidence of cause of death, which was not the case here. By way of explaining what happened to the child, appellant stated to others only that he had bounced the child on the bed in play. He did not admit to others that he struck the child with ‘tremendous’ force or even that she had fallen off bed or onto any other object with such force. In fact, he denied to the hospital nurse that the child had fallen off the bed.” Kellam’s admission “only to playing with the victim by bouncing her on the bed” was not an admission to doing the acts charged in the indictment – “inflicting blunt force trauma injuries to [the child’s] abdomen with an unknown solid object.” “Additionally, according to the undisputed testimony of the medical examiner, the act of bouncing the child on the bed could not have been the act that caused the injuries that were alleged in the indictment and confirmed by the postmortem examination of the child. Appellant could argue, as he did in trial counsel’s closing, that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof that appellant committed the act alleged in the indictment. Because, however, appellant failed to ‘establish an evidentiary foundation to authorize a charge on the defense of accident, the trial court did not err in denying his request.’ Durden v. State, 327 Ga.App. 173, 179(6), 755 S.E.2d 909 (2014).” Collymore v. State, 298 Ga. 355, 782 S.E.2d 7 (January 19, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no harm in trial court’s modified jury instruction on defense of accident. “Collymore contends that the trial court gave the jury an incomplete charge on accident because it removed references to criminal negligence from the pattern jury charge. Pretermitting whether the trial court erred by omitting ‘the phrase “criminal negligence” under the facts of this case, there is no likelihood that the omission affected the outcome of the trial. The instruction as given informed the jury that for it to find [Collymore] not guilty by reason of accident, there must be “no criminal scheme, undertaking, or intention.” [Collymore] now argues that the jury should have been informed instead that there must be “no criminal scheme, undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.” Thus, the effect of the trial court’s omission was to remove from the jury’s consideration one factor, to wit, criminal negligence, that would be required for it to find that [Collymore] was not guilty by reason of accident. Put another way, what [Collymore] now claims to be the proper instruction would require the jury to make an additional finding before it could find him not guilty than it had to do under the