☢ test - Í

Murray v. State, 265 Ga.App. 119, 592 S.E.2d 898 (January 9, 2004). “In denying Murray’s requests for counsel and an out-of-time appeal, the trial court vaguely asserted that any appeal relating to his motion to withdraw the guilty plea would be discretionary, rather than as of right. Clear Georgia law establishes the contrary. A defendant has a right to appeal directly the denial of his timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. [Cit.] Our Supreme Court has also determined that a ‘plea withdrawal proceeding is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution.’ [Cit.] A defendant who files such a motion, therefore, is entitled to the assistance of counsel, and the trial court must inform the defendant of this right. [Cit.] Moreover, the right to counsel extends through the direct appeal of an order denying the defendant’s motion.” Accord, Watson v. State , 307 Ga.App. 839, 706 S.E.2d 194 (February 14, 2011). Schlau v. State, 261 Ga.App. 303, 582 S.E.2d 243 (May 16, 2003). Since state is required to provide counsel for indigent defendants for trial and first appeal as a matter of right under the U.S. Constitution, that right extends through a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea and appeal of denial of such motion. Cites Gibson v. Turpin , 270 Ga. 855, 513 S.E.2d 186 (1999), Fortson (June 12, 2000), below . Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 532 S.E.2d 102 (June 12, 2000). Following guilty plea to felony murder and related offenses, trial court erred in conducting hearing on motion to withdraw guilty pleas without obtaining a waiver of counsel. “The hearing which included introduction of evidence, advocacy by the prosecutor, and a determination of whether a guilty plea was valid, clearly affected Fortson's substantial rights and thus satisfied the test for determining whether the proceeding qualified as a critical stage under Ballard v. Smith, [225 Ga. 416, 418, 169 S.E.2d 329 (1969)]. Accordingly, because we hold that the plea withdrawal proceeding is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution and that in this particular case there was not a valid waiver of counsel, we conclude Fortson was entitled to counsel to assist him in seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas. ” See generally Council of Sup. Ct. Judges, Georgia Superior Court Benchbook § 4.12 at 4-5, 4-6. Accord, Kennedy v. State, 267 Ga.App. 314, 599 S.E.2d 290 (May 7, 2004); Johnson v. State , 273 Ga.App. 11, 614 S.E.2d 477 (April 19, 2005); Douglas v. State , 317 Ga.App. 425, 731 S.E.2d 109 (August 14, 2012) (trial court erred by failing to either appoint counsel or secure waiver of counsel on motion to withdraw guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute); Young v. State , 328 Ga.App. 91, 761 S.E.2d 504 (July 9, 2014); Durham v. State , 329 Ga.App. 312, 764 S.E.2d 898 (October 20, 2014); Walker v. State , 332 Ga.App. 256, 771 S.E.2d 905 (April 17, 2015); Owens v. State , 335 Ga.App. 537, 782 S.E.2d 321 (January 27, 2016). Costello v. State, 240 Ga.App. 87, 522 S.E.2d 572 (September 16, 1999). Trial court erred in allowing defendant to pursue his appeals pro se without first advising “defendant of his right to have counsel appointed for any appeal he might wish to pursue. Cochran v. State, 253 Ga. 10, 315 S.E.2d 653 (1984). … Consequently, we must vacate the judgments in these cases sub judice since the consolidated record does not reveal any explanation to defendant of his entitlement to appellate counsel, the dangers of proceeding without counsel and a valid waiver of appellate counsel.” 2. APPOINTED COUNSEL OF CHOICE See also subheading APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL – DISCHARGE OF APPOINTED COUNSEL, below Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (October 20, 2014). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to reappoint trial counsel to represent him in post-conviction proceedings “because he trusted [trial counsel] Moore and had a good working relationship with him.” “As to Hulett's contentions regarding his good relationship with Moore and Moore's familiarity with his case, it is true that, under certain circumstances, this Court has found similar considerations significant enough to outweigh countervailing considerations in cases involving the denial of a defendant's request to retain trial counsel. See Davis [ v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 222, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991)] (finding preferred counsel's familiarity with the case and long-standing relationship with the defendant ‘weighty considerations’ where the case was ‘legally and factually complex’ and where a contention was made that the defendant was ‘in a fragile state of mind’). However, we do not find such considerations as persuasive in post- conviction proceedings where the bulk of counsel's work is with the record under review. Moreover, in denying Hulett's motion, the trial court found that Hulett's current counsel had announced their intention to raise issues of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the motion for new trial.” Russell v. State, 322 Ga.App. 553, 745 S.E.2d 774 (July 1, 2013). Burglary conviction affirmed; no error where trial court “advis[ed] Russell that he could not have another attorney appointed simply because he did not like his current attorney. ‘While an indigent defendant accused of a crime for which imprisonment is possible is entitled to have reasonably effective counsel provided to assist him, he is not entitled to counsel of his own choosing. A request by an indigent criminal defendant to discharge one court-appointed counsel and have another substituted in his place addressees itself to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Reynolds v. State, 231 Ga.App. 33, 36(4), 497