☢ test - Í

S.E.2d 580 (1998) (trial court acted within its discretion in declining to appoint new counsel simply because defendant ‘tended not to like or trust his lawyer.’)” Phan v. State, 290 Ga. 588, 723 S.E.2d 876 (February 27, 2012). Interlocutory appeal in capital murder prosecution; no abuse of discretion in appointing GPDSC staff counsel to replace state-retained private counsel. “Here, while we recognize the value in having original counsel continue their work on the case — for reasons of efficiency and continuity and due to the relationship of trust they have undoubtedly developed with their client over these many years — we simply cannot overlook the compelling ‘countervailing considerations’ that exist. First and foremost, retaining current counsel would perpetuate the funding problems that have plagued this case thus far. See Weis [ v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 50(1)(b) (694 S.E.2d 350) (2010)] (potential for constitutional speedy trial violation due to funding problems ‘surely qualifies as a “countervailing consideration” justifying the appointment of replacement counsel, even over the defendant's objection’). In addition, as the trial court noted, [co-counsel] Adams has relocated his practice to Charleston, South Carolina, increasing the costs associated with his continued representation of Phan and further complicating efforts to move the case forward expeditiously. See Davis [ v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 223 (403 S.E.2d 800) (1991)] (Hunt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing as potential ‘countervailing consideration’ the fact that ‘the defendant's choice maintains his primary office some considerable distance from the court’). For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in replacing Phan's counsel. See Davenport v. State, 283 Ga. 29(2) (656 S.E.2d 514) (2008) (no abuse of discretion in replacing indigent defendant's original appointed counsel, as trial court's reasonable concern over counsel's diligence and preparedness was ‘countervailing consideration’ justifying court's decision). Cf. Grant v. State, 278 Ga. 817 (607 S.E.2d 586) (2005) (trial court abused discretion in removing appointed counsel of death penalty defendant, as trial court's interest in involving local counsel in case was not a sufficient ‘countervailing consideration’ to justify removal of defendant's preferred counsel); Amadeo [ v. State, 259 Ga. 469, 470(2) (384 S.E.2d 181) (1989)] (trial court abused discretion in refusing to reappoint prior defense counsel on retrial after grant of habeas relief, as desirability of involving local lawyers was not a sufficient ‘countervailing consideration’ outweighing reasons supporting defendant's choice).” Laye v. State, 312 Ga.App. 862, 720 S.E.2d 233 (November 15, 2011). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no error in substitution of public defender from another circuit for defendant’s originally-appointed private conflict counsel, based on budget constraints of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council. Record belies defendant’s contention that he wasn’t given opportunity to object: “another defendant did object and thereby retained his original counsel. No explanation has been given for why Laye's counsel could not also have objected. The motion to substitute counsel was served on counsel for Laye and it included the statement that counsel had been advised and had agreed to the substitution and that the defendants had not objected. Thus, Laye and his original counsel were on notice that the substitution was based on their failure to object. At that point, they had an obligation to speak up and correct any misinformation.” Ware v. State, 307 Ga.App. 782, 706 S.E.2d 143 (February 10, 2011). Robbery conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court summarily denied defendant’s pre-trial requests to replace appointed counsel with another specified attorney. 1. No right to preferred counsel. “An indigent defendant has no right to compel the trial court to appoint an attorney of his own choosing. The choice of appointed counsel is a matter governed by the trial court's sound exercise of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless [that discretion is] abused. However, when a defendant's choice of counsel is supported by objective considerations favoring the appointment of the preferred counsel, and there are no countervailing considerations of comparable weight, it is an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's request to appoint the counsel of his preference. Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 222, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991) (citations omitted, emphasis supplied); see Chapel v. State, 264 Ga. 267, 268(2), 443 S.E.2d 271 (1994). Nothing in Ware's letters provided any objective considerations favoring the appointment of his preferred counsel. And when Ware was asked at the hearing on motion for new trial why he had preferred in particular the lawyer named in his letters, Ware responded only that ‘I know [he] is a drug attorney, but I also know he's a good attorney, too.’ Thereupon, Ware was pressed, ‘Was this from personal prior experience of friends maybe?’ Ware answered, ‘Just from people that I have met through jail.’ He gave no additional testimony regarding his choice of appointed counsel. Ware's scant testimony fell short of providing objective considerations favoring the appointment of his preferred counsel. Compare, e.g., Chapel, supra at 268(3)(a), 443 S.E.2d 271 (noting that the appellant cited the following objective considerations: the preferred lawyer had represented appellant as retained counsel for about five months before being appointed, during which time he ‘pursued an aggressive motions practice’; during his representation of appellant, both as retained and appointed counsel, lawyer and client had developed a relationship of trust and confidence essential to effective criminal representation; a death penalty case requires special skill and knowledge and the preferred lawyer was one of only nine attorneys in the county both qualified and willing to accept appointed death penalty cases; and the preferred lawyer had ‘foregone further lucrative employment with [the county] in order to defend the accused’); Davis, supra (defendant's choice of two attorneys was supported by several