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weighty considerations, including that the attorneys were already familiar with the legally and factually complex case and the two attorneys had a long-standing relationship with the defendant, who they contended was in a fragile state of mental health).” 2. No right to hearing pre-trial. “In complaining that the trial court denied his requests without first conducting a hearing, Ware cites Heard v. State, 173 Ga.App. 543, 327 S.E.2d 767 (1985), for this proposition: ‘When ... the issue of the effectiveness of appointed counsel is raised, it would appear that the trial court, in order to insure that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right has been and will continue to be afforded, should conduct a hearing as to the basis of the defendant's motion for appointment of new counsel. An assertion of ineffectiveness is sufficient to invoke a ruling by the trial court, which ruling should be made after hearing from counsel. Thus, when the effectiveness of counsel is challenged, the Sixth Amendment requires more than a perfunctory, surface inquiry to determine the truth and scope of the allegations.’ Id. at 544-545(1), 327 S.E.2d 767 (citation and punctuation omitted). But Ware disregards Heard's further instruction that a trial court's error in refusing to conduct a hearing ‘can be cured by a post-trial hearing before the judge in the trial court. If on the basis of evidence introduced at such hearing the trial judge concludes that appellant was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel, it must order a new trial.’” Post-trial hearing here established no entitlement to other counsel and no ineffective assistance of counsel. Accord, Betancourt v. State , 322 Ga.App. 201, 744 S.E.2d 419 (June 12, 2013), affirmed on other grounds sub nom. Hernandez v. State , 294 Ga. 903, 757 S.E.2d 109 (March 28, 2014). Kollie v. State, 301 Ga.App. 534, 687 S.E.2d 869 (November 19, 2009). No abuse of discretion in rejecting defendant’s request to replace appointed trial counsel. “Kollie claimed that his second appointed trial counsel did not have his ‘best interest at heart,’ screamed at him and insulted him, lied to him, failed to relay to him a threat made against his family by [co-defendant] Brandt, and used ‘false methods of persuasion in an attempt to get [him] to accept the State's plea offer.’” “Because Kollie has not shown that appointed counsel could not provide him effective representation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to replace counsel three months before the start of trial. See Middlebrooks v. State, 255 Ga.App. 541, 544(6) (566 S.E.2d 350) (2002) (where appointed counsel used racially derogatory term, court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to discharge counsel because no showing counsel could not provide effective representation).” Armstrong v. State, 298 Ga.App. 855, 681 S.E.2d 662 (July 9, 2009). No ineffective assistance where defendant was represented at sentencing by a different public defender, because trial counsel was engaged in another trial. “Armstrong has not argued that the lawyer who represented him during the sentencing hearing performed deficiently. He merely asserts that, without ‘his’ lawyer, he was at a ‘disadvantage.’ ‘The essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee effective assistance of counsel, not to guarantee a defendant preferred counsel or counsel with whom a “meaningful relationship” can be established.’ Smith v. State, 273 Ga. 356, 358(3) (541 S.E.2d 362) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, Armstrong has shown no merit in his contention that the trial court erred by rejecting his claim. Id.” Davenport v. State, 283 Ga. 29, 656 S.E.2d 514 (January 28, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court, on State’s motion, removed appointed counsel over defendant’s objection based on counsel’s repeated unpreparedness. “Davenport and his appointed counsel appeared on July 7, 2004, for a hearing on pre-trial motions. The prosecuting attorney expressed concern at that hearing that counsel was not providing adequate representation and was filing motions for dilatory purposes; that counsel had first raised an insanity defense 10 days before a previously-scheduled trial date although he had been representing Davenport for almost two years at that point; that counsel did not prepare Davenport for an interview with a psychologist or even inform him of the interview beforehand; that counsel had been unprepared for a previous motion hearing; and that counsel had filed a number of motions on the evening before the July 7 hearing despite having had three months’ notice of the hearing.” Trial court tried to proceed with existing counsel, but “when the trial court came to understand that counsel was attempting to present the testimony of a psychologist concerning whether Davenport had a mental illness which would have prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights when questioned by a police officer, the issue of whether counsel was performing his duties competently was revisited by the trial court. Concluding that counsel had made a meaningful hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of Davenport’s statement impossible by ignoring his discovery responsibilities and instructions given at earlier appearances, and that counsel was willing, in order to avoid the consequences of not having made proper discovery, to forego the testimony he had just asserted was relevant to his client’s ability to make a voluntary statement, the trial court concluded counsel was not performing competently and determined it was necessary to replace counsel with new and more competent counsel .” Held, no abuse of discretion: “We conclude the trial court’s efforts to balance ‘the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar’[ U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565-2566, 165 L.Ed.2d 409) (2006)] and to protect Davenport’s right to a fair trial and representation by competent counsel were not an abuse of its discretion and