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did not, therefore, constitute error. Compare Davis v. State, [261 Ga. 221, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991)] (abuse of discretion when countervailing considerations not of comparable weight). In reaching that conclusion, we have taken into account the fact that it was the prosecuting attorney who initially addressed to the trial court concerns regarding counsel’s conduct of the defense, and the concerns expressed by this Court and the Court of Appeals regarding efforts by opposing counsel to have an attorney removed from representation. See Bernocchi v. Forcucci, 279 Ga. 460(2) (614 S.E.2d 775) (2005) (objection from opposing counsel should be viewed with caution for it can be misused as harassment); Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga.App. 129(1) (616 S.E.2d 888) (2005) (courts are reluctant to grant motions to remove opposing counsel because of immediate adverse effect by separating client from counsel of choice, because parties seek removal of opposing counsel for tactical reasons, and because such motions inevitably cause delay). Even considering those concerns, our review of the record in this case, and especially the fact the trial court was willing to proceed with counsel representing Davenport after considering the State’s expressions of concern, until counsel expressed willingness to forego useful testimony, persuades us that the trial court, rather than being unduly swayed by the prosecuting attorney’s concern, exercised its discretion properly.” See also Phan (February 27, 2012), above. Grant v. State, 278 Ga. 817, 607 S.E.2d 586 (January 10, 2005). Addresses “the limits of the trial court’s discretion in selecting defense counsel for indigent death penalty defendants.” Trial court erred “in determining who would serve as Grant’s counsel, [when it] failed to give proper weight to the significant relationship that existed between Grant and [co-counsel]. As was the case in Amadeo [ v. State , 259 Ga. 469, 384, S.E.2d 181 (1989)], the record reflects that the trial court wished to ensure the participation of local counsel. That objective is not sufficient, however, to overcome the strong interest of the defendant and of the court system in sustaining an existing, close relationship between a death penalty defendant and his counsel.” Note, unlike Amadeo , co-counsel in this case had previously worked with appointed lead counsel in the case, but had not themselves been appointed. Complexity of a death penalty case is an important consideration. Accord, Williams v. State , 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 51 (March 28, 2005). Distinguished, Phan (February 27, 2012), above. 3. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, GENERALLY See also subheading RIGHT TO COUNSEL – DISCHARGE, below, for cases on requests to discharge appointed counsel Joyner v. State, 278 Ga.App. 60, 628 S.E.2d 186 (March 7, 2006). “Joyner ... contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after ‘standby’ counsel was appointed to represent him during the trial. During trial, Joyner decided that he no longer wished to represent himself and asked the judge to designate standby counsel to represent him for the remainder of the trial. As soon as he was appointed, counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that he was unprepared for trial, and the trial court denied the motion but took a recess in order to allow counsel to speak with the witnesses and make ‘additional preparations.’ Counsel declared after the recess that he was ready to proceed. Joyner argues that counsel had insufficient time to prepare the case, and that this is grounds for a mistrial. But ‘[t]he standard of review for the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial is abuse of discretion. [Cit.]’ Johnson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 426, 427(1) (602 S.E.2d 177) (2004). As noted repeatedly by the trial court during the colloquy with standby counsel, counsel’s lack of preparation was entirely due to Joyner’s insistence on representing himself and then changing his mind mid-trial. Counsel had been present as standby counsel and was familiar with the case, and the trial court declared a recess and offered counsel the opportunity to interview witnesses and prepare, after which counsel stated that he was ready to proceed. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Joyner’s motion for mistrial.” In re: Schoolcraft, 274 Ga.App. 271, 617 S.E.2d 241 (July 11, 2005). Trial court did not exceed its authority by removing attorney from appointed counsel list as punishment for contempt of court. Attorney challenged removal on grounds that “penalty exceeded the statutory penalty for contempt” under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8(5), which provides that “superior courts have the authority to ‘punish contempt by fines not exceeding $500.00 and by imprisonment not exceeding 20 days.’” “Trial court has the inherent power ‘to prescribe the manner in which the business of the court shall be conducted,’” a power independent of the prescribed statutory authority and subject to review for manifest abuse. Removal from appointed counsel list “simply addressed the administration of the court’s business” and was within the trial court’s broad discretionary power. Speight v. State, 279 Ga. 87, 610 S.E.2d 42 (March 7, 2005). “In Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 764 (438 S.E.2d 905) (1994), this Court held that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel even if he has counsel representing him pro bono.” This is true both at trial (as in Roberts ) and on appeal, as here. Young v. State, 245 Ga.App. 799, 538 S.E.2d 487 (August 18, 2000). Physical precedent only. Aggravated assault