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conviction affirmed. Young’s argument “that he never validly waived his right to seek appointed counsel, is rendered moot by the fact that Young was provided with counsel who conducted all phases of the trial except the opening argument.” 4. COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL See also SENTENCING – ATTORNEY FEE RESTITUTION, below Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. State, 285 Ga. 269, 675 S.E.2d 25 (March 9, 2009). Trial court properly ordered Council to pay for cost of capital defense occurring after January 1, 2005, although case was originally tried before that date and conviction reversed on habeas. “[N]othing in [OCGA § 17-12-124] required that the Council fund representation only for defendants who are indicted or sent a death penalty notice after a certain date.” “[T]he fact that Attorneys were appointed after the effective date of former OCGA § 17-12-127(b) indicates that their payment is governed by that statute rather than preexisting law.” Council’s director also expressly promised to pay counsel in this case, which was within his powers under “former OCGA §§ 17-12-5(b)(3), 17-12-123(4) (Ga.L.2003, pp. 191, 197, 216, § 1). Even if Mr. Mears was not authorized to hire Attorneys and promise payment, former OCGA § 17-12-127(b) placed ultimate responsibility on the trial court for the appointment of counsel due to a conflict of interest in a death penalty case. Once such an appointment was made, that statute required payment with state funds appropriated to the Council for use by the Capital Defender, regardless of whether any authorized person agreed to such payment.” 5. DISCHARGE OF APPOINTED COUNSEL See also subheading WITHDRAWAL, below Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (October 20, 2014). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to replace appointed co-counsel. “A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a defendant's request to appoint his preferred counsel only when the defendant's choice ‘is supported by objective considerations favoring the appointment of the preferred counsel, and there are no countervailing considerations of comparable weight,’” quoting Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 222, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991). Hulett believed that co-counsel Hill wasn’t doing his job and had lied to him. Trial court found, however, that neither allegation was true. “The trial court appropriately weighed the considerations favoring Hulett's request and properly concluded that they did not outweigh the countervailing considerations that Hill had completed a significant amount of work on the case and that removing him would delay the trial while a new death-qualified attorney was procured and allowed time to become familiar with the case. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14(IV), 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (rejecting ‘the novel idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a “meaningful attorney-client relationship”’); Smith v. State, 273 Ga. 356, 357(2), 541 S.E.2d 362 (2001) (stating that the Sixth Amendment ‘guarantee[s] effective assistance of counsel, not ... preferred counsel or counsel with whom a “meaningful relationship” can be established’ (citation and punctuation omitted)); Chapel v. State, 264 Ga. 267, 269–270(3)(c), 443 S.E.2d 271 (1994) (‘The amount of time and effort expended by an attorney on behalf of a criminal defendant are weighty considerations in determining whether that attorney should be appointed to represent the defendant.’); Amadeo v. State, 259 Ga. 469, 470(1), 384 S.E.2d 181 (1989) (stating that an appointing trial court must ‘consider the prior experience of the available lawyers when choosing counsel in a death penalty case’). Moreover, the denial of Hulett's request did not leave him without trusted counsel, as Moore remained on the case throughout trial. See Grant v. State, 278 Ga. 817, 817(1), 607 S.E.2d 586 (2005) (noting ‘the strong interest of the defendant and of the court system in sustaining an existing, close relationship between a death penalty defendant and his counsel’). Thus, because Hulett's personal preference as to co-counsel was not supported by objective considerations that outweighed countervailing considerations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hulett's request. See Amadeo, 259 Ga. at 470, 384 S.E.2d 181 (holding that an indigent defendant's preference for a particular attorney is a consideration but ‘not a determinative factor requiring the appointment of that attorney’).” Accord, LaGon v. State , 334 Ga.App. 14, 778 S.E.2d 32 (September 28, 2015). Waddell v. State, 292 Ga.App. 801, 665 S.E.2d 893 (July 17, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s request to replace appointed counsel. “Waddell … contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint him different counsel [for trial]. However, in weighing whether to do so, the trial court determined that current counsel had adequately prepared for the case, had not failed to communicate with her client, and had otherwise taken action mitigating most if not all of the concerns raised by Waddell. Waddell identified no other preferred attorney, and no new attorney was familiar with Waddell's case. The trial court had given Waddell nearly four months to cooperate with his appointed counsel, whom the trial court found to have performed adequately, or to hire private counsel. In light of the facts of this case, including trial counsel's familiarity with the case, adequate performance, open communication, and time invested in investigating the case and preparing a defense, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Davenport v. State, [283 Ga. 29, 31-32(2)(b) (656 S.E.2d 514) (2008)] (‘[w]e have recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar’)