☢ test - Í

(punctuation omitted); Chapel v. State, [264 Ga. 267, 269-270 (3)(c) (443 S.E.2d 271) (1994)] (‘[t]he amount of time and effort expended by an attorney on behalf of a criminal defendant are weighty considerations in determining whether that attorney should be appointed to represent the defendant’).” Accord, Bates v. State , 306 Ga.App. 418, 702 S.E.2d 460 (October 13, 2010) (same; defendant chose to proceed pro se). Holsey v. State, 291 Ga.App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (April 17, 2008). Fact that defendant filed bar complaint against appointed counsel, and expressed dissatisfaction “because counsel allegedly had not communicated with him for several months” did not entitle defendant to appointment of new counsel. “[T]rial counsel responded that he had been diligently preparing the case and that he was ready to go to trial despite the fact that Holsey had filed a grievance against him. The trial court requested that trial counsel communicate with Holsey more frequently but was satisfied that there was no conflict or complete breakdown in communication warranting appointment of new counsel. Consequently, the trial court gave Holsey the choice between keeping his current trial counsel or proceeding pro se. Holsey chose to proceed with his current counsel. Given these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holsey’s request for an appointment of new trial counsel. See Johnson (February 9, 2007), below , at 528-529(5) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel based on lack of communication between defendant and counsel on key strategic trial decision).” Accord, Mason v. State , 325 Ga.App. 609, 754 S.E.2d 397 (January 24, 2014) (trial court not required to replace appointed counsel despite disagreements, absent “complete breakdown in their communication”). Johnson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 524, 642 S.E.2d 170 (February 9, 2007). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw on day of trial: “A trial court is entitled to ‘decline an attorney’s request to withdraw if “to do so would delay the trial of the action.”’ Quoting Bryson (October 20, 2006), below , and “quoting Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3(1). Here, the trial court already had discharged one attorney and appointed another for Johnson earlier in the case; the motion to withdraw was filed on the very day the trial was set to commence; the first trial had resulted in a mistrial; and the trial had already been rescheduled five previous times. Given these combined factors, the trial court was entitled to deny the motion to withdraw. See id.” “[T]he fact that defense counsel and his client disagreed over a strategic issue, causing tension in their relationship, was not sufficient, standing alone, to require the discharge of defense counsel,” citing Bryson (October 20, 2006), below . Accord, Holsey v. State , 291 Ga.App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (April 17, 2008). Bryson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (October 20, 2006). “Bryson claims that the trial court erred in denying his court-appointed trial counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation. Bryson’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representation four days before the trial was scheduled to commence. While trial counsel asserted in his motion that his relationship with Bryson was extremely strained and marked by an ‘atmosphere of distrust and lack of confidence,’ he nevertheless stated that ‘[b]ased on his judgments as to how the case should be tried, [he had] prepared for trial and could be ready for trial’ on the scheduled date. Bryson also indicated that he wished for the trial court to grant his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw and appoint another attorney to represent him. ‘[A]n indigent criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to discharge one court-appointed counsel and have another substituted in his place. A request of this sort addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Newby v. State, 161 Ga.App. 805, 807(2) (288 S.E.2d 889) (1982). Furthermore, Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3(1) provides that the trial court may exercise its discretion and decline an attorney’s request to withdraw if ‘to do so would delay the trial of the action.’ The trial court concluded that granting trial counsel’s motion to withdraw on the eve of trial would delay the trial of the action. Given that trial counsel represented that he could be ready for trial and the timing of trial counsel’s request, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw. See, e. g., Durham v. State, 185 Ga.App. 163, 164(1) (363 S.E.2d 607) (1987) ( defendant is guaranteed effective counsel, not an attorney-client relationship free of disagreement or tension ).” Accord, Johnson (February 9, 2007), above; Frye v. State , 298 Ga.App. 415, 680 S.E.2d 431 (May 28, 2009); Sevostiyanova v. State , 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Middlebrooks v. State, 255 Ga.App. 541, 566 S.E.2d 350 (May 24, 2002). “A request to discharge one appointed counsel and have another substituted in his place is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Just because [defendant] experienced distrust or loss of confidence in his appointed counsel did not entitle him to new counsel or show that counsel could not provide him with effective representation. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees effective assistance of counsel, not preferred counsel or counsel with whom a meaningful relationship can be established.” Accord, Tucker v. State , 264 Ga.App. 872, 592 S.E.2d 521 (December 19, 2003); McCoy v. State , 285 Ga.App. 246, 645 S.E.2d 728 (May 8, 2007) (no error in continuing trial despite defendant’s objections that he ‘did not like his