☢ test - Í

representation’ and counsel wouldn’t ask witness questions defendant wanted him to ask); Holsey v. State , 291 Ga.App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (April 17, 2008); Cain v. State , 310 Ga.App. 442, 714 S.E.2d 65 (July 1, 2011); Williams v. State , 318 Ga.App. 744, 734 S.E.2d 745 (November 26, 2012). Oliver v. State, 246 Ga.App. 32, 538 S.E.2d 837 (August 31, 2000). Shoplifting conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in proceeding to trial with pro se defendant who chose to discharge his appointed lawyer just before trial. “Applying the standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), the trial court and this Court must determine if Oliver intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege. That determination must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, ‘“including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019.’ Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 196, 275 S.E.2d 49 (1981). As has been repeatedly held, an accused is entitled only to ‘reasonably effective assistance of counsel, not counsel of his own choosing.... [Cit.]’ Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 616, 617(2), 491 S.E.2d 320 (1997). A request by an accused to replace one appointed counsel with another addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court. Reynolds [ v. State, 231 Ga.App. 33, 36(4), 497 S.E.2d 580 (1998)]. Here, because Oliver did not contest the competence of Peterson, only her preparedness, … there was no error in the trial court's requiring him to either proceed to trial with Peterson or represent himself. Moody v. State, 244 Ga.App. 214, 217, 534 S.E.2d 912 (2000); Reynolds, supra ; Jefferson v. State, 209 Ga.App. 859, 861(1), 434 S.E.2d 814 (1993). Also, we find the warnings given by the trial court regarding proceeding pro se more than adequate, particularly considering Oliver's experience. Clarke, supra.” Accord, Nicely v. State , 277 Ga.App. 140, 625 S.E.2d 538 (January 4, 2006); Feaster v. State , 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007). 6. FINDING OF INDIGENCE Hatcher v. State, 320 Ga.App. 366, 739 S.E.2d 805 (March 14, 2013). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; “upon reviewing the many colloquies between Hatcher and the trial court, we see no error in the court's failure to inquire into Hatcher's indigency following his comment that he had ‘to go with ... a public defender,’ where Hatcher: asserted at arraignment that he was employed and could afford to hire counsel of his choosing; was advised by the court, weeks before trial, that it was his responsibility to apply for appointed counsel if he desired to do so; [fn] first raised the issue of a public defender on the day of jury selection; apparently made no effort to apply for appointed counsel even after having another week before trial to do so; and then insisted, after suggesting a public defender, that he still planned to hire counsel for trial. … Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself at trial.” Thomas v. State, 297 Ga.App. 416, 677 S.E.2d 433 (April 9, 2009). Conviction for criminal trespass affirmed. Trial court’s denial of appointed counsel based on defendant’s family’s income upheld; OCGA § 17-12-2(6)(A), setting standard for indigence of misdemeanor defendants, specifically authorizes consideration of “other resources that might reasonably be used to employ a lawyer” besides defendant’s own income. Here, 19-year old defendant had $428 monthly earnings, but lived with his mother and stepfather, who earned $4000 monthly. Patel v. State, 283 Ga.App. 181, 641 S.E.2d 184 (December 15, 2006). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw nolo plea to family violence battery charge. “In 1987, the Georgia Supreme Court held that ‘the court’s judgment in regard to [defendant’s] indigency is not subject to review.’ Penland v. State, 256 Ga. 641, 642 (352 S.E.2d 385) (1987). Since then, our Court has repeatedly confirmed that on appeal ‘[w]e will not look behind the court’s determination of indigence.’ McQueen [ v. State, 240 Ga.App. 15, 16 (522 S.E.2d 512) (1999)]. See, e.g., Schlau v. State, 261 Ga.App. 303, 305(2) (582 S.E.2d 243) (2003). (‘whether a defendant is indigent, and entitled to have counsel appointed to pursue an appeal, lies within the discretion of the trial court, and this determination is not subject to review’) (punctuation omitted); Lopez v. State, 259 Ga.App. 720, 723(4) (578 S.E.2d 304) (2003) (‘[a] trial court’s determination regarding a defendant’s indigent status is not subject to review’); Barrett v. State, 192 Ga.App. 705, 707(6) (385 S.E.2d 785) (1989). Accordingly, we do not review the trial court’s findings as to Patel’s indigency. ‘Review of a trial court’s procedure in making decisions as to appointed appellate counsel, however, is authorized.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Schlau, supra, 261 Ga.App. at 305(2). As the trial court here conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Patel was allowed to present his evidence of and arguments regarding indigency, we discern no error in the procedure followed.” Accord, Breazeale v. State , 290 Ga.App. 632, 660 S.E.2d 376 (January 23, 2008) (determination of indigence not reviewable where defendant given opportunity to demonstrate financial condition); Thomas (April 9, 2009), above . Ford v. State, 254 Ga.App. 413, 563 S.E.2d 170 (March 25, 2002). Conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and related obstruction charge reversed. Defendant’s application for appointed counsel was denied by the public