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merely urged the jury to make a deduction about veracity from the facts.’ (Citations omitted.) Moody v. State, 273 Ga. 24, 27(4) (537 S.E.2d 666) (2000).” Hunstein dissents. Accord, Alexis v. State , 313 Ga.App. 283, 721 S.E.2d 205 (December 8, 2011); Humphrey v. Lewis , 291 Ga. 202, 728 S.E.2d 603 (June 18, 2012); Johnson v. State , 296 Ga. 504, 769 S.E.2d 87 (February 2, 2015) (no improper bolstering where prosecutor observed that experienced detective wouldn’t fabricate evidence: “He knows there is somebody taking down everything he says.... He knows that if he intentionally falsified something, it's going to come back to bite him in the butt.”). Wood v. State, 264 Ga.App. 787, 592 S.E.2d 455 (December 16, 2003). Prosecutor’s remarks to witnesses thanking them for their honesty were improper, but not reversible error given overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Wilson v. State, 276 Ga. 674, 581 S.E.2d 534 (June 2, 2003). Prosecutor’s opening statement alluded to witness’s statement to police, then added “we believe the evidence will show that she’s being truthful about these statements,” and made reference to corroborating evidence. Held, this was not improper bolstering, even when prosecutor said, “we checked out [witness’s] story. It checked out in most aspects.” Quinn v. State, 255 Ga.App. 744, 566 S.E.2d 450 (June 12, 2002). Prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to witness as “a ‘respected’ doctor who sacrificed a lucrative practice to serve as a general practitioner ‘on the west side of town where it’s sorely needed’” did not constitute improper bolstering. “Compare Bolden v. State, 272 Ga. 1, 525 S.E.2d 690 (2000) (statement by solicitor that he thought police officer was very credible constituted reversible error). Here, the prosecutor made no statement about his personal belief as to the veracity of this witness.” Bolden v. State, 272 Ga. 1, 525 S.E.2d 690 (January 18, 2000). Reversing 237 Ga.App. 195, 514 S.E.2d 32 (1999) , trial court erred by overruling objection to improper closing argument, bolstering credibility of police officer/only State’s witness in DUI prosecution. “During closing argument, the solicitor stated: ‘You look at what you heard from the officer, who I thought was very credible.’” “The longstanding rule is that counsel may not state to the jury his or her personal belief about the veracity of a witness. See Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 617, 266 S.E.2d 218 (1980).” Because officer’s credibility was “the primary issue in dispute at trial, we cannot conclude that it is highly probable that the solicitor’s bolstering of the officer’s credibility did not contribute to the verdict.” Contrary to Court of Appeals, error was not waived by failure to except to trial court’s ruling. D. CLOSING ARGUMENT 1. ABRIDGMENT/EXTENSION Johnson v. State, 309 Ga.App. 655, 710 S.E.2d 857 (May 24, 2011). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no presumption of harm, and none shown, where trial court limited pro se defendant’s closing argument to one hour. “[Defendant] points out that armed robbery is a capital felony in Georgia and OCGA § 17–8–73 allows a two-hour closing argument in cases where the defendant is charged with a capital crime.” “‘The right to make a closing argument to the jury is an important one, and abridgement of this right is not to be tolerated. Harm, requiring that a defendant be given a new trial, is presumed when the right is erroneously denied, and the presumption of harm, although not absolute, is not readily overcome. The presumption of harm may fall when the denial of the right is not complete and only in those extreme cases in which the evidence of a defendant's guilt is so overwhelming that it renders any other version of events virtually without belief,’ quoting Agee (October 24, 2005), below . “Here, the right to make a closing argument was not completely abridged. Johnson was given an hour to make his closing argument and ‘presumably tailored his argument for presentation in one hour.’ Hardeman v. State, 281 Ga. 220, 223 (635 S.E.2d 698) (2006). Further, Johnson could not articulate any argument that he would have made were he given more time. Therefore, ‘[t]he decisive issue is whether, but for the erroneous denial of the extra hour, there is a reasonable probability that [Johnson] could have convinced the jury that [he] was innocent of the crimes charged.’ Id. Johnson has failed to make any such showing and the trial court correctly denied his motion for new trial on these grounds.” Accord, Santiago v. State , 314 Ga.App. 623, 724 S.E.2d 793 (February 17, 2012); Wilkerson v. Hart , 294 Ga. 605, 755 S.E.2d 192 (February 24, 2014) (argument improperly limited to thirty minutes instead of two hours). Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 708 S.E.2d 294 (March 25, 2011). Convictions for felony murder, kidnapping and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to trial court’s announcement to jury that “the law gives each side an hour for closing arguments,” instead of the two hours allowed in capitol cases. “The trial court never interrupted [attorney] Axam’s argument or indicated to him that he had limited time. We conclude that such weak evidence of an actual improper limit on closing argument is insufficient to demonstrate a violation of OCGA § 17-8-73. In any event, the existence of the statutory right to make a two-hour closing argument in a murder case does