☢ test - Í

not mean that an attorney acts incompetently whenever he decides to use less than the whole two hours. Brown claims that Axam must have shortened his argument to less than an hour because of the trial court’s comment to the jury and that Axam did not object because he was unaware of OCGA § 17-8-73. But that is pure speculation. When asked whether he was aware of the time allowed for closing when he defended Brown, Axam testified that he could not recall what he knew on that issue eight years earlier. Absent a persuasive demonstration to the contrary, we must presume that Axam knew the law and that his decision not to object resulted from strategy and tactics rather than incompetence. See [ Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 110 (131 S.Ct. 770, 790, 178 L.Ed.2d 624) (2011)]. For example, even assuming Axam felt bound by the court’s comment directed to the jury, he may have understood that the court’s statement was erroneous but decided not to object because he was not planning to argue for more than an hour in any event; because he thought the court had simply made a slip of the tongue; or because he wanted to wait and see how the arguments were going and to object, if at all, when the trial court tried to cut him off to enforce the one-hour limit. There are many reasonable explanations for why defense counsel would decide not to make a two-hour-long closing argument in a case like this one, and Brown has shown nothing to suggest that Axam’s failure to object (to the court’s comment to the jury rather than a directive to counsel) was professionally deficient. As a result, the trial court properly rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this basis.” Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 891, 692 S.E.2d 384 (March 29, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; court didn’t curtail closing argument. “Pointing out that he was entitled to two hours for closing argument, see Monroe v. State, 272 Ga. 201(2), 528 S.E.2d 504 (2000), defendant asserts the trial court erred in limiting his closing argument to one hour. We disagree. Defense counsel informed the trial court that he planned to use the ‘full time’ for closing argument. Asked how long that would be, counsel said one hour. Counsel gave and finished his closing argument without asking for additional time. Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court curtailed defendant's argument. And even if there were any error, it was invited. Valdivia v. State, 283 Ga. 140, 657 S.E.2d 230 (2008).” Accord, Stovall v. State , 287 Ga. 415, 696 S.E.2d 633 (June 28, 2010) (no abridgment, although trial court announced one-hour limit on argument in capital case, where defense counsel’s argument lasted only 23 minutes; “appellant's assertion on appeal that trial counsel was ‘chilled’ by the trial court's announcement and the trial court's interruption of the prosecuting attorney's closing argument is without merit.”). Dorsey v. State, 285 Ga.App. 510, 646 S.E.2d 713 (May 23, 2007). “Dorsey claims that the trial court erred in permitting the state additional time to finish its closing argument. The record shows that after exhausting its statutorily allotted time for closing, [fn] the state requested five additional minutes to conclude its argument. The trial court granted the request over Dorsey’s objection. Dorsey argues that additional time for argument should not be granted absent a pre-argument request for an extension. As determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia, however, a trial court has discretion to grant a short period of additional time for a party to ‘reach the logical conclusion of [its] closing argument,’ even without a pre-argument request for more time. Carter v. State, 263 Ga. 401, 402-403(3) (435 S.E.2d 42) (1993). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to permit a brief extension here.” Miller v. State, 281 Ga.App. 354, 636 S.E.2d 60 (August 29, 2006). In defendant’s non-capital felony trial, trial court properly limited closing argument to one hour per side pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-73, despite USCR 13.1, which “provides that ‘[c]ounsel shall be limited in their arguments as follows: (A) Felony cases punishable by the death penalty or life in prison – 2 hours each side.’ Rule 13.1, however, must be construed consistently with the substantive law. See Wyse v. Potamkin Chrysler-Plymouth, 189 Ga.App. 64, 65(1) (374 S.E.2d 785) (1988).” As defendant’s charges, drug possession and trafficking, are not capital offenses, the one-hour statutory limitation applies. Hardeman v. State, 281 Ga. 220, 635 S.E.2d 698 (July 13, 2006). Deficient representation, but no prejudce, where trial counsel failed to object to trial court’s improper limitation of closing argument to one hour (instead of the two hours he was entitled to in defendant’s kidnapping trial). “The right to make closing argument is an important one, the abridgement of which is not to be tolerated. Ricketts v. State, 276 Ga. 466, 470(4), 579 S.E.2d 205 (2003). … A trial court’s erroneous denial of the right afforded by OCGA § 17-8-73 gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defense was harmed. Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809, 813(7), 493 S.E.2d 169 (1997).” Here, however, no contemporaneous objection, and although counsel was thus ineffective, no harm shown. Accord, Hammond v. State , 303 Ga.App. 176, 692 S.E.2d 760 (March 26, 2010) (same facts as Hardeman ; “[t]he issues in this case were not complex … [e]ven though the defense counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that there were other points she would like to have made in closing, the transcript of her closing and her cross-examination at the motion for new trial hearing shows that she addressed these issues to some degree.”); Johnson (May 24, 2011), above; Wilkerson v. Hart , 294 Ga. 605, 755 S.E.2d 192 (February 24, 2014) (argument improperly limited to thirty minutes instead of two hours).