☢ test - Í

Newman v. State, 334 Ga.App. 439, 779 S.E.2d 678 (November 12, 2015). DUI, vehicular homicide and related convictions affirmed ; no mistrial required where prosecutor told jury in closing that “the defense has requested a charge of homicide by vehicle in the second degree.” “In this case, although the prosecutor should have refrained from mentioning that Newman requested the lesser included charge, we discern no error in the trial court’s failure to give a curative instruction or grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s statement. … [T]he statement at issue was a passing reference only and still unlikely to have caused a different result in the verdict. The trial court provided valid reasons to avoid a specific instruction on the issue in its oral ruling, including protential confusion to the jury and prejudice to the defendant. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury generally on the requirement that the State prove every element of a crime, that the statements made by the attorneys were not evidence in the case, and that only the court itself could instruct the jury on the law. Finally, Newman completely denied driving recklessly during his testimony at trial, and thus, Newman did not assert the lesser included as a defense. Based on the foregoing and the evidence presented by the defense in support of the jury’s verdicts, it is highly probable that any error on the part of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury further regarding the statement did not contribute to the guilty verdict.” Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 779 S.E.2d 322 (November 2, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance where counsel didn’t object to prosecutor’s appropriate “comments during closing argument regarding witness intimidation. Specifically, the prosecutor highlighted the evidence of Hendrix’s post-shooting phone calls to Heard and Sanford; the obvious reluctance of another witness—who was ultimately declared hostile—to testify against Hendrix; and the visible increase in spectators ‘on the defendant’s side of the ledger’ during the testimony of the eyewitnesses. As the prosecutor’s characterization drew on reasonable inferences from admissible evidence and the trial proceedings, it was within the wide realm of acceptable closing argument.” Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; closing argument which asked the jury to have “compassion” for the victims was improper at guilt/innocence phase, “because ‘compassion’ for the victims should have played no part in the jury’s decision regarding whether Martin was guilty of committing crimes against them.” Objection forfeited, however, by failure to object. Brown v. State, 297 Ga. 685, 777 S.E.2d 466 (September 14, 2015). Felony murder conviction affirmed. No ineffective assistance for failure to object when prosecutor “noticeably choked up” while describing infant victim’s injuries during closing argument. “ This Court has long recognized that trials often evoke strong feelings, and ‘[i]t would be unreasonable to expect that all emotions be completely frozen during a trial by jury when such effective bridle on emotions cannot be sustained elsewhere.’ Forney v. State, 255 Ga. 316, 318 (338 S.E.2d 252) (1986) (citations and punctuation omitted). Lawyers should certainly strive to maintain their composure during trials, but the record here indicates that the prosecutor’s emotional display was neither extended nor excessive. … Under the circumstances here, we cannot say that no competent attorney would have made the tactical decision to let the prosecutor’s momentary display of emotion pass, rather than objecting and drawing attention to it. See Jones [ v. State, 292 Ga. 593, 601 (740 S.E.2d 147) (2013)]; Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 886 (572 S.E.2d 612) (2002). Moreover, even if trial counsel had made an objection, the trial court would have been well within its discretion to deny a mistrial. See Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705–706 (273 S.E.2d 124) (1980).” Crawford v. State, 297 Ga. 680, 777 S.E.2d 463 (September 14, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in allowing prosecutor’s closing argument, demonstrating strangulation by rope for four silent minutes, as described in evidence. “After tying the rope around a bannister in the courtroom and tugging on it to illustrate the act of strangulation, the prosecutor ended her closing argument with four minutes of silence stating ‘[t]his is Matthew’s four minutes.’” “The State’s demonstration … was authorized by the evidence presented at trial. As such a demonstration was not beyond the bounds of permissible argument, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision allowing the demonstration to proceed. See Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 336 (745 S.E.2d 630) (2013); Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 54 (572 S.E.2d 583) (2002).” Lamar v. State, 297 Ga. 89, 772 S.E.2d 636 (May 11, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument wasn’t improper. Lamar argued that another man, Stallings, committed the murder, but in closing argument, “the prosecutor stated that, if Stallings had murdered McCrae, the prosecution would not have been able to get Stallings to testify.” This was a reasonable inference from the evidence presented, not improper.