☢ test - Í

Galvan v. State, 330 Ga.App. 589, 768 S.E.2d 773 (February 4, 2015). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; any error in allowing prosecutor’s closing argument was harmless. “During closing argument, the prosecutor … remarked to the jury that he had tried 117 cases, but that he usually handled ‘gangs and murders’ and that this was the first child molestation case he had tried. … In this case, we fail to see how the prosecutor's extraneous remarks about his experience trying gang and murder cases and lack of experience trying child molestation cases could have had any impact on the jury's assessment of Galvan's guilt or innocence.” Johnson v. State, 296 Ga. 504, 769 S.E.2d 87 (February 2, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no improper closing argument where prosecutor commented on types of people defendant chose to associate with. “Johnson … claims that his trial lawyer should have objected when the prosecutor argued that the jury should not hold it against the State that many of its witnesses were either drug users or people who sold drugs. According to the prosecutor's argument, even though such people might not be the most reliable witnesses, it was Johnson who chose to associate with them. While Johnson asserts that this argument improperly put his character at issue, prosecutors have wide latitude in conducting closing argument, and they may comment upon and draw deductions from the evidence presented to the jury. See Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 347(7), 676 S.E.2d 215 (2009). Here, the prosecutor's argument was based on the facts in evidence and was not improper.” Campbell v. State, 329 Ga.App. 317, 764 S.E.2d 895 (October 20, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no mistrial required based on prosecutor’s closing argument. Prosecutor’s comment that police officer “was standing out in the hallway throughout this trial” was a matter not in evidence. “The trial court immediately sustained Campbell's objection, rebuked the prosecutor, and instructed the jury not to consider the statement. The trial court did not abuse his discretion in this response to Campbell's objection. See Wyley v. State, 169 Ga.App. 106, 108, 311 S.E.2d 530 (1983) (‘The trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial is not an abuse of discretion where the trial court immediately rebukes the counsel and instructs the jury to ignore the improper comments.’) (citation omitted).” Accord, Samuels v. State , 335 Ga.App. 819, 783 S.E.2d 344 (February 25, 2016) (immediate curative instruction sufficient where prosecutor referenced matter not in evidence – defendant’s history of alcohol abuse – in closing argument in DUI case). Mowoe v. State, 328 Ga.App. 536, 759 S.E.2d 663 (July 10, 2014). Rape conviction reversed; trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to demonstration during prosecutor’s closing argument, which amounted to introduction of new evidence. “[D]uring closing argument, the prosecutor asked Mowoe's girlfriend to stand up and make her presence known even though the girlfriend had not been called to testify at trial.” Prosecutor then commented on defendant’s failure to call her to testify despite her presence. “Mowoe argues this procedure was improper and that his counsel's failure to object ‘directly and misleadingly undermined [his] credibility, and at the same time wrongly shored up [the victim's] credibility.’” Court of Appeals agrees, noting her testimony at hearing on motion for new trial which supported defendant. “Having Wise stand up during closing argument demonstrated to the jury that she was readily available to testify and could have been called as a witness in the case, facts that were not presented during the evidentiary portion of the trial. Williams [ v. State, 254 Ga. 508, 511(3) (330 S.E.2d 353) (1985)]. This tactic, after the close of evidence, gave Mowoe no chance to rebut the prosecutor's demonstration with evidence showing the defense's efforts to contact Wise before and during trial. The prosecution could easily have used a similar demonstration at trial during the cross-examination of Mowoe, but if the State had done so, Mowoe could have asked for the opportunity to rebut it by putting Wise on the stand. … Thus, we find that ‘[t]his demonstration should have taken place during trial or not at all.’ Id. See also Sumlin v. State, 283 Ga. 264, 266(2) (658 S.E.2d 596) (2008); Mathis v. State, 276 Ga.App. 587, 587, n. 1 (623 S.E.2d 674) (2005); Rust v. State, 264 Ga.App. 893, 899(3) (592 S.E.2d 525) (2003).” Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44, 757 S.E.2d 646 (April 10, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; demonstration during prosecutor’s closing argument wasn’t improper. “[A]s the prosecutor began his rebuttal argument, he approached the jury box and said, ‘Mr. Turner, would you hand me that folder that's down at the bottom right there? There's not a folder down there, is there? Ms. Brown, don't look for a folder.’ Having heard defense counsel's closing, the prosecutor's point was that questions asked by counsel do not constitute evidence; only the witnesses' answers are evidence. The trial court overruled Appellant's objection, saying that the prosecutor ‘was making a point by illustration.’ Appellant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting this demonstration of a legal principle. Cf. Norton [ v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335–336, 745 S.E.2d 630 (2013)] (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court permitted the prosecutor to present a demonstration during closing argument using an 18–inch piece of wood to represent the sawed-off shotgun that the defendant claimed that he and the victim had struggled over).”