☢ test - Í

Rush v. State, 294 Ga. 388, 754 S.E.2d 63 (January 21, 2014). Malice murder and firearm convictions affirmed; no improper argument by prosecutor “which appellant contends implied his trial counsel was not seeking the truth or justice. However, in the complained of statements the prosecutor suggested that appellant, not appellant's trial counsel, was responsible for the ‘new lies’ coming out at trial. While it is ‘wrong for the prosecuting attorney ... to comment that opposing counsel knows the defendant to be guilty or knows his client's case is not meritorious,’ Estep v. State, 129 Ga.App. 909, 916 (201 S.E.2d 809) (1973), the prosecutor's comments in this case did not violate this precept. ‘The wide leeway given to argue all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence during closing argument, encompasses pointing out inconsistencies in a defendant's testimony and urging that, on that basis, the defendant lied.’ Appling v. State, 281 Ga. 590, 592–593 (642 S.E.2d 37) (2007) (internal citations omitted). … [T]he lack of objection from appellant's trial counsel to these statements did not constitute deficient performance.” Accord, Turner v. State , 334 Ga.App. 515, 778 S.E.2d 257 (October 8, 2015) (“The prosecutor’s comments about Turner leaving the residence before the police arrived were proper.”). Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 745 S.E.2d 630 (July 1, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no improper closing argument where “the State presented a demonstration with a piece of wood 18 inches long, which represented the sawed-off shotgun that Norton told investigators he and [victim] struggled over. [fn] … [S]uch a demonstration is not beyond the bounds of permissible argument, and Norton cannot show an abuse of discretion in permitting it. See Scott v. State, 290 Ga 883, 885(2) (725 S.E.2d 305) (2012); Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 198(9) (515 S.E.2d 610) (1999). Contrary to Norton's contention, nothing in the record indicates that the State introduced new evidence during the closing argument. Compare Williams v. State, 254 Ga. 508, 511(3) (330 S.E.2d 353) (1985).” Yancey v. State, 292 Ga. 812, 740 S.E.2d 628 (April 29, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no improper closing argument by prosecutor. “Appellant complains that … the prosecuting attorney attributed statements to him that he did not make, arguing that Appellant said, ‘I got to go ... I'm not helping you,’ when asked by officers to draw a diagram. Again, Appellant failed to object, and this claim is not preserved for review. Even if he had objected, however, a lawyer has wide latitude in closing argument to remark upon the evidence that has been adduced at trial, Banks v. State, 281 Ga. 678, 682(4), 642 S.E.2d 679 (2007), and he ‘may draw reasonable inferences or deductions from the evidence.’ Messick v. State, 276 Ga. 528, 529(2), 580 S.E.2d 213 (2003) (footnote omitted). The words that the prosecuting attorney attributed to Appellant were, we think, an arguably fair statement of what Appellant effectively communicated to the officers by his leaving the police station, and if a timely objection had been made, it would have been within the discretion of the trial judge to overrule it.” Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 740 S.E.2d 590 (March 25, 2013). Aggravaterd assault conviction reversed; prosecutor’s closing argument was unsupported by evidence. Prosecutor erroneously argued that defendant was involved in a prior gang incident. After defense objected, trial court failed to rebuke counsel, sustain objection, or grant mistrial, instead repeating the standard charge that closing arguments aren’t evidence. “We conclude that the general instruction given by the trial court was an inadequate curative measure and did not serve ‘to remove the improper impression from [the jurors'] minds,’ as required by OCGA § 17-8-75.” Accord, Luke v. State , 324 Ga.App. 531, 751 S.E.2d 180 (November 7, 2013) (co-defendant with Jones; note that, although the improper argument related only to Jones, “the State presented argument connecting Jones and Luke to one another and to gang-related activity.”). Wright v. State, 319 Ga.App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (February 11, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Prosecutor’s closing argument, suggesting effect a ‘not guilty’ verdict would have on State’s witness/defendant’s young female cousin, improperly argued facts not in evidence, but harmless in light of “the strength of the evidence against Wright.” Prosecutor here argued that defendant’s cousin “‘took the hard road. Don't let that be for nothing. What do you think she will think about doing the right thing in the future if you tell her you don't believe her? Do you think she will think it is worth doing the right thing again if you tell her, no, you are a liar? If you came up here, you were brave enough to come up here and tell the truth against your family, but, no, sorry. How do you think that would affect her for the rest of her life? It's just not right.’ ‘“[T]he wide range of discussion permitted in closing argument does have its limitations, the first and foremost of which is the longstanding prohibition against the injection into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial matters which have no basis in the evidence.’ Bell v. State, 263 Ga. 776, 777, 439 S.E.2d 480 (1994) (citations and punctuation omitted). This segment of the state's closing argument fell outside the wide permissible range. See Stroud v. State, 284 Ga.App. 604, 616–617(3)(h), 644 S.E.2d 467 (2007) (condemning prosecutor's inappropriate remarks to jury that returning a not guilty verdict would be tantamount to calling the testifying victims liars); Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 574–575(5), 602 S.E.2d 312 (2004) (finding that it was inappropriate for prosecutor to tell jurors, ‘For you to go back in that jury room and return a verdict of not guilty means you must be