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prepared to come out and look those boys in the eye and call them liars; because that's what it does.’).” Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed. Prosecutor’s argument wasn’t objectionable even if suggested inferences were contradicted by State’s own expert, as long as facts stated were supported by the evidence. “Ellington contends that the prosecutor made an argument that was contrary to the State's own expert testimony by suggesting that the fact that Christian Ellington's eyes were open after his death was an indication that he was awake during his murder. … [W]e conclude that the argument was not improper, even assuming it was not correct, because it was based upon evidence showing that Christian Ellington's eyes were open after his death, including crime scene photographs and testimony by the medical examiner. As to what inferences may be drawn from the evidence admitted at trial, we have said that a closing argument may even be ‘absurd’ as long as it does not introduce facts not otherwise in evidence, and the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments. See Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 203–204, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996). It was for the jury to decide what inferences from the evidence were reasonable.” Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 887, 734 S.E.2d 41 (November 5, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court sustained objection to defense counsel’s closing argument. Counsel’s references to defendant being a member of a gang weren’t supported by any evidence. Lewis v. State, 317 Ga.App. 218, 735 S.E.2d 1 (June 18, 2012). Convictions for family violence aggravated assault and battery affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, but harmless error to overrule objections thereto. “Here, the prosecutor argued, ‘I have been doing this for 29 years, a long time. When I first got into this business, I had domestic abuse cases. And just as [one of the witnesses] told you, there are many, many, many of them and most of the women will recant—the vast majority.’ Lewis objected and was overruled. Lewis made the same objection when the prosecutor continued, ‘Women will come in and be battered and they will say to you, “I don't want to press charges,”’ and the trial court made the same ruling. Lewis also objected unsuccessfully when the prosecutor argued that ‘[p]eople in domestic situations get killed’ and when the prosecutor began to describe an elderly man's murder to illustrate that a jury will convict based on eyewitness testimony even when the police make mistakes in failing to gather evidence. The prosecutor's arguments referring to her prior criminal experience, the frequency with which the victims she dealt with recanted, and people being killed in domestic situations were not supported by evidence, and the trial court erred in denying Lewis's objections to them. Conner [ v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 123(6) (303 S.E.2d 266) (1983)]. Likewise, while a prosecutor may analogize between a defendant and historical criminals such as Jesse James, James v. State, 265 Ga.App. 689, 690–691(1)(a) (595 S.E.2d 364) (2004), the prosecutor's reference to the murder of an elderly man in this case was not such an analogy and was improper.” Tucker v. State, 313 Ga.App. 537, 722 S.E.2d 139 (January 12, 2012). Drug convictions affirmed; no improper closing argument by prosecutor. When defense counsel argued that it was unrealistic to expect defendant’s co-defendants to take responsibility for the drugs, prosecutor was properly allowed to argue, “it is not unusual for the D.A.'s office to dismiss a case if someone comes forward and says no, those are my drugs, they are not Antron Tucker's, those were not his drugs. That is not unusual. It happens and it happens often. We do dismiss cases when people come forward.” “‘Closing arguments are judged in the context in which they are made.’ Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298, 302(3)(e) (658 S.E.2d 627) (2008).” It is apparent that the prosecutor was directly responding to the argument previously made by defense counsel and there was no error in her doing so. Cf. Manley v. State, 284 Ga. 840, 844–845(2)(b) (672 S.E.2d 654) (2009).” Tolbert v. State, 313 Ga.App. 46, 720 S.E.2d 244 (November 16, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument was based on reasonable inference from evidence, and responsive to defense argument. “[Co-defendant] Willis's counsel argued, ‘No gun recovered. No fake guns recovered. No evidence that a gun was even used or here or anything like that, even though they purport to have a weapon of some sort, somewhere in evidence.’ On rebuttal, the State's prosecutor responded to the attacks on the evidence and, with regard to the issue of a gun, replied, ‘No gun.... Well, why no gun? Well, because the Defendants got rid of it. We don't have the gun.’ … [T]he State's argument was clearly in rebuttal to arguments made by the defendants, [fn: See Johnson v. State, 150 Ga.App. 405, 407(3) (258 S.E.2d 22) (1979) (holding that State's argument was not improper when it ‘remarked upon a fact that was obvious to the jury’ and that ‘[s]imilar comments had been stated in the negative by the defense in his closing argument,’ making the State's remarks ‘a form of rebuttal’). ] and it sought to raise a possible explanation for the fact that no gun was entered into evidence. [fn] Accordingly, it was not improper to suggest a conclusion the jurors themselves could have reached on their own. [fn]”