☢ test - Í

Arnett v. State, 311 Ga.App. 811, 717 S.E.2d 312 (October 4, 2011). Marijuana distribution and firearms convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s argument, referring to defendant’s statement as a “confession,” wasn’t improper. “‘Attorneys [are] allowed reasonable latitude in the argument of cases to a jury provided they do not go outside the facts legitimately appearing from the trial and “lug” in extraneous matters as if they were part of the case. Counsel may draw remote deductions and inferences from the evidence and there is no basis for objection even if the deductions and inferences are illogical or unreasonable.’ [ Callahan v. State, 179 Ga.App. 556, 563(5) (547 S.E.2d 269) (1986).] Pretermitting whether Arnett's statement constituted a confession, the prosecutor's characterization of Arnett's statement to Detective Stockard was not an extraneous matter outside the facts legitimately produced during trial.” Trial court properly instructed jury that closing argument is not evidence. Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed (but sentence reversed); prosecutor’s reference to defendant as a “predator” was supported by “Bryant's own testimony that he had taken the victims' property after killing them and that he had attempted to suborn perjury in order to protect himself. Therefore, we find no error here. See Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 864(2)(a) (485 S.E.2d 470) (1997); Cooper v. State, 178 Ga.App. 709, 712(3) (345 S.E.2d 606) (1986) (finding the prosecutor's reference to the defendant as a ‘pervert’ and a ‘loan shark’ during closing argument were based on reasonable inferences raised by the evidence at trial).” Woods v. State, 304 Ga.App. 403, 696 S.E.2d 411 (June 11, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no improper closing argument. Prosecutor’s comment, “I submit there’s probably more we don’t even know today,” was based on evidence that the victim kept remembering more incidents of molestation each time she was interviewed, and that interviewer testified that this was common for molestation victims. Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009). 1. At defendant’s capital murder trial, prosecutor’s closing argument, misquoting defendant’s statement to deputies, was erroneous, but harmless under the circumstances: prosecutor erroneously argued that defendant told deputies the day before the murder, “I'm not scared of no bitch. I done killed one bitch. I'll kill another.” (The first two sentences were accurate, but the last sentence was not supported by evidence.) Harmless error, however: “The improper statement, consisting of one sentence, was interrupted by defense counsel's prompt objection, and the trial court immediately observed that the ‘jury w[ould] remember the evidence.’ The defense raised no additional objection and obtained no additional ruling. Defense counsel reminded the jury during closing argument that the deputy had testified that he considered Arrington's comments ‘tough-talking’ and did not take them seriously and that Arrington had assured the deputies that he would not go back to the victim's home, because he had no intention of returning to prison. Defense counsel also pointed out that the officers did not consider Arrington much of a threat, because they did not even write a report about his remarks until eight months later. Furthermore, the trial court charged the jury fully as to what constituted evidence, including instructing them that evidence did not include the attorneys' opening statements or closing arguments.” 2. “The prosecutor's remark that Arrington hoped that the jury would not apply the law was permissible as a reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence, because Arrington acknowledged on cross-examination that he had argued with the victim close to the time of her death, that he had made derogatory remarks about her to the police, that his bloody fingerprint and bloody boot prints were in her apartment because he had been there and had walked around her dead body, that he did not have an alibi defense, and that the State had presented ‘pretty much a carbon copy’ of the facts in this case as in his wife's killing for which he had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. See Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730, 738-739(7) (571 S.E.2d 788) (2002).” 3. Prosecutor’s argument that defendant’s conviction “would say enough to this dual killer,” was not improper, as evidence of defendant’s prior manslaughter conviction was in the record. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 676 S.E.2d 215 (April 28, 2009). Malice murder convictio affirmed. Prosecutor’s closing argument, claiming that defense counsel had tried to keep testimony away from the jury, was not an improper inference from evidence before the jury. Letters between attorneys and investigator, asserting attorney-client privilege, were in evidence. “‘“(T)his Court has long held that the permissible range of argument during final summation is very wide.” [Cit.] ... “[Moreover,] it is permissible for counsel to draw deductions from the evidence regardless of how illogical or unreasonable.” [Cit.]’ Perry v. State, 232 Ga.App. 484, 487(2)(c), 500 S.E.2d 923 (1998).” Wingfield v. State, 297 Ga.App. 476, 677 S.E.2d 704 (April 13, 2009). Evidence supported prosecutor’s argument that defendant “was ‘in the business of dealing drugs.’” “Here, the evidence presented to the jury was that Wingfield possessed a trafficking amount of cocaine [fn] and over $2,000 in cash in his pocket.”