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Alexander v. State, 285 Ga. 9, 673 S.E.2d 208 (February 9, 2009). Trial court properly prohibited “defense counsel from arguing that the State possessed taped interviews of Alexander and his wife that had not been introduced into evidence,” where “there was no evidence to suggest that a recorded statement even existed.” “[T]he undisputed testimony at trial indicated that no recording was made of Alexander's statement due to a malfunctioning tape recorder. Thus, there could be no basis for commenting on the alleged existence of this statement.” Crane v. State, 294 Ga.App. 321, 671 S.E.2d 123 (October 31, 2008). “Counsel's failure to object when the state described Crane as a ‘predator’ during its opening statement did not constitute deficient performance. Given that the state introduced evidence at trial that Crane was involved in a series of armed robberies against pedestrians, the state's use of this figurative speech in its opening statement was not beyond the permissible latitude afforded counsel.” Dingler v. State, 293 Ga.App. 27, 666 S.E.2d 441 (July 24, 2008). No error where trial court prohibited counsel, in closing argument, from revealing facts not in evidence – here, terms of witness’s plea bargain, prohibiting her from testifying in favor of defendant. Osborne v. State, 291 Ga.App. 711, 662 S.E.2d 792 (May 29, 2008). At defendant’s trial for rape and child molestation, no error where prosecutor was allowed to comment in closing argument on “testimony given by the child that she sometimes slept in the bed with her father, Osborne, because she was afraid of the dark, and ‘there were monsters in my closet.’ The prosecutor then argued that the real monster was Osborne.” Griffin v. State, 291 Ga.App. 657, 662 S.E.2d 767 (May 23, 2008). Trial court should have sustained defense objection to prosecutor’s closing argument that “If the car you drove here today is stolen by some car thief and [defense counsel] represents the car thief, he would argue that it didn’t happen.” Citing Estep v. State , 129 Ga.App. 909, 915 (8), 201 (S.E.2d 809 (1973), “where we found reversible error in the prosecutor’s argument that defense counsel ‘knows he doesn’t have any merits on this case and he is just trying to confuse you. We held that ‘it is ... wrong for the prosecuting attorney representing the majesty of the state to comment that opposing counsel knows the defendant to be guilty or knows his client’s case is not meritorious.’” Harmless error, however. Accord, Warner v. State, 299 Ga.App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (June 12, 2009) (prosecutor’s argument that defense counsel’s “only allegiance is to his client and the only thing that's in this case was money in order to come up here and spend as much smoke and as enough distraction from the evidence in the case” was improper but objection was waived when not made until conclusion of argument); compare Rush (January 21, 2014), above. Hernandez v. State, 291 Ga.App. 562, 662 S.E.2d 325 (May 19, 2008). “The prosecution’s argument was improper to the extent that he inferred that Hispanics were responsible for ‘the big [drug] cases,” but waived by failure to object. Cantrell v. State, 290 Ga.App. 651, 660 S.E.2d 468 (March 31, 2008). Counsel’s performance was deficient for failure to object to improper argument from prosecutor. Arguing that jurors should find the police officer witnesses credible, counsel made extended reference to the recent funeral of a local officer, killed in the line of duty. “It was the injection of extrinsic prejudicial matters which is the issue here, and trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing constituted deficient representation. Rather than arguing the issue of police credibility, the prosecutor showcased his attendance at the funeral of an officer killed in the line of duty – a tragic and emotionally charged event that had no relation to the evidence admitted or the case at hand. Under these circumstances, the argument was improper and trial counsel was deficient.” Defense counsel expressed no strategic reason for failure to object, and acknowledged at motion for new trial hearing that he should have objected. “The wide range of discussion permitted in closing argument … ‘does have its limitations, the first and foremost of which is the longstanding prohibition against the injection into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial matters which have no basis in the evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bell v. State, 263 Ga. 776, 777 (439 S.E.2d 480) (1994).” No prejudice shown, however, given overwhelming evidence of guilt. Three judges concur/dissent, would find prejudice based on conflicts in evidence and prior hung jury on same charge. Dissent (Barnes): “the prosecutor clearly did not consider the evidence against Cantrell so overwhelming that he should forego what he admittedly knew was an improper argument likely to inflame the passions of the jury. Such intentional misconduct should not be rewarded.” Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298, 658 S.E.2d 627 (March 10, 2008). Defense counsel cross-examined state’s witnesses about fact that prosecutor had prepared them lists of questions to expect at trial. In response, prosecutor explained to jury in closing argument that this was his routine during trial preparation. “Adams urges that this improperly put before the jury the statement that there was evidence in the case that was not revealed to the jury. But, the argument did not put forth any