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facts not in evidence, or inform the jury that facts existed in this case outside the record. Rather, the prosecutor was explaining to the jury his regular practice of witness preparation, was doing so after that practice had been made an issue at trial by defense counsel, and thus, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, this argument fell within the wide latitude afforded counsel in closing arguments. See Banks v. State, 281 Ga. 678, 682-683 (4, 5)(642 S.E.2d 679) (2007).” Sumlin v. State, 283 Ga. 264, 658 S.E.2d 596 (March 10, 2008). Prosecutor’s improper comment during closing argument did not require mistrial where “[t]he improper … statement did not address the ultimate issue for the jury and merely sought to rebut the defense theory [on a collateral issue]. … Moreover, the improper evidence presented by the prosecutor was arguably cumulative….” Lipsey v State, 287 Ga.App. 835, 652 S.E.2d 870 (October 15, 2007). No abuse of discretion in limiting closing argument. On State’s motion, trial court ruled that defense counsel could argue the lack of fingerprint evidence generally, but could not argue the failure of officers to obtain fingerprints from the paper or plastic bags in issue, as “evidence had not been presented at trial regarding … the types of surfaces from which fingerprints could be lifted.” “Although the scope of closing argument is broad, it is not unlimited, and the trial court has discretion ‘to determine the range of proper closing argument.’ Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 600, 602(2) (619 S.E.2d 649) (2005). Moreover, closing argument must be ‘derived from evidence properly before the factfinder.’ Id.” Davis v. State, 287 Ga.App. 478, 651 S.E.2d 750 (August 15, 2007). Defense counsel objected to prosecutor’s statement of facts not in evidence during closing arguments. Trial court responded by instructing jury that “‘you will recall what the evidence shows. And arguments, as I said earlier, are the arguments of attorneys. And whatever they’ve stated in the courtroom is not evidence and is not to be considered by you as evidence.’ The corrective action taken by the trial court was sufficient because, in effect, it instructed the jury to disregard the foregoing argument of the prosecutor. ‘[W]here the instruction by the court to the jury to disregard the remarks was full, it ... amount[s] to a rebuke of counsel. [Cits.]’ London v. State, 142 Ga.App. 426, 427(1) (236 S.E.2d 158) (1977).” Cherry v. State, 283 Ga.App. 700, 642 S.E.2d 369 (February 22, 2007). “[T]he prosecutor’s remarks must be considered in their context. ‘[E]ven an improper statement, when taken in context, may not constitute reversible error.’ (Citation omitted.) Sosebee v. State, 190 Ga.App. 746, 747(1) (380 S.E.2d 464) (1989). ‘What is not permitted, however is the injection into the argument of extrinsic, prejudicial matters that have no basis in the evidence.’ (Footnote omitted.) Navarro v. State, 279 Ga.App. at 313(2). But ‘[a] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting for lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hambrick v. State, 278 Ga.App. 768, 772(3) (629 S.E.2d 442) (2006).” Here, argument that child molesting victims should not be “punished” because they weren’t physically injured was not improper . “[The prosecutor] used the phrase ‘the girls should not be punished’ to mean that they should not be disbelieved because they were children or because such other evidence was lacking. We find that these comments did not impermissibly divert the jury from the evidence.” Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 521, 640 S.E.2d 274 (January 22, 2007). “We agree with [defendant] that the prosecuting attorney engaged in improper argument during closing. [fn] The prosecutor’s statement, claiming that [defendant] would have denied being at the crime scene had not crime lab testing revealed the presence of the victim’s blood on [defendant’s] pants, was not an inference reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Harmless error, however, “[b]ecause the improper statement involved speculation about a potential defense [defendant] clearly did not assert at trial, because it consisted of only one sentence spoken simultaneously with defense counsel’s prompt objection, and because the trial court in preliminary instructions before closing told the jury that the argument of counsel was not evidence.” Pickett v. State, 277 Ga.App. 316, 626 S.E.2d 508 (January 4, 2006). “Pickett … argues that the trial court erred when it interrupted that portion of counsel’s closing argument concerning the extent of injury to the child’s vagina. Specifically, Pickett asserts that he had the right to characterize medical testimony as suggesting that the injuries suffered were inconsistent with full penetration. We disagree. As the trial court pointed out during the cross-examination of the physician and repeated in its admonition during closing argument, the crime of aggravated child molestation does not distinguish between degrees of vaginal injury. See OCGA § 16-6-4(c) (defining aggravated child molestation as commission of act which ‘physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy’). The physician testified that the victim’s hymen was narrow, indicating that it had been torn as a result of penetration. The court therefore did not err when it admonished counsel not to suggest that the penetration or the resulting injury had been insignificant. See OCGA § 17-8-